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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The financial and economic crisis resulted in severe challenges for public finances in many EU Member 
States. Tax revenue, which had been boosted during the boom years by tax-rich growth and rising asset 
prices, plummeted as a consequence of the automatic stabilisers inherent in the tax system, a reversal of 
the revenue windfalls from asset prices and the discretionary measures taken in support of domestic 
demand. Against this background, the report analyses tax revenue developments and recent tax reforms in 
EU Member States. It looks at tax policy issues related to the crisis and how reforms of the tax system 
could contribute to bringing public finances back on a sustainable path in a growth-friendly way, 
including the role tax coordination in the EU might play in this context.  
Despite a general trend of cuts in tax rates in recent years, the EU remains on average a high-tax area. 
While tax ratios differ widely across Member States, a convergence process can be observed over time. 
The crisis has not only impacted on the level of tax revenue but also on its composition. In the period 
from 2007 to 2010, the tax composition in terms of the type of tax levied shifted towards social security 
contributions and away from direct taxes as the revenue from the latter has been most affected by the 
crisis. In a longer-term perspective, the share of the three main tax categories (direct taxes, indirect taxes 
and social security contributions) has, however, remained relatively stable with each one contributing 
around one third to overall tax revenues. At the same time, differences in tax composition across 
countries remain large.  
Tax policies have played an important role in countering the financial and economic crisis. Policy 
responses varied markedly between Member States, mirroring to a large extent the evolution of macro-
economic and financial conditions. Discretionary budgetary measures necessary to support the ailing 
financial sector and temporarily bolster aggregate demand clearly dominated the later part of 2008 and 
2009. After the strong fiscal boost in 2009, in the aggregate, fiscal policy is expected to remain growth 
supportive in 2010. However, in some Member States fiscal stimulus ended due to the lack of fiscal space 
and the emergence of macro-economic vulnerabilities. Tax reforms enacted during this period have been 
broadly in line with recent trends in tax policy. In particular, measures to support labour supply via a 
reduction in personal income taxes have contributed to a reduction in the share of direct tax revenues. The 
tax burden on labour, as measured by the tax wedge, has gone down in almost all Member States in the 
recent past, especially for low income workers. Meanwhile, the quest for higher revenues to curb budget 
deficits has typically resulted in increases in indirect taxes. 
There is wide consensus that the crisis was primarily triggered by factors that are outside the domain of 
taxation. Nevertheless, specific elements of the tax systems could have contributed to the crisis in some 
countries. In particular, current corporate tax systems in the EU favour debt-financing over equity-
financing. This could lead to a higher leverage for firms, especially during an economic boom, and to 
liquidity constraints once the economy turns. The report discusses two different ways to overcome this 
bias: an allowance for corporate equity, i.e. granting of a deduction for the return on equity, or 
disallowing the deduction of interest payments on debt (comprehensive business income tax). A 
combination of these two measures could mitigate the bias from both directions and could a-priori be 
designed revenue-neutral. The analysis also shows that tax incentives may have played a role in the 
development of the housing bubble. The main options in order to reduce a potential bias of the tax system 
in favour of investment in housing are the taxation of imputed rents and/or the reduction or abolition of 
mortgage interest deductibility. Higher property taxes would be partly equivalent to the taxation of 
imputed rents and could be the source of stable additional tax revenue though this may require improved 
valuation systems in order to create a reliable tax base. 
 
Taxation also contributed to countering the crisis via the automatic stabilisers inherent in the tax system. 
The size of the automatic stabilisers is primarily related to the overall tax-to-GDP ratio. While, 
theoretically, tax progression and the tax mix also play a role, available evidence indicates that changes in 
these elements cannot be expected to lead to substantial increases in demand stabilisation. Moreover, 
reforms that have the potential for increasing the automatic stabilisation function of the tax system would 
have to be carefully assessed against the aim of growth-friendly tax systems. The analysis also shows that 
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personal income taxation has a bigger potential as an automatic stabiliser than the corporate income tax, 
with indirect taxes only playing a marginal role. 
A key question emerging from the recent crisis is the extent to which the financial sector is providing a 
fair contribution to the repayment of the cost of the crisis. There is a theoretical case for the existence of 
economic rents in the financial sector, which results from the sector's specific role in the economy and the 
implicit state guarantee. A possible way to capture these rents would be by means of a Financial 
Activities Tax that takes the sum of profit and remunerations as taxable base, therefore mimicking value-
added. To the extent that these rents are captured by managers via bonuses and specific executive 
compensation schemes, a tax on bonuses might also be considered. Such a tax could also contribute to 
reducing short-termism induced by those performance-related compensation schemes. A Financial 
Transaction Tax, which is also discussed in the report, would aim in the same direction as the above 
proposals with the broad objective to stabilise financial markets by reducing speculative and technical 
trading while raising significant revenue. The report also briefly refers to the proposals for a bank levy in 
the context of bank resolution frameworks. 
An important question in the current debate is whether it is possible to change the tax system such that it 
yields additional tax revenue, thereby contributing to the forthcoming consolidation effort needed in 
many countries, while minimising the distortionary effects on growth. The report concludes that in 
general this could be best achieved by shifting the tax structure towards taxes on property and 
consumption and environmental taxes. Revenue increases should preferably be attained by a broadening 
of tax bases, including by cuts in tax expenditures, rather than by increasing tax rates. Moreover, in many 
Member States there is a potential for raising revenue by improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
tax collection and tax administration. Measures to this effect would also be conducive to making the tax 
system more equitable.   
The shift in the tax structure has been rather modest in recent years in most Member States. This might 
partly be due to the distributional effects of potential tax shifts and political economy reasons. Some 
reforms may also have been held back by a lack of coordination at the EU level since cross-border spill-
over effects may constrain the taxing capacity of an individual Member State. Moreover, the high 
integration of the economies of the European Union is not without consequences for the potential 
economic effects of tax reforms. Carried out individually, some tax reforms may entail a risk for the 
proper functioning of the Single Market. Thus tax coordination in some specific areas would be a 
prerequisite for reaping the full benefits of the Single Market. But progress in the past years has been 
slow and it remains to be seen whether national fiscal exit strategies in a post-crisis economic and 
budgetary environment provide new impetus.  
The report "A new strategy for the single Market – At the service of Europe's Economy and Society" by 
former Commissioner Mario Monti points to the most important areas where tax coordination should be 
reinvigorated: (i) corporate taxation, with a wider examination of the effects of harmful regimes, 
mismatches and other negative effects of tax competition, and the work towards the definition of a 
common base; (ii) consumption taxation, particularly VAT; and (iii) environmental taxation, the latter 
being likely to play a key role in the near future. These are the areas where reforms would benefit most 
from coordination at EU level because either they target mobile tax bases or affect in an asymmetric way 
the competitiveness of companies. Coordination of tax reforms could also be instrumental in reducing 
compliance costs for citizens and enterprises and reducing the occurrence of double taxation.  
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In 2009, the first edition of the report 'Monitoring 
revenue trends and tax reforms in Member States' 
was published. The report was drawn up in 
response to the request by the 5 June 2007 
ECOFIN Council 'for Member States to exchange 
information on current and planned tax reforms 
and their impact on growth and employment within 
existing procedures'.  
Based on the mandate of the ECOFIN Council, the 
present report reviews recent developments of the 
revenue side of government budgets with a view to 
providing a basis for informed policy choices 
aimed at improving the quality of public finances 
in the EU. In line with last year's edition, the 2010 
report presents a succinct analysis of tax revenue 
trends and an overview of recent major tax 
reforms, as well as a discussion of selected topical 
tax policy issues. 
The report is prepared jointly by DG ECFIN and 
DG TAXUD of the European Commission. It 
builds on a substantial body of work carried out by 
the Commission services, including assessments of 
the budgetary implications of tax reforms, analyses 
on the key role of revenue systems for the 
sustainability of public finances and studies 
considering their effects on employment, growth 
and equity and their contribution to the 
achievement of environmental policy 
objectives. (1) Rather than aiming at a 
comprehensive overview of the structure of 
revenue systems in the EU (2), the present report 
focuses more on specific aspects and recent 
developments that are relevant for growth and 
employment.  
A particular focus of this year's edition is the 
consequences of the global economic and financial 
crisis on revenue systems and the need to provide 
adequate policy responses. Public finances have 
deteriorated substantially in the wake of the crisis 
due to massive and unprecedented fiscal 
interventions and fiscal stimulus packages, aimed 
at supporting the financial sector and aggregate 
(1) See, e.g., European Commission (2008a, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010d, 2010e) and Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme (2009). 
(2) With the annual report 'Taxation Trends in the European 
Union prepared by DG TAXUD and Eurostat (cf. European 
Commission (2010a)) a comprehensive overview of the 
level and structure of taxation is available on a yearly 
basis.  
demand, in conjunction with the operation of the 
automatic stabilisers. According to the 
Commission services' spring 2010 economic 
forecast, the EU-wide general government 
headline deficit is expected to reach 7.2% in 2010 
and 6.5% in 2011, up from 0.8% in 2007; the debt 
level is forecasted to increase from 58.8% in 2007 
to 83.8% in 2011. In view of this dramatic 
deterioration of government finances, EU Finance 
Ministers agreed at their meeting on 20 October 
2009 on the need for a co-ordinated and 
comprehensive approach on exit strategies. 
Starting in 2011 at the latest, annual consolidation 
efforts in most Member States will have to be well 
above the 0.5% of GDP per annum benchmark in 
structural terms stipulated in the Pact. Meanwhile, 
for some countries, fiscal consolidation will have 
to start well ahead of that date.  
In view of the sizeable consolidation requirements, 
many countries will not be able to achieve this 
solely by expenditure restraint; hence a 
contribution from the revenue side will also be 
needed. This does not necessarily or exclusively 
mean increasing tax rates, but also reviewing "tax 
expenditure" (e.g. a broadening of tax bases) and 
improving the efficiency of tax collection and 
administration (e.g. combating tax fraud and 
evasion, administrative cooperation between tax 
authorities, etc.). Whatever choices are made, it 
will be important to devise the right strategies so 
as to avoid stifling the nascent recovery and to 
prevent harmful consequences for competitiveness. 
Moreover, in order to avoid cross-country spill-
over effects undermining national policy strategies, 
enhanced coordination of tax policies will be an 
important element for a successful consolidation 
strategy.  
The report pursues several objectives. First, it 
identifies the way in which European revenue 
systems are evolving and the related fiscal, 
economic, and social challenges that policy makers 
are facing in their pursuit of improved revenue 
systems. Second, it looks at various tax reforms 
that have been enacted or are being considered in 
the Member States. Finally, it reviews various 
policy options that are presently considered in the 
policy debate, such as the taxation of profits in the 
financial sector via a financial activity tax.  
European Commission 
Monitoring tax revenues and tax reforms in EU Member States 
The report aims further to contribute to enhanced 
communication and exchange of best practice 
among Member States on tax reforms and to 
encourage an intensified debate on the role of 
improved revenue systems for growth, 
employment and equity. Better communication can 
reveal common challenges and may suggest ways 
for Member States to coordinate their actions to 
achieve better outcomes for all. An intensified 
discussion of tax reforms will also raise the 
awareness of potential spill-over effects of 
particular tax policies of one Member State on 
others. 
The report may also play a role in advancing the 
reduction of differences among revenue systems in 
the EU where this is appropriate. Making tax and 
social security regulations increasingly compatible 
across Member States reduces compliance costs 
for firms and citizens, thereby encouraging cross-
border activities by firms and worker mobility 
within the EU. As highlighted in the May 2010 
report of former Commissioner Mario Monti (3), 
increased coordination of revenue system design, 
convergence towards more compatible tax policies 
and eliminating tax barriers can reduce tax-induced 
distortions of the internal market and thus 
contribute to raise the efficiency of European 
factor and product markets.  
Respecting the inter-temporal government budget 
constraint implies that, in the long run, the level of 
government revenue is largely determined by the 
level of government expenditure. However, 
revenue systems are much more than the pure 
budgetary counterpart of government spending 
since they have important implications in terms of 
the allocation of economic resources. They impact 
on key economic decisions, such as physical and 
human capital investments, labour supply and 
labour demand, the decisions to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity and to start up a business, 
innovation decisions, and many others. Taxes also 
redistribute economic resources between economic 
agents. These effects at the micro-level translate 
into the aggregate, so that the design of revenue 
systems substantially impacts on macroeconomic 
outcomes in terms of employment, growth and 
equity. Therefore, the proper design of revenue 
systems represents a key determinant of a strong 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(3) See Monti (2010). 
employment and growth performance while 
ensuring fairness and social equity. 
From a policy perspective, improving the structure 
of revenue systems has a key role to play for the 
successful implementation of the Europe 2020 
strategy, in particular in the context of activating 
employment policies and in the promotion of 
investment and innovation. As highlighted by the 
strategy, particular attention should be given to the 
quality of the revenue/tax systems. Where taxes 
may have to rise, this should, where possible, be 
done in conjunction with measures to make the tax 
systems more employment, environment and 
growth-friendly, for example by shifting the tax 
burden to environmentally harmful activities. 
The importance of sound revenue systems is also 
reflected in the movement towards including tax 
reforms more closely in the monitoring of the 
implementation of structural reform efforts by 
Member States. The Commission is currently 
establishing a new database (TAXREF) on tax 
reforms in the Member States. (4)  This database 
will complement the databases on labour market 
(LABREF) and product market reforms 
(MICREF), which contain comprehensive 
overviews of Member States' reform efforts in key 
structural reform areas. The TAXREF database 
will similarly allow Member States and the 
Commission to track better tax reforms to assess 
progress in making European revenue systems 
more supportive of employment and growth. 
The recent economic crisis also offers an 
opportunity to rethink tax systems and to restate 
the objectives of taxation, taking into account the 
potential impact on the fairness of tax systems. 
Given the high policy relevance of revenue 
systems, policy makers need sound advice 
regarding the direction of reform. To define this 
direction, it is important to consider the various 
shortcomings of current systems and assess the 
available alternatives using an appropriate set of 
criteria for sound revenue systems. While there is 
no consensus in the literature, some observers have 
singled out high levels of taxation as a key reason 
for low employment levels and unsatisfactory 
(4) The TAXREF database will be managed by the European 
Commission (DG TAXUD) and build on the existing 
'Taxes in Europe' database and the information provided by 
Member States in the context of the Working Group 
"Structures of the Taxation Systems". 
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economic performance in the EU. High income 
taxes can discourage labour supply and demand, 
and reduce investment incentives. However, some 
EU Member States have been able to combine 
relatively elevated levels of taxation with a strong 
economic performance and low unemployment. 
This indicates that the determination of the optimal 
aggregate level of taxation is not straightforward 
and may be of secondary importance. Rather, this 
highlights the relevance of the optimal structure 
and design of the tax system for a given level of 
revenues, along with the structure and cost-
efficiency of public spending. Thus, there is great 
potential in tax reforms that improve the structure 
of the tax system. Such reforms need to address 
issues related to the optimal tax composition, but 
also the details of the tax schedule (in particular 
regarding tax progressivity) and the interaction of 
taxes with the benefit system. Moreover, since 
revenue-neutral tax reforms do not, in principle, 
require adjustments on the expenditure side, such 
reforms may be easier to implement politically 
than measures that aim to reduce the overall level 
of expenditures and taxation.  
An optimal revenue system should fulfil several 
criteria. In particular, it should be efficient, 
ensuring growth, a desired distribution of income, 
and the necessary public funds for spending on 
publicly provided goods with minimal 
distortions. (5) It should avoid excessive negative 
incentive effects for employment, investment, and 
innovation, and it should properly internalise 
social costs and benefits of, e.g., research and 
development, human capital formation and 
polluting activities. An optimal tax system should 
also be fair in order to be accepted by citizens and 
move the economy towards a desired distribution 
of income. Furthermore, it should be simple and 
transparent and minimise incentives and 
opportunities for tax avoidance, evasion and fraud. 
Finally, it should have low administrative demands 
and low compliance costs. 
Such criteria for sound revenue systems make it 
possible to consider the current state of revenue 
systems in the EU and to assess whether ongoing 
(5) This is in fact the key question in the literature on optimal 
taxation: How can the government maximise the welfare of 
its citizens subject to the requirement of raising a given 
amount of tax revenue to provide public goods and services 
or to redistribute income subject to technical and 
informational constraints? 
tax reforms are moving European tax systems 
closer towards such optimal revenue systems and 
what kind of reforms may be appropriate to better 
achieve these objectives. 
In view of the above-mentioned criteria for sound 
revenue systems, more attention ought to be given 
also to the various aspects of an appropriate 
management of tax systems. According to some 
estimates, in many Member States there seems to 
be a significant potential to raise tax revenue by 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of tax 
administration and tax collection. In some 
countries, tax compliance could also be increased 
by making the tax code simpler and more 
transparent. Measures to this effect would also be 
conducive to making the tax system more 
equitable. While a more in-depth discussion of 
these issues is beyond the scope of the present 
report, there is a clear case for raising these aspects 
of tax systems in the policy debate.  
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the level, structure and trends of taxation 
in the EU. Section 3 discusses common 
developments in European revenue systems in the 
aftermath of the global economic and financial 
crisis. After a general overview of the role of 
revenue side policies in addressing the challenges 
posed by the crisis, it outlines the major tax 
reforms carried out by Member States over the past 
two years. A particular focus is on the impact of 
changes in the tax and benefit systems on labour 
supply and demand. Section 4 discusses several tax 
policy issues that have recently become highly 
topical, given their relation to the financial and 
economic crisis. It analyses how far taxation has 
contributed to the crisis and the role of taxation as 
an automatic stabiliser in the crisis. Reflecting the 
ongoing debate on how to recover the cost of 
direct financial support to the banking sector, the 
section finally discusses possibilities for the 
taxation of profits in the financial sector. Section 5 
looks at the link between taxation and growth, 
particularly in regard to the tax dimension of the 
single market and the potential benefits of EU-
wide coordination of tax policies in certain areas. 
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2.1. TAX STRUCTURES AND RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
This section provides an overview of the structure 
of revenue systems in the EU and their evolution 
over time, thereby setting the stage for the 
discussion of key developments in the following 
sections. While it draws on the more detailed 
findings presented in the Commission's annual 
report on "Taxation trends in the European union" 
(see European Commission 2010a) for 1995-2008, 
it also sheds light on more recent developments in 
2009 and 2010. (6) In particular, the section looks 
into the level and trend of both total taxes and their 
decomposition (by type of tax and economic 
function), including an investigation of 
convergence/divergence across Member States. 
2.1.1. Level and long-term development of 
the overall tax burden 
The overall tax burden in the European Union, 
measured by total taxes (including social security 
contributions) as a percentage of GDP, is relatively 
high by international standards (see Graph 2.1). In 
2008, the overall tax-to-GDP ratio in the EU 
amounted to 39.3% (7), more than one third higher 
than the levels recorded in the United States and 
Japan, and 3½ percentage points higher than the 
arithmetic OECD average (including 19 EU 
countries).(8)  
Tax ratios differ widely in the EU … 
There are, however, wide differences in tax levels 
across the Union. There are two groups of high-tax 
countries, the Nordic countries (i.e. Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland), and a cluster of five 
Member States, namely Belgium, Austria, Italy, 
France and Hungary, all of which had a tax ratio in 
excess of 40% of GDP in 2008. Neighbouring 
Germany and the Netherlands are just below this 
level at 39.3% and 39.1% of GDP respectively. 
                                                          (6) Information from DG ECFIN's Ameco database – adjusted 
for differences in the definition of the tax indicators – is 
used to extrapolate the time series published in European 
Commission (2010a) for the years 2009 and 2010. 
(7) Unless stated otherwise, averages quoted in the report are 
GDP-weighted. 
(8) See OECD (2009). 
With the exception of Cyprus, the geographically 
more peripheral countries tend to show lower tax 
ratios, particularly in Eastern Europe. 
The differences reflect, on the one hand, political 
choices such as public or private provision of 
services, e.g. in the area of old-age and health risk 
protection. On the other hand, technical factors 
play a role: some Member States provide social or 
economic assistance via tax reductions rather than 
direct government spending, while social transfers 
are exempted from taxes and social contributions 
in some Member States but not in others; these 
factors thus affect the measured tax-to-GDP ratios 
without reflecting differences in the underlying tax 
burden.  
Historically, the variation of tax ratios in the Union 
has been determined by two factors. First, the 
dispersion of tax ratios across countries has usually 
increased on the occasion of each enlargement. 
With the exception of the 1973 enlargement, the 
inclusion of new Member States has led to a 
significant rise in the dispersion of tax ratios as 
measured by the coefficient of variation (Graph 
2.2).(9) A remarkable jump in this dispersion 
occurred in 1981 with the entry of Greece, which 
had a tax ratio of less than one third of the average 
rate of the incumbent Member States, but also in 
1986 with the entry of Spain and Portugal, where 
tax rates were around ten percentage points below 
the previous average. Similarly, as a result of the 
generally low tax ratios in the twelve recently 
acceded Member States, the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements again raised the dispersion across the 
Member States. (10) Second, however, there has 
been a general trend of convergence of tax ratios 
over time for any given composition of the Union, 
with new entrants often adjusting their tax ratios 
rather quickly towards the mean. Since 2004, for 
instance, tax ratios have risen in most of the twelve 
new Member States. This, together with the 
expansion of the euro area to a growing number of 
new Member States, has largely eliminated the 
positive gap of the tax ratio in the euro area as 
(9) The coefficient of variation is a normalised dispersion 
measure. It is computed as the standard deviation divided 
by the mean (both unweighted). 
(10) The total tax-to-GDP ratio in the new Member States was 
six percentage points lower than the average of the former 
EU15 in 2008. 
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Graph 2.1: Overall tax-to-GDP ratio (incl. SSC) in the EU, US and Japan- 2008, in% 
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compared to the EU as a whole (37.6% vs. 37.0% 
of GDP in 2008). 
…but converge over time  
The small window in Graph 2.2 testifies the trend 
towards a convergence of tax ratios for the current 
EU27 Member States since 1995. (11) The 
dispersion of tax burdens diminished rather 
steadily between 1996 and 2007. In 2008 and 
2009, it picked up as a consequence of the uneven 
impact of the economic and financial crisis on tax 
revenues. While in countries with important 
housing bubbles, such as Spain and Ireland, the tax 
ratio started to fall markedly already from 2008, in 
other countries, such as Germany and Austria, tax 
ratios stabilised or even rose. With the effects of 
the crisis on tax revenues gradually abating, the 
dispersion of tax burdens is projected to decrease 
again in 2010.   
 
                                                          
High tax levels as a legacy of tax hikes in the 
1970s to early 1990s 
The high tax-to-GDP ratios in the EU, particularly 
in the former EU15, are to a large extent the result 
of the persistent upward trend in the tax burden in 
the 1970s, and to a lesser extent also in the 1980s                                                           
(11) Missing values for Bulgaria at the beginning of the series 
are substituted by the first available data point (1998). 
and early 1990s (see Graph 2.3) (12). This long-run 
increase in the overall tax burden was the result of 
the growing share of the public sector in the 
economy in those years, as taxes and social 
contributions were raised in order to finance 
increasing government spending; labour taxes, in 
particular, increased steadily in order to finance 
expenditure on the welfare state, including a 
persistent rise in expenditure on unemployment 
benefits as a result of the secular rise in 
unemployment rates.  
From the early 1990s, the Maastricht Treaty and 
subsequently the Stability and Growth Pact 
resulted in the set-up of a multilateral budgetary 
surveillance framework committing Member 
States to undertake fiscal consolidation efforts. For 
a number of Member States, the fiscal 
consolidation effort needed in the run-up to the 
EMU ruled out any major tax cuts. In the late 
1990s, several countries started to take advantage 
of their improved budgetary position to reduce the 
tax burden through cuts in personal income tax, 
social contributions and also in corporate income 
tax. However, the overall tax ratio decreased only 
from 2000, as the economic boom of the late 1990s  
(12) European Commission (2000) reports a long-run increase 
of 11 percentage points in the euro area between 1970 and 
1999, compared with a relatively small increase of 2.5% of 
GDP recorded in the United States. Similar differences are 
reported in OECD (2002a). 
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Graph 2.2: Dispersion (coefficient of variation) of total taxes,% of GDP 
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boosted the measured overall tax burden despite 
substantial cuts in statutory tax rates. Following a 
decrease in the first half of this decade, the tax 
burden increased again in the years between 2005 
and 2007. In 2008, the economic and financial 
crisis started to drive down tax revenues, even 
though the bulk of the effect came through only in 
2009, when the tax burden fell by more than one 
percentage point. On current projections, it will 
continue to decrease in 2010.   
Tax ratios show pro-cyclical behaviour 
It is evident from the above that, in the short term, 
tax ratios are affected by cyclical developments, 
with tax ratios normally buoyed during cyclical 
upswings while cyclical downswings have a 
dampening effect on tax ratios. In gauging 
developments over past years, it is therefore 
important to disentangle the changes in the overall 
tax-to-GDP ratio that are due to the impact of the 
cycle from those that reflect policy change. In 
order to abstract from the impact of the business 
cycle on tax revenues one can compare revenues in 
similar stages of the cycle. Given the 
unprecedented and atypical sharpness of the output 
loss and its exceptional impact on tax revenue in 
2009, it seems preferable to look at the situation in 
 
2008, i.e. the year after the peak of the current 
business cycle in 2007 and before the 2009 slump. 
A comparable reference year would be 2001, 
which is the year following the peak of the 
previous business cycle. Compared to that year, 
the tax-to-GDP ratio in the EU was only slightly 
lower in 2008, by around ¼ of a percentage point. 
In thirteen countries, the overall tax ratio actually 
increased, in some of them by significant amounts. 
The increase in Cyprus stands out for its size 
(almost 8% of GDP, more than half of which in 
2007 alone), while another large increase, by more 
than 4% of GDP, took place in Malta. Relatively 
large increases, amounting to more than 2% of 
GDP, were also seen in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Portugal and Poland. 
While Spain saw a significant increase in revenues 
until 2007, this was more than reversed by the 
steep drop in 2008, amounting to 4% of GDP. 
Among the countries that reduced the tax burden 
over the period 2001-2008, the most remarkable 
cases are Luxembourg and Slovakia, where the tax 
burden fell by around 4 percentage points. In the 
case of Slovakia, this happened after the overall 
tax ratio had already been cut by more than seven 
percentage points from 1995 to 2001. The tax 
burden was also significantly reduced in Austria 
and Sweden, by around 2½% of GDP.  
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Graph 2.3: Long-term trends in the overall tax ratio (including 
SSC)% of GDP 
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Convergence trend confirmed 
Graph 2.4 displays the change in the tax-to-GDP 
ratio between 2001 and 2008 in percentage points 
of GDP against the prevailing tax ratio in 2001. 
The purpose of the graph is to show the extent to 
which countries starting with a higher-than-
average (lower-than-average) tax ratio tend to 
reduce (increase) it over time. The top half of the 
graph shows Member States for which the overall 
tax ratio increased since 2001, while the bottom 
half shows those for which it decreased. The right-
left dimension of the graph identifies the starting 
point just after the peak of the previous cycle in 
2001; that is, countries that displayed a higher-
than-average tax ratio in 2001 are on the right 
while countries that displayed a lower-than-
average tax ratio are on the left. The graph shows a 
majority of countries in the upper/left and 
lower/right quadrant, indicating that over time 
there is a tendency for tax ratios to convergence 
towards the mean. This supports the results already 
derived with the help of the dispersion measure. 
Revenue decline during the crisis largely 
driven by stimulus measures… 
The decline in tax ratios became more pronounced 
in 2009 under the impact of the crisis. This was 
due to two factors. Firstly, many countries adopted 
significant fiscal stimulus packages under the 
European Economic Recovery Plan, in the form of 
both expenditure increases and tax cuts to support 
household's purchasing power and relieve 
enterprises. The revenue-based stimulus measures 
were around ¾% of GDP in 2009 and 2010.   
Graph 2.4: Level in 2001 and change of tax-to-GDP ratio until 
2008 in% 
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Secondly, the declining tax ratio mirrors a more 
than proportional fall in certain tax categories, 
particularly in property taxes, in response to the 
sharp drop in economic activity, thereby reversing 
the windfall revenues collected during the 
preceding boom years.  
…but contained when compared to 
expenditure boost 
In terms of its contribution to the change in budget 
balance, government revenue is however paled by 
expenditure (Graph 2.5).(13) With the exception of 
Hungary, the expenditure ratio increased more or 
less sharply in all Member States, adding up to an 
increase of 4% of GDP for the EU as a whole. By 
contrast, the aggregate revenue ratio fell by a 
moderate 0.8% of GDP. There are marked 
differences at the country level, with some 
countries seeing relatively sharp drops (e.g. the 
Nordic Member States, Cyprus, UK, Spain, and 
Bulgaria), while seven countries (the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Malta Slovenia, 
Slovakia) even registered an increase compared to 
2008 (as a share of GDP). 
                                                          
(13) The graph is based on general government revenue, which 
is a broader measure than the overall tax and social 
contributions revenue usually utilised in this report. 
However, given that taxes and social contributions 
constitute the bulk of government revenue, the 
development of the two series is similar.  
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Graph 2.5: Contributions to changes in budget balances (2008-2010) 
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2.2. TAX COMPOSITION 
By looking at the components of tax revenues, 
revenue systems across countries can be described 
in more detail. The composition can be considered 
in terms of the type of tax levied, i.e. indirect 
taxes, direct taxes and social security contributions 
(SSCs) (section 2.2.1), or in terms of a 
classification of taxes according to economic 
function, i.e. consumption taxes, taxes on labour 
and capital and environmental taxes (section 
2.2.2). (14) 
2.2.1. Decomposition by type of tax  
The analysis of the ‘tax mix’, i.e. the composition 
of tax revenues, shows that the vast bulk of 
revenue raised in the EU - indeed more than 90 per 
cent - comes from three main sources: indirect 
taxes (VAT, taxes on consumption, production and 
imports, excise duties), direct taxes (current taxes 
(14) There are, of course, potentially other ways to decompose 
tax revenues. The current decomposition follows the one 
applied in European Commission (2010a). 'Annex C: 
Methodology and explanatory notes' of that publication 
gives extensive details on the underlying methodology. The 
data may also be found in electronic format from the 
Eurostat web page and via the following link to the DG 
Taxation and Customs Union homepage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxtrends. 
on income and wealth, capital taxes) and social 
security contributions (SSCs). When considering 
the evolution of tax revenues from these three 
broad categories, it is important to recall that tax 
revenues from different sources are differently 
affected by the business cycle. This complicates 
the interpretation of changes in the importance of 
these tax components over time. Direct taxes are 
most pro-cyclical because of the sensitivity of 
corporate taxes to the business cycle and because 
of the progressive nature of personal income tax 
(PIT) schemes. SSCs, which are closely related to 
the aggregate wage bill, tend to be less responsive 
to the cycle, reflecting caps on maximum 
contributions and the relative inertia of the wage 
bill. Therefore, the SSC-to-GDP ratio should 
display some degree of counter-cyclicality. 
Finally, indirect taxes theoretically evolve 
proportionally to output, i.e. the ratio to GDP 
should be relatively stable over the cycle. 
The crisis led to a strong decline in direct and 
indirect taxes  
Graph 2.6 displays the evolution of tax revenues 
from indirect taxes, direct taxes and SSCs in the 
EU from 1995-2010. The significant fall in the 
ratio of indirect taxes to GDP since 2008 greatly 
exceeds its (moderate) previous increase until 
2006/07, in sharp contrast to the symmetric pattern 
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observed in the previous cycle. While this might 
point to negative confidence effects of the current 
crisis, leading to heightened precautionary saving, 
it also reflects discretionary tax cuts in some 
countries. With such measures partly expiring in 
2010 and private consumption to recover slowly, 
the ratio is set to pick up again.  
Graph 2.6: Indirect taxes, direct taxes and SSCs,% of GDP, 
EU27 
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Graph 2.7: Tax composition in 2008, % of total taxes 
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Direct taxes exhibit the expected pronounced 
cyclical pattern. While the fall in 2008 was still 
relatively contained, tax revenue from corporate 
and personal income taxes plunged in 2009 and is 
set to continue to fall this year.  
Apart from a large fall in 1998, which mirrors 
significant reductions due to reforms in two big 
Member States (France and Italy), SSCs as a 
percentage of GDP evolve in a relatively  stable  
manner  over  the  sample period, displaying, as 
expected, a slight counter-cyclical pattern. After a 
gentle downward trend until 2007, which might 
reflect governments' efforts to reduce the tax 
burden on labour, the SSC-to-GDP ratio picked up 
markedly in 2008 and 2009. This can be explained 
by the schemes implemented in many countries to 
shield the labour market from the severe impact of 
the crisis on output, leading to a considerable 
degree of labour-hoarding, and thus robustness of 
the SSCs' tax base. Indeed, the losses in 
employment in 2009 were relatively moderate 
relative to those in output (-1.8% compared to 
-4.2%). However, given the usual time lag of 
employment changes with respect to changes in 
output (15), the SSC-to-GDP ratio is projected to 
decline again in 2010. 
Overall, it is difficult to detect clear-cut longer-
term trends in tax composition at the EU level. 
Table A1.1 in Annex 1 provides a more detailed 
overview of the developments of indirect and 
direct taxes and SSCs since 2000, including a more 
detailed disaggregation of these tax categories. 
                                                          
(15) For more information on the labour market outlook in the 
EU, see European Commission (2010c). 
2. Level, structure and trends of tax revenues in the EU 
Large differences in tax composition across 
countries  
There is substantial variation across Member 
States in the importance of indirect taxes, direct 
taxes and SSCs (Graph 2.7). In 2008, indirect taxes 
accounted for less than 30% in Belgium but for 
over 55% in Bulgaria. The share of direct taxes in 
total taxation varied from around 21% of total 
taxes collected in Bulgaria to over 62% in 
Denmark where the social security system is 
financed out of general tax revenues. Finally, SSCs 
represented only about 2% of total taxation in 
Denmark, and also played only a rather small role 
in Ireland, the UK, and Malta, but made up almost 
45% of the total taxes in the Czech Republic. 
Shift towards SSCs in the course of the crisis  
Graph 2.8 sheds some light on the effects of the 
crisis on tax composition across Member States. In 
line with the developments at aggregate level, 
there is a general tendency for a growing relative 
importance of SSCs at the expense of revenues 
from direct and indirect taxes. This pattern is 
particularly marked for countries with high 
structural adjustment needs following the crisis 
(Lithuania, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, but also 
Cyprus). At the other end of the scale is a group of 
 
three countries (Sweden, Hungary, Czech 
Republic) where the tax composition shifted 
towards a higher contribution from indirect taxes 
during the crisis.  
The dispersion across Member States of tax 
revenues from indirect and direct taxes and SSCs 
has remained relatively stable over the past one 
and a half decades (Graph 2.9). The dispersion of 
direct taxes is the highest. While some 
convergence took place in 2006 and 2007, the 
dispersion measure broadly returned to its average 
level during the crisis. The dispersion of SSCs 
appears to display a slight downward trend, 
although this decline had been levelling off prior to 
the crisis. The reduced dispersion of SSCs 
compared to 1995 might reflect some convergence 
in the financing of social protection across the EU. 
Some Member States that were traditionally 
relying mostly on SSCs to finance social spending 
have introduced several elements of tax financing 
and reduced SSCs. Indirect taxes (as a percentage 
of GDP) are the least dispersed in the EU, 
reflecting the comparably high level of 
harmonisation, e.g. in the form of minimum VAT 
rates. While the late 1990s saw some further 
convergence, revenues from indirect taxes have 
been slowly diverging again since 2000. Pointing 
to the impact of discretionary rate cuts in some  
 
Graph 2.8: Changes in tax composition,% of total taxes, 2007-2010 
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Member States as a response to the crisis, the level 
of dispersion increased further in 2008 and 2009, 
but is set to stabilise this year.  
Graph 2.9: Tax dispersion (coefficient of variation) of indirect 
taxes, direct taxes and SSCs, EU27 
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2.2.2. Decomposition by economic function  
Graph 2.10 ranks Member States by overall tax 
burden and displays a breakdown of revenue by 
economic function - taxes on consumption, labour 
(employed and non-employed) and capital (capital 
and business income and stocks) - for the year 
2008. (16) The graph shows quite a lot of variation 
both in terms of the overall level and in its 
composition. In particular, despite the fact that the 
most important indirect taxes are harmonised at 
EU level, there is substantial variation, even in the 
amount of revenues raised from consumption 
taxes. This is due to the fact that harmonisation 
usually does not directly translate into the setting 
of actual tax rates (e.g. equalising them), but that 
structures and minimum requirements are 
harmonised (e.g. minimum excise duties on 
mineral oils). Greater variation is visible in 
revenues from capital and business income, while 
some smaller revenue sources, such as taxation of 
stocks of capital/wealth and taxation of non-
employed labour (essentially pensions and social 
security benefits) range from the significant to the 
negligible. This primarily reflects the choice made 
in the different Member States to provide social 
benefits and pensions either on a gross or a net 
basis. Overall, the taxes levied on (employed) 
labour income, which are usually withheld at 
source (i.e. personal income tax levied on wages 
and salaries income plus social contributions), 
represent the most prominent source of revenue, 
contributing around 50% to overall receipts on 
average in the EU, followed by consumption at 
over one fourth and capital at over one fifth.  
                                                          
 
Graph 2.10: Total tax burden according to economic function 2008, in % of GDP 
(16) For a discussion of the tax burden by economic function 
see also De Laet and Woehlbier (2008). 
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Graph 2.11: Development of implicit tax rates EU25 average, 
1995-2008, in% 
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The distribution of the overall tax burden by 
economic function has undergone some important 
changes since 2001 (see Table A1.1 in Annex 1), 
and the pattern is rather mixed across Member 
States. Overall in the EU, taxes on capital as a 
percentage of GDP decreased between 2001 and 
2003, before progressively rising to 9.4% by 2007. 
In 2008, the ratio went down to 9.0%. However, 
this masks diverging developments in Member 
States. While almost all Member States (the 
exceptions being Hungary, Malta and Sweden) cut 
top corporate tax rates, some, such as Malta and 
Cyprus, envisaged a considerable increase in 
capital taxes compared to 2001. Compared to 
2001, the contribution of labour and consumption 
taxes in the total has slightly declined; labour taxes 
as a percentage of GDP have increased in eleven 
Member States, while in the remaining 16 Member 
States they contributed to the reduction in overall 
taxation. Despite significant changes in many 
Member States, labour taxes as a percentage of 
GDP are, on average, only slightly below their 
2001 levels. The same is true for consumption 
taxes. The biggest increase in consumption taxes 
occurred in the new Member States, where 
adjustments to EU requirements in these fields, 
such as the minimum tax rate on energy products, 
had to be made.  
Graph 2.11 displays the evolution of the three 
main implicit tax rates (ITR) (17) on consumption, 
                                                          
                                                          (17) The implicit tax rates try to estimate the real tax burden. 
They are computed as the ratio of total tax revenues of the 
category (consumption, labour, and capital) to a proxy of 
the corresponding tax base. 
labour and capital between 1995 and 2008. These 
ITRs are here juxtaposed to highlight four main 
facts: first, implicit tax rates on labour remain 
above those for capital and consumption; second, 
after a declining trend, labour taxation stabilised 
from 2004 onwards; third, effective taxation of 
capital had been on the increase till 2007 despite 
considerable cuts in the top corporate tax rates, 
most likely indicating a base broadening; finally, 
from 2001 on consumption taxation had been 
trending upwards slowly, before falling slightly in 
2008. 
Consumption taxes 
The economic and financial crisis has interrupted 
the broad trend towards higher consumption 
taxation that prevailed in a large number of 
Member States. The EU27 average ITR on 
consumption decreased by 0.5 percentage points 
from 2007 to 2008 to 19.5%. While final 
expenditure of households in the EU increased by 
1.2% from 2007 to 2008, the revenues of 
consumption taxes decreased by 1.3%. In 2008, the 
ITR decreased in 22 EU Member States (see Table 
A1.2 in Annex 1). Some countries experienced 
particularly large decreases in their ITR in 2008: 
Estonia (-2.9 percentage points) and Ireland (-2.7 
percentage points). The lowest ITR on 
consumption throughout the whole Union is 
observed for Spain (14.1%) followed by Greece 
(15.1%), Italy (16.4%), Latvia and Lithuania (both 
17.5%). Among the countries with high 
consumption taxes, Denmark stands out with 
32.4%, four percentage points above the second 
Member State, Sweden, followed by Luxembourg, 
Hungary and the Netherlands. 
The aggregate level of the ITR on consumption 
combines a number of taxes, which are different in 
nature and justification. Thus, a certain level of 
disaggregation is needed to highlight different 
components of the ITR on consumption and their 
share in the composition of the aggregate. The 
approach taken in this report has been to classify 
consumption taxes into three main sub-
components: VAT, energy and excise duties on 
tobacco and alcohol, plus a residual (18) (see Graph 
2.12). Not surprisingly, the VAT component is the 
(18) The residual covers items such as additional duties on 
pollution or transport, local taxes on company sales, etc. Its 
composition is largely country specific.   
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Graph 2.12: Decomposition of the implicit tax rate on consumption, 2008 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
DK SE LU HU NL BG FI SI IE AT BE CZ PL EE CY MT DE FR PT SK RO UK LT LV IT EL ES EU27
VAT Energy Tobacco and alcohol Residual
Note: The ITR on consumption is the ratio between the revenue from all consumption taxes and the final consumption expenditure of households. 
Italian data on tobacco and alcohol include revenue from stamp duties. 
Source: Commission services. 
largest. Nevertheless, the non-VAT component of 
the ITR is far from negligible in all Member 
States.  
Labour taxes 
The tax burden on labour in the European Union 
started to grow strongly in the early 1970s, 
decelerating only slightly in the 1980s and the first 
half of the 1990s. The weighted EU15 average for 
the implicit tax rate on employed labour (ITR on 
labour) increased from about 28% (1970) to almost 
42% (1997). (19) Starting from the late 1990s, 
concerns about excessive labour costs prompted 
initiatives to lower the tax burden on labour 
income, in order to boost demand for labour and 
foster work incentives. Some Member States opted 
for across the board cuts in taxes or social 
contributions, while others focused on targeted 
reductions in social contributions for low-wage 
and unskilled workers. These cuts in social 
contributions were mostly aimed at granting relief 
to employers, although some countries have also 
implemented substantial cuts in employees' social 
contributions. Reforms of personal income taxes 
have varied, including lowering tax rates, raising 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(19) See European Commission (2000). Data for the 1995-2007 
period is based on ESA95 and not fully comparable with 
previous ESA79 data. 
the minimum level of the tax exempt income or 
introducing specific deductions, allowances or 
credits for low-income workers. In 2008, the EU27 
average regained its 2001 level, at 36.5%. Seven 
Member States have ITRs on labour below the 
30% mark and seven are above the 40% threshold 
(see Table A1.2 in Annex 1). 
The pattern of the changes over the period 2000–
2008 is quite diverse across Member States. In 
general, the ten Central and Eastern European 
Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 
2007 show a much stronger decline than the 
arithmetic EU27 average over this time period: the 
average in these Member States went down by 
about 4.4 percentage points since 2000, while the 
arithmetic EU27 average decreased by only 1.6 
percentage points.(20)  
(20) The tax burden on labour is essentially composed of 
personal income taxes and social security contributions. In 
most Member States the personal income tax contains 
several rates. However, a description of the entire rate 
structure goes beyond the scope of this report. The 
interested reader can find a complete description of the rate 
system and the brackets in force in the Member States in 
the 'Taxes in Europe' database on the EU website at the 
following url: http://ec.europa.eu/tedb The database is 
accessible free of charge and updated annually. Table A.1.3 
in Annex 1 contains the top PIT rates (including surcharges 
and local taxes) for the EU Member States. 
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Graph 2.13: Decomposition of the implicit tax rate on labour, 2008 
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Source: Commission services. 
On average, nearly two thirds of the overall ITR on 
labour consists of non-wage labour costs paid by 
both employees and employers (see Graph 2.13). 
Only Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
have a share of personal income taxes in the total 
charges paid on labour income of more than 50%. 
In Denmark, the share of social contributions in 
government receipts is very low, as most welfare 
spending is financed by general taxation. (21) As a 
result, Denmark has only the 11th highest ITR on 
labour in the EU, while the ratio of PIT (as a 
percentage of total labour costs) is, at around 36% 
in 2008, by far the highest of all Member States. In 
some of the Member States, namely Romania, 
Greece and Slovakia, less than 20% of the ITR on 
labour consists of personal income tax. 
Taxes on capital 
 
                                                          
In recent years, growing policy attention has been 
paid to the taxation of capital (22) and in particular 
                                                                                  (
21) A large part of employees' social contributions in Denmark 
comes from an 8% contribution paid on the basis of 
employees' gross earnings. Some studies classify this 
revenue as a SSC, while others report it as a separate type 
of personal income tax. 
(22) Taxes on capital are a complex class that includes a variety 
of taxes paid both by enterprises and households: stamp 
taxes, taxes on financial and capital transaction; car 
registration taxes paid by enterprises; taxes on land and 
buildings; the part of personal income paid on earnings 
from capital, taxes paid on income or profits of 
corporations and taxation of capital transfer such as 
to the level of corporate income taxation. At 9.0% 
of GDP on average for the EU, taxes on capital can 
be split up into those on corporate income (3.1%), 
capital income of self-employed (2.0%), 
households (1.0%) and the stock of capital 
(wealth) (2.8%). Corporate income tax, although 
usually considered the main tax on capital, is not a 
major source of revenue in any of the Member 
States. In 2008, it was less than 4% of GDP in all 
countries but four: Cyprus (7.1%), Malta (6.8%), 
Luxembourg (5.1%), and Czech Republic (4.4%). 
Compared to 2007, the EU-average decreased by 
0.3 percentage points, partly attributable to the 
deterioration of the economic situation in 2008. 
After the inclusion of all other capital taxes, the 
revenue from overall capital taxation reaches more 
than 10% of GDP in some Member States.  
In the European Union, countries moved towards 
lowering CIT rates and in one case (Estonia) even 
abolished the tax on retained earnings altogether. 
Taking local taxes and surcharges into account, the 
 
inheritance taxes. It should be noted that under the 
definition used in this report, taxes raised on self-
employment income are booked as taxes on capital, 
although stricto sensu earnings from self-employment 
include a return to labour as well as to capital. Given this 
complexity, one should be cautious in interpreting the 
available figures as the concept covers many sources of 
revenues that are of a different nature, and are earned by 
different recipients. 
23 
European Commission 
Monitoring tax revenues and tax reforms in EU Member States 
(arithmetic) average of the general corporate tax 
rate in the EU27 was reduced by 12.1 percentage 
points in the period 1995 to 2010 (see Table A1.3 
in Annex 1). This reduction is, however, not a new 
phenomenon, as cuts in corporate tax rates started 
as early as in the 1980s. (23) This policy was 
usually part of a tax-cut-cum-base-widening 
strategy. For example, the scope and scale of 
deductions and exemptions were reduced. Many 
Member States in recent years indeed enlarged the 
corporate tax base via less generous depreciation 
rules and deductions. This trend was also partly 
due to the Code of Conduct for business taxation 
(which has played a role in limiting preferential tax 
regimes) and to the necessity to conform to EU 
rules limiting state aid to enterprises (as some state 
aid is in the form of tax breaks).  
 
                                                          
The ITR on capital for the EU27 increased 
dramatically between 1995 and 2001, before 
showing a three-year decrease and a new rise since 
2003. From 2007 to 2008, the indicator declined 
again (see Graph 2.11). Interestingly, this 
evolution corresponds closely to the one of the 
business cycle. (24) Comparing 2000 and 2008, the 
overall ITR on capital decreased in six Member 
States: Sweden (-15.3 percentage points), Finland 
(-7.9 percentage points), Slovakia (-6.2 percentage 
points), Germany (-5.3 percentage points), the 
Netherlands (-3.7 percentage points), and Austria 
(-0.3 percentage points). The ITR on capital rose 
(25) in all other countries, with some very large 
increases recorded for example in Cyprus (12.9 
percentage points) and Denmark (7.1 percentage 
points) (see Table A1.2 in Annex 1). 
(23) A similar trend towards lower statutory corporate tax rates 
also occurred — albeit less dramatically — in many third 
countries. 
(24) The computation of the entire time series 1995–2008 for 
the ITR on capital is possible only for nine of the NMS-12, 
namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland Slovenia and Slovakia. Partial 
data are available for Bulgaria. 
(25) A more pronounced increase could be observed for the 
overall indicator when using a simplified denominator 
referring to the net operating surplus of the whole 
economy. Carey and Rabesona (2002) who used a similar 
(biased) denominator also reported increases in the implicit 
tax rate on capital. Factors, which could affect/bias 
comparisons between Member States, are described in 
European Commission (2010a, Annex B, Part D). Their 
importance differs between Member States according — 
for instance — to a different share of financial companies 
making capital gains. Data limitations prevent the 
computation of the ITRs for Luxembourg, Malta and 
Romania. 
Graph 2.14: Implicit tax rate on capital, 2008 
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Source: Commission services. 
In terms of levels, in 2008 the UK tops the ranking 
with an ITR on capital of 45.9%. (26) The values 
for Denmark, France, Portugal, Cyprus and Italy 
are above 35%. At the other extreme of the scale, 
Estonia at 10.7%, Lithuania at 12.4% and Ireland 
at 15.7% display very low levels of ITR on capital 
(see Graph 2.14). 
Environmental Taxes 
The introduction of environmental tax reforms 
gained increasing support during the 1990s as part 
of the endeavour to shift the tax burden from 
labour towards the use of natural resources and 
environmentally harmful goods and activities. 
Among others, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
Estonia and Czech Republic have increased 
environmentally-related taxes and used additional 
tax revenues to finance tax cuts on labour or 
personal income, with the intention to boost 
employment.  
However, despite their increasing importance in 
the policy debate environmental tax revenues have 
not been growing in recent years in the EU on 
average. In 2008, revenues from environmental 
taxes in the EU27 accounted for 2.4% of GDP and 
for 6.1% of total revenues. Compared to 1999, 
when environmental taxes reached their peak level 
of 2.9% in relation to GDP and 7.0% out of total 
                                                          
(26) The ITR on capital is biased upwards in the case of the UK 
compared to other EU countries because the ITR base does 
not capture the full extent of the taxable profits of financial 
companies. Also, the UK figures allocate tax on all 
occupational and private pension benefits to capital income 
whereas for most other MS occupational pension benefits 
are allocated to transfer income of the non-employed.  
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taxation, the fall is quite significant. This 
development measured at the weighted EU average 
level hides, however, substantial differences 
between the Member States. In fact, since 1995 the 
share of environmental taxation out of total 
taxation has increased in a number of Member 
States (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Netherlands, 
Austria, Poland and Slovakia), but remained 
stagnant or decreased in the others. Many big 
Member States figure in the last group, which 
explains the falling trend of the EU weighted 
average. In the new Member States, the increase 
has been largely driven by the EU accession 
process, although some of these countries used the 
occasion to increase energy tax levels beyond the 
strict requirement of the EU provisions. Also in 
some old Member States environmental taxes have 
been increased recurrently, often as a part of 
broader fiscal reforms. 
Several factors could explain the fall of 
environmental tax revenues in relation to GDP. 
First, as many environmental taxes are levied per 
unit of physical consumption (unit taxes) and are 
usually fixed in nominal terms, their real value in 
relation to GDP tends to fall when they are not 
adjusted for inflation (so far only Denmark and 
Sweden use this option). Second, also as a result of 
the heightened importance given to energy 
efficiency, energy demand has a tendency to grow 
more slowly than income. Third, increasing energy 
taxes may have reduced energy consumption and 
thus eroded the tax base of energy taxation. The 
growing popularity of non-fiscal instruments such 
as emissions trading and high world prices for oil 
in the early 2000s might also have led to a reduced 
appetite for additional environmental taxation, at 
 
least as far as energy is concerned. 
A high ratio of environmental tax revenue to total 
taxation as such does not necessarily represent an 
indication of a high priority being attributed to 
environmental protection because it says nothing 
about the achievement of environmental policy 
goals. This suggests using an implicit tax rate for 
environmental taxes. An ITR focusing only on 
energy products has been constructed, measuring 
energy tax revenues in relation to their base. (27) 
Table A1.3 in Annex 1 shows the amount of 
energy tax, in euro, levied per unit of final energy 
consumption. In recent years, Denmark displays 
the highest ratio by a wide margin, followed by 
Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
Sweden. Generally, the new Member States 
display markedly lower levels of taxation. 
However, all of the Member States in this group 
have been increasing energy taxes significantly. To 
abstract from tax increases due to inflation, a 'real' 
ITR on energy has been calculated. This 
adjustment shows that in real terms, taxation on 
energy has been trending downward, on average, 
since 1999, and that the fall has been sharpest in 
the more recent period. Overall, the average EU27 
real ITR on energy in 2008 was clearly at the 
lowest level since 1995. Concerning individual 
countries, one can observe that the real burden of 
taxation on energy has been declining significantly 
in several old Member States (Denmark, Italy, 
Spain, United Kingdom), offsetting increases in 
most new Member States and the majority of old 
Member States (most significantly in the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, and 
Sweden) (see Table A1.4 in Annex 1).  
(27) Note that the ITR on energy treats equally all kinds of 
energy consumption, regardless of their environmental 
impact; an energy unit produced from hydroelectric power 
has the same weight as a unit produced from coal. In many 
countries, however, renewable energy sources are subject 
to lower tax rates or altogether exempted. Paradoxically, a 
country with a large share of renewable energy will have a 
lower ITR on energy than a country, which relies largely 
on carbon-based energy sources.  
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3.1. GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Tax reforms implemented in the past two years 
have to be assessed against the background of the 
financial and economic crisis and the need for 
governments to provide an adequate policy 
response. Member States have been hit differently 
by the crisis depending on the sector composition 
and the degree of macroeconomic imbalances 
prevailing in the economy. In addition, fiscal room 
to manoeuvre at the outset of the crisis differed 
substantially between Member States, with some 
benefiting from robust budgetary positions and an 
absence of macro-economic imbalances and others 
being in a vulnerable state due to high public 
deficits and/or marked macro-economic 
imbalances. Policy responses therefore varied 
markedly between Member States, mirroring the 
evolution of macro-economic and fiscal 
conditions.        
In the aggregate, discretionary budgetary measures 
necessary to support the ailing financial sector and 
to temporarily bolster aggregate demand clearly 
dominated the later part of 2008 and 2009. This 
resulted from sizeable expansionary measures in a 
vast majority of Member States, in line with the 
European Economic Recovery Programme, only 
partly offset by the implementation of deficit-
reducing measures in a few countries where this 
was imposed by the fragility of the budgetary 
situation (e.g. Ireland, the Baltic States, Greece 
and Hungary). Fiscal policy continued to be 
expansionary in 2010, though this was clearly less 
pronounced than in the year before, with those 
Member States that entered the crisis with 
relatively healthy public finances contributing 
most to the stimulus (i.e. Germany, Austria, the 
Nordic Member States and the Czech Republic). 
At the same time, amid growing sustainability 
concerns, a number of Member States with rapidly 
deteriorating public finances started to reverse the 
stimulus of the previous year. Ultimately, the use 
of expansionary and consolidating measures over 
the period 2008-2010 has therefore been 
determined by the magnitude of the drop in output 
and employment, on the one hand, and the need to 
ensure the sustainability of public finances, on the 
other.      
The revenue side contributed by more than one 
half to the overall stimulus from discretionary 
policies, with tax measures making up the lion's 
share. The impulse provided by discretionary tax 
measures has to be added to the significant 
stimulus stemming from the automatic 
deterioration of government revenues as a 
consequence of the drop in output growth. 
Abstracting from measures that consisted of a pure 
time shift of tax payments or refunds (e.g. deferral 
of income tax payments, acceleration of VAT 
refunds) a major part of the tax measures was 
implemented on a permanent basis. In addition to 
the introduction of changes in the tax code, 
discretionary changes were also implemented by 
postponing or revising reforms that had already 
passed legislation in previous years. Finally, 
governments have also used recent reforms as an 
opportunity to carry out much needed 
'maintenance' of the tax system, e.g. by trimming 
some tax breaks at the same time as they 
introduced new incentives. 
The question arises as to whether these measures, 
which were mainly induced by the urgent need to 
provide a policy response to the crisis, constituted 
a break with the general trends in tax reforms in 
the recent past and/or deviated from acquired 
principles regarding the desired quality of tax 
reforms. In considering recently implemented 
reforms, it is therefore important to assess whether 
they measure up to general tax policy goals or, 
more specifically, whether the reform steps bring 
the overall tax system closer to the benchmark of 
an "optimal" revenue system. Such a system 
should fulfil several conditions. First, it should be 
efficient. An efficient tax-benefit system ensures 
growth, moves the economy towards a desired 
distribution of income, and raises the necessary 
public funds for spending on publicly provided 
goods with minimal distortions.  This includes the 
avoidance of excessive negative incentive effects 
for employment, investment, and innovation, as 
well as proper internalisation of social costs and 
benefits of activities that generate positive or 
negative externalities, such as research and 
development, human capital formation or polluting 
activities. It also encompasses dynamic efficiency, 
i.e. the avoidance of negative effects on 
investment, innovation and growth. Second, an 
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Table 3.1: Recent tax measures by type. 
Statutory rate Base or special regimes
Increase LT, HU, PT BE , BG, IE, EL (2009-13), IT, LT (2009-11), HU
Decrease CZ, EL (2010-2014), HU, LU, SI, SE, LT 
AT, BE (2010-11), DE, ES (2009-11), IT, CY, LT, 
NL, PT, PL, RO, SE, SK, UK (2009-11)
Increase EL, IE, FR, LV, PT, SI, UK DK, EE, EL, ES, IE, HU, LV, LT, PT 
Decrease AT, DE, DK, FR, FI, HU, LV, LT, RO
AT, BE, BG, DE, DK, ES (2008), FI, HU, MT, IE, IT, 
LV, LU, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SI, SE
Increase CY, EE, HU, PT, RO, SK, FI BG, CZ, EE, LV, LT
Decrease BG, CZ, HU, RO, SE FI
Increase CZ, EL, ES, EE, HU, LV, LT, FI EE, LV, LT
Decrease IE, FI, UK (12.2008-09) BE, DE, CY, FR, LT, MT, HU, NL, RO, SI, FI 
Increase BG, DK, EE, EL, ES, IE, HU, LV, LT, PT, PL, RO, 
SI, FI DK, FI, EL, LV
Decrease IT, LT (2009-11), PL, SK BG
Excise Duties
Corporate Income Taxation
Personal Income Taxation
Social Security Contributions
Value Added Tax
Source: Based on European Commission (2010a). 
 
 
28 
optimal tax system should be fair, as it aims at 
being accepted by citizens and moving the 
economy towards a desired distribution of income 
or other equity goals. Third, an optimal tax system 
should be simple and transparent. Fourth, it should 
minimise incentives and opportunities for tax 
avoidance, evasion and fraud. Finally, it should 
have low administrative demands and low 
compliance costs. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that 
the distortionary effects introduced by taxation can 
act as a constraint to growth. As argued in more 
detail in Chapter 5, personal and in particular 
corporate income taxes, through their negative 
allocation effects, are the most detrimental in this 
respect. On the other hand, there is wide consensus 
that property and consumption taxes (including 
environmentally related taxes) are the least 
detrimental to growth. Against this background, 
there has been a general tendency over the last few 
years to shift taxation from labour and capital 
towards the taxation of consumption.  
3.2. SELECTED TAX REFORMS 
Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of recent tax 
measures by type of measure. It distinguishes 
between reforms changing the tax rate and those 
acting on the tax base (incl. special regimes), in 
one dimension, and the type of tax, i.e. corporate 
income taxes, personal income taxes, social 
security contributions, value added taxes and 
excise duties, in the other. Altogether, amendments 
to direct taxation schemes have been broadly in 
line with the recent trends observed in the 
European Union in attempting to reduce the tax 
burden on labour and capital. Overall, this is 
indicative of a continued common strategy of 
Member States towards reducing the fiscal burden 
in order to foster labour supply and labour demand 
incentives, and increase participation and 
employment. Such policies have become 
particularly important in the course of the 
recession in order to counteract the negative 
repercussions of product market developments on 
labour market conditions. Section 3.3 below 
provides a more detailed analysis of the impact of 
recent tax and benefit reforms on labour supply 
and demand.  
Similar to developments in personal income 
taxation, several Member States also reduced 
corporate income tax rates to some extent, thereby 
continuing the process of steady downward 
convergence in tax rates on corporations over past 
years in the European Union. This possibly reflects 
increasing pressures from fiscal competition, 
particularly from the recently acceded Member 
3. Recent reforms of tax systems in the EU 
States. Given the sensitivity of capital flows to tax 
rates, the fiscal burden on mobile tax bases might 
have been constantly reduced in order to prevent 
relocation of physical capital and book profits.  
Against this background, the quest for higher 
revenues in order to curb budget deficits has 
typically resulted in increases in indirect taxation. 
The fiscal burden on consumption has been 
increased through hikes in VAT and excise rates as 
well as the introduction of base broadening 
measures. In addition, Member States' 
governments have increasingly tried to resort to 
alternative sources of financing, such as 
environmental taxation. This policy stance has 
often been part of more comprehensive strategies, 
endorsed also by actions taken at the EU level, 
aimed at promoting economic and environmental 
objectives in order to put national economies on a 
sustainable long run growth path. As developed in 
chapter 2, this strategy has not always been 
successful when it comes to additional revenue 
collection. 
Among the measures introduced to boost aggregate 
demand, there has been a widespread use of 
provisions to directly support disposable income. 
Reductions in the rates applicable to the lower 
personal income brackets and increases in 
allowances have both been used as instruments to 
protect the purchasing power of low-income 
households. In some cases, in accordance with the 
redistributive goals of taxation and the need for an 
equitable distribution of the fiscal burden, these 
measures have been accompanied by the 
introduction of higher rates on high-income 
earners (for instance, in Greece and Ireland), with 
the combined effect of increasing progressivity. 
Special levies have also been imposed on certain 
income sources, such as bonuses granted by banks 
and financial institutions (in France, Greece, the 
UK and – at the corporate level – in Portugal), 
which would serve the additional purpose of 
reducing rewards for short term risk-taking 
behaviour in the financial sector (see Chapter 4 for 
a wider discussion of these issues). A few 
countries characterised by a high tax burden on 
physical persons (Finland, Denmark, and Austria) 
have implemented generalised reductions in rates. 
In a few cases where governments were left with 
extremely limited room for fiscal manoeuvre, rates 
on personal income were instead increased, 
reversing previous reductions (Latvia).  
Direct support to low-income earners and other 
social strata that have been hit harder by the 
economic crisis appears particularly important – 
both for equity considerations and for the 
economic effect on private consumption – in the 
light of the shift towards indirect taxation put in 
place in several Member States. Generalised 
increases in VAT rates have been introduced in 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and 
Spain, often together with base broadening 
measures such as narrowing the scope for 
application of the reduced rates. Reductions in 
rates to boost consumption have been extremely 
rare – typically only temporary (in the UK) or 
targeted at specific sectors (in Belgium and 
France). Amendments in the area of excise duties 
have in general mirrored the changes in VAT. 
Thus, rates have been commonly increased and, in 
some cases, previously exempted products have 
been included in the excisable base.  
A number of measures have been taken also in the 
area of environmental taxation, ranging from the 
introduction of carbon taxes (in Ireland) to levies 
on motor vehicles determined on the basis of their 
environmental impact (for instance in Greece, the 
Netherlands, Latvia). Higher revenues have also 
been sought from property taxation in some 
Member States, for instance reducing exemption 
thresholds for the real estate tax (in Bulgaria) or 
introducing progressive taxation schemes to 
replace flat rate systems (Greece and Latvia). 
The interventions to reduce the corporate income 
tax rate (for instance in the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden) are presumably 
to be ascribed to the already long-standing policy 
towards taxation of mobile bases in Europe, 
particularly as in some cases they were not linked 
to the cyclical development but had been 
introduced in the context of previous reforms. In 
fact, these measures would have no significant 
effect on the corporate sector in the presence of 
losses during the downturn. Measures to directly 
support the supply side focused on the reduction of 
the corporate tax base, by introducing new 
deductions. (28) Similar measures were aimed at 
fostering investment capacity in the short run  
 
                                                          
(28) For instance, in Italy part of the IRAP (a regional tax on 
productive activities) payments became deductible from 
the base. 
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Box 3.1: Recent tax reforms in Member States
Number and scope of measures (1) 
Member States differed in the degree of reliance on automatic stabilisers and on the number and scope of
discretionary tax measures. Generally, however, governments have followed an activist stance: The detailed 
list of measures by Member State in European Commission (2010a) shows that an average of ten important 
tax policy measures has been taken per Member State since the end of 2008, with those Member States that
have been strongest affected by the crisis tending to approve a higher number of measures; 
Size of the budgetary impact 
The majority of the measures adopted has had an estimated budgetary impact of well below a half point of
GDP.(2) However, several measures, typically those involving adjustments in the tax rate, amount to nearly 
one percent point of GDP or, in a few cases, even more. Reforms of the VAT, the PIT or the reforms of social
security, as well as some excise rate increases, have often involved large amounts.  
Tax increases vs. tax cuts 
Within all main tax categories, both tax increases and tax cuts have been introduced over the past two years,
often in the same country and sometimes even within the same tax. As already mentioned, this partly reflects
the fact that in the initial phases of the crisis, a greater emphasis was put on supporting economic activity,
while in a later phase the emphasis moved towards consolidation.  
Choice between general rate cuts and specific tax breaks 
Changes in the statutory tax rate, given their high visibility and the fact that they affect a greater number of
taxpayers, should normally have a stronger impact on agents' expectations, but typically cost more (in
budgetary terms, in the case of a rate cut, and in political terms, in the case of a rate increase) than measures 
aiming at the tax base such as the introduction of exemptions or allowances. In addition, focusing on the tax
base usually allows targeting the impact to a specific group of taxpayers. Hence, it is not surprising that 
measures affecting the tax base have been adopted more frequently than changes in the tax rate. Furthermore,
base-narrowing measures have been most common for PIT and CIT, because the structure of these taxes lends
itself to this and also because Member States have more latitude in direct taxes than in partly harmonised EU
taxes such as VAT or excise duties. Finally, many EU governments have introduced preferential tax regimes,
including the introduction of special low rates on certain activities. (3)  
Qualitative composition of measures 
Cuts dominate in corporate and personal income taxation, while increases were clearly prevalent in excise
duties and VAT. In particular, several countries chose to cut the corporate income tax rate. While during a
deep recession, this will not give an immediate benefit for the many loss-making companies, the choice 
seems primarily linked with the wish to give a political signal on the long-term attractiveness of the country 
to investors. There was also considerable activity on the corporate income tax base and on special tax 
regimes: many Member States attempted to support business investment through measures such as more
generous depreciation allowances or investment tax credits; in a few cases, the cuts were targeted towards 
SMEs. Several Member States have opted for granting these incentives for a limited period of time only, in
order to give an immediate boost to capital spending. 
                                                          
(1) The box is based on European Commission (2010a). 
(2) The more detailed listing by country in European Commission (2010a) provides an approximate quantification of the 
budgetary impact of the measures, where available. 
(3) This is classified as measures narrowing the tax base in Table 3.1.  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
 
30 
3. Recent reforms of tax systems in the EU 
Box (continued) 
 
As for the personal income tax, one of the most common types of measure was the direct support of
household spending power by reductions in the PIT. This happened more often through increases in
allowances than cuts in rates, presumably also because an increase in allowances can be expected to more 
directly boost private consumption given its proportionally higher impact on lower-income households. In a 
few cases, PIT rates were increased, but this was typically limited to higher incomes. Some countries
suffering from particularly pronounced drops in GDP decided to defer previously decided PIT rate cuts.  
Despite the general strive to maintain or increase the employability of workers, relatively few measures were
adopted in the field of social security contributions. Furthermore, a majority of them involves hike. However, 
the net effect of this on the cost of labour appears unclear, as several countries have raised basic allowances
or taken other measures reducing the tax burden on the low paid.  
In the case of VAT, the situation is not clear-cut showing a predominance of rate increases but also a high 
number of measures narrowing the base. Base narrowing was in many cases linked to equity considerations,
as some countries reduced the tax burden on food or necessities. Generally, however, the measures increasing 
the standard VAT rates have had a much larger (positive) budgetary impact than the base narrowing
measures. Overall, given also the widespread increases in excise duties, one of the effects of the crisis on tax 
systems seems to be a reinforcement of the trend of the last few years towards higher consumption taxes.  
Tax fairness 
Several countries have introduced measures to safeguard lower incomes, usually by raising allowances or, in
a few cases, by raising the top PIT rate. This seems to point towards some increase in progressivity in the
coming years. Furthermore, as mentioned above, several countries have striven to shield expenditure on food
or other essentials from tax increases. 
Temporary vs. permanent measures 
The depth and severity of the crisis has induced several governments to introduce measures with an explicit
end date, in order to encourage spending by consumers and businesses in the short term. A prominent
example is the temporary VAT reduction to boost consumer spending in the UK, but several other countries
utilised temporary measures, typically to encourage investment in the construction sector or to strengthen the
structural competitiveness of firms.  
Sectoral schemes 
A wide variety of measures targeting individual sectors has been introduced. In particular, several Member 
States tried to dampen the slump in the housing sector by granting tax reductions of various kinds; several 
countries took measures to support the labour-intensive restaurant or tourism sector, notably by VAT rate 
cuts; others adopted measures aimed at supporting stock prices or reducing inheritance taxes.  
 
 
 
through the introduction of accelerated 
depreciation rules and investment tax credits. In a 
few cases, special provisions were targeted 
towards SMEs and towards R&D outlays.  
On the other hand, several Member States 
introduced measures to improve tax collection, 
stepped up efforts to fight tax evasion and 
implemented other revenue-raising measures, 
partly to mitigate the impact of narrowed corporate 
tax bases. Box 3.1 provides a synoptic overview of 
recent reforms in Member States along several 
dimensions. 
Although a shift towards consumption taxation 
appears more desirable than the use of income 
taxes (see Section 5.3) from a point of view of the 
potential effects on growth, the widespread 
increase in VAT rates might potentially lead to 
distortions of trade flows and the allocation of 
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capital. In particular, an increase in VAT rates 
combined with a parallel reduction of the burden 
on corporations (for instance through lower labour 
costs following decreases in social security 
contributions) could affect relative prices on 
international markets because of the zero VAT rate 
applicable to exports. Hence, in theory, even 
countries adopting the single currency could 
modify unilaterally their real exchange rate vis-à-
vis other euro area members by properly adjusting 
different tax rates. These considerations suggest 
that there might be substantial benefits from 
coordinated action in designing and implementing 
tax reforms in the European Union. In an 
integrated area characterised by free mobility of 
factors, virtually any policies affecting the relative 
costs of factors of production might substantially 
alter the competitiveness of national jurisdictions. 
In the current juncture, this could entail serious 
risks to the effectiveness of the policies designed 
by the Member States to exit from the crisis and 
restore sound fiscal positions. Moreover, 
coordination might usefully contribute to and 
reinforce the process of convergence in national 
revenue systems which is already observed, 
leading for instance to exchange of best practices 
or the elimination of mismatches between national 
systems. This will reduce administrative and 
compliance costs, and will in turn improve the 
functioning of the internal market (see Chapter 5). 
Table 3.2 at the end of this chapter provides an 
overview of tax reforms enacted in selected 
Members States. It does not provide a 
comprehensive summary of all policy changes that 
affect national revenue systems, also because of 
the substantial number of one-off and temporary 
measures implemented by Member States to 
address the financial and economic crisis, in 
addition to the minor changes usually introduced 
to update existing tax legislation and 
administrative procedures. It focuses on the 
developments in selected Member States where 
substantial tax reforms have been enacted, either in 
the form of non-temporary tax reductions to boost 
domestic demand, or in the form of revenue 
increasing measures, owing to the lack of 
budgetary room for manoeuvre when the crisis hit. 
(29) In order to limit the room for discretionary 
 
                                                          
                                                                                  
(29) The current report uses information on tax reforms mainly 
from the Commission Services' Taxation Trends Report 
and from official external sources. Cut-off date is 30 June 
judgement in selecting the reforms, the choice has 
been mainly informed by two criteria: the non-
temporary nature of the reform and its impact in 
terms of GDP. (30)   
3.3. IMPACT OF RECENT TAX AND BENEFIT 
REFORMS ON LABOUR SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND  
Supporting labour demand and monitoring 
incentives to work calls for the assessment of both 
tax and benefits systems. Their design 
(individually or through their interaction) almost 
inevitably creates a potential distortion in some 
segments of the labour market in the form of 
reduced labour demand and disincentives to work. 
Sustained reform efforts have been undertaken 
over recent years, on the tax and benefits side, 
largely aimed at improving labour utilisation.  
The tax burden on labour as measured by the tax 
wedge is on average very high in Europe, although 
substantial differences exist across Member States 
(see Box 3.2 for the explanation of the tax wedge 
indicator and its potential impact on labour supply 
and labour demand). This heavy tax burden has 
been considered by some analysts as one of the 
main factors behind the unsatisfactory European 
employment performance in recent years.  
Since 2000, many Member States have attempted 
to support employment by reducing the tax wedge, 
especially on low income earners (see Graph 3.1 
which displays the tax wedge and its evolution for 
low income workers earning 67% of the average 
wage (AW) across EU Member States). In the 
period since 2000 a rather small increase in the tax 
wedge for low income workers can be observed in 
only two Member States, Greece and Malta. Over 
the recent period 2008-2009, the tax wedge for the 
 
 
2010. Future issues will additionally draw on the 
forthcoming TAXREF database, managed by the European 
Commission (DG TAXUD) in cooperation with Member 
States (the Working Group "Structures of the Taxation 
Systems"), when available. 
(30) A detailed list of recent tax reforms in all EU Member 
States can be found on the homepage of DG TAXUD via 
the following url: http://ec.europa.eu/taxtrends. 
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Graph 3.1: Tax wedge and its evolution since 2000, low income worker (67% AW) 
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Source: Commission services. 
low income worker declined or remained stable in 
all countries but Greece and Ireland (31). By 
reducing the tax burden on labour, Member States 
aimed at supporting employment. 
The breakdown of the tax wedge into its 
components in Graph 1 in Box 3.2 (32) 
demonstrates that in the EU, employers' SSC 
constitute the largest part of the tax wedge for the 
single average income worker in about two thirds 
of the EU countries (17.6% of labour costs for the 
un-weighted EU average in 2009). The second 
largest component of the tax wedge is income tax 
(12.4%), followed by employees' SSC (9.6%). The 
breakdown of the tax wedge is very much in line 
with the decomposition of the ITR on labour as 
discussed in Chapter 2.3.  
                                                          
(31) This statement refers to 19 OECD-EU countries only, since 
2009 data for non-OECD countries is currently not 
available. Over 2007-2008, the tax wedge declined also in 
Bulgaria. Table A1.5 in Annex 1 shows that developments 
are broadly similar for the average income worker. 
(32) See also Table A1.5 in Annex 1.  
The analysis of the breakdown in Table A1.5. in 
Annex 1 shows that the recent reduction in the tax 
burden on labour on the EU average mainly 
focused on the personal income tax and employers' 
SSC. When looking at the reforms in individual 
Member States, however, the picture is more 
heterogeneous. The biggest reductions in the tax 
wedge (at the average wage level) in 2009 can be 
found in the Czech Republic, Finland and 
Denmark, and the only substantial increase in 
Ireland. The tax wedge in Ireland, however, 
remains the third lowest in the EU (for a review of 
tax reforms in these countries see the appendix to 
this chapter). Substantial reductions can also be 
found for Bulgaria and Romania, which however 
refer to the year 2008. Bulgaria has substantially 
reduced SSC in several steps over the recent years 
and introduced a flat PIT. Romania reduced SSC 
in several steps over the 2006-2008 period as well. 
In 2009, however, Romania increased SSC 
substantially, which is not reflected in the data yet. 
EU countries tend to place quite different tax 
burdens at different income levels which results in 
33 
European Commission 
Monitoring tax revenues and tax reforms in EU Member States 
 
 
Box 3.2: Measuring the impact of tax and benefits on labour supply and demand
The tax barrier to employment is usually measured by the tax wedge, the proportional difference between 
the costs of workers to their employer and the amount of net earnings that the worker receives (take-home 
pay). The tax wedge is composed of several elements. First, employers have to pay payroll taxes and/or 
employers' social security contributions (SSC). Second, employees have to pay SSC on their wage income. 
Finally, the labour income is subject to the personal income tax. (1) These different taxes and SSC constitute 
the different components of labour taxation, and they can be summed up to give the aggregate tax wedge 
due to labour taxes. The tax wedge is calculated for different household types and different income levels 
relative to the gross wage earnings of an average worker (see OECD (2010a) for a detailed discussion). 
Graph 1 displays the tax wedge and its composition for a single average income worker in 2009. 
Graph 1: Composition of tax wedge in 2009, single average income worker 
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Note: Data for non-OECD-EU countries (SI, LT, LV, EE and MT, BG and RO) are only available for 2008 (CY only for 2007).
Source: Commission services. 
The effect of the tax wedge on labour demand and labour supply (and eventually on employment) depends 
on whether and to what extent the tax burden increases the total labour cost for the employer or is 
transferred on to the worker, translating into a lower net wage. When increasing the total labour cost, taxes 
on labour (notably in the form of employer's SSC) tend to reduce labour demand. On the labour supply side, 
taxes levied on wages (both direct taxation on labour income and employee's SSC) reduce the net income 
and drive a wedge between the marginal product of labour and the marginal value of leisure. They thus tend 
to discourage the availability to work, especially at the lower end of the wage scale due to higher labour 
supply elasticity of low income workers.  
In particular for low-income workers it is important to include the impact of the benefit system into the 
analysis of the work incentives. This can be done by the concept of the so-called METR (marginal effective 
                                                          
(1) Contrary to taxes, SSC (whether paid by the employer or employee) give a right to individual benefits. Therefore, 
only to the extent to which the link between contributions and benefits in such social insurance schemes is not 
actuarially fair, i.e. the extent to which the contributions are disproportionately high, the contributions actually 
constitute a tax. As it is very difficult to isolate the tax component in the various SSC paid in the different Member 
States, the standard approach is to include the full amount in the measure of the tax burden.  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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tax rate) and AETR (average effective tax rate). (1) Both indicators are calculated in order to show what part 
of a change in earnings is “taxed away” by the combined operation of taxes, social security contributions 
(SSCs), and any withdrawal of earnings related social transfers (e.g. unemployment benefits, social 
assistance, housing benefits and family benefits). In case of METR, the change in earnings is marginal while 
in case of AETR the change in earnings stem from transitions between non-employment and employment. 
Therefore, METR is used for studying labour supply decisions on the intensive margin while AETR is used 
for studying labour supply decisions on the extensive margin. AETR is the main concept behind so-called 
unemployment and inactivity traps, which are used to monitor labour supply distortions, in particular 
financial disincentives to take up work either from unemployment or inactivity. The unemployment trap is 
driven in particular by a withdrawal of unemployment benefits and the inactivity trap by a withdrawal of 
social assistance and housing benefits. The "trap" indicates that the change in disposable income by taking 
up work is small and, conversely, the work-disincentive effect of the tax and benefit system large. 
Monitoring these traps is relevant in particular for low wage workers with poor income prospects and certain 
family types (e.g. single parent with children, one-earner couple and two-earner couple). It is important to 
bear in mind that the trap indicators have to be interpreted with regard to the conditionality of benefits and 
work-availability criteria which - if consistently enforced - increase job search and can counterbalance the 
negative effects of high out-of-work benefits on job search behaviour.  
                                                          
(1) The details of the methodology used to calculate the METRs are described in Carone et al. (2004).  
 
 
different scales of tax progressivity. Following 
OECD (2010a), the degree of progressivity of the 
tax burden on labour (incl. SSC) can be assessed 
by comparing the burden faced by single persons 
earning 167% of the average wage with the burden 
faced by their counterparts earning two-thirds of 
the average wage (Graph 3.2). (33)  
In several countries, the progressivity of the 
personal income tax is partly offset by the 
regressive structure of SSC. (34) This raises the 
question of the optimal tax design across workers 
to achieve better aggregate employment outcomes. 
Over the period 2000-2009, most of the EU 
countries reduced tax wedges for low wage and 
high wage workers (see Graph A1.1 in Annex 2). 
The reduction was generally larger for low wage 
workers, which resulted in an increase of the 
progressivity of the tax burden on labour in most 
Member States analysed (see Graph A.2.2 in 
Annex 2).  
 
                                                          
(33) See OECD (2010a) for a discussion of this progressivity 
measure. The topic of tax progressivity is also discussed in 
chapter 4.2 of this report. For a discussion of different 
measures of progressivity see also Jakobsson (1976). 
(34) The regressivity of the SSC is mainly due to the 
contributions ceilings in place in many Member States. 
These ceilings can in several cases already be reached at  
167% of the average income. 
Graph 3.2: Unemployment trap for a single person without 
children (67% of AW) 
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Differences in tax wedges between the Member 
States also contribute to a large dispersion of 
unemployment traps across the EU (see Box 3.2 
for the explanation of the unemployment trap 
indicator), thus indicating large differences in 
financial disincentives for the unemployed to take 
up work. (35) Despite adjustments in tax and  
  
                                                          
(35) Unemployment and inactivity traps take into account the 
initial level of unemployment benefits. As unemployment 
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Graph 3.3: Tax wedge and tax progressivity, single workers, 2009 
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benefit systems since 2001, the unemployment trap 
for a single low income worker remains at over 
80% in 12 EU countries and close to 90% in four 
countries (Graph 3.3).  
 
                                                                                  
This means that the net financial reward for taking 
up a job is only about 10% of the earnings in the 
latter group of countries suggesting a large benefit 
dependency. The main contribution to the 
unemployment trap comes from a withdrawal of 
unemployment benefits, followed by income taxes, 
SSC and the withdrawal of housing benefits, where 
available. On the other hand, relatively low 
unemployment traps in some countries are 
generally due to relatively low out-of-work 
benefits. This in turn suggests relatively low 
consumption smoothing of unemployed benefits 
and points to the trade-off between providing work 
incentives and the generosity of the unemployment 
insurance system.  
 
benefits may decline over the unemployment spell, 
financial incentives to search and take up work may 
correspondingly increase.  
Graph 3.4: Inactivity trap for a two-earner couple with 2 
children (67% AW) 
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To assess the participation rate of females in the 
labour market, it is essential to monitor 
hypothetical households with two earners, in 
particular financial incentives to move from 
inactivity to low-wage work for the second spouse, 
generally women. Normally, a household where 
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one spouse is earning a (low) wage does not 
benefit from the means-tested out-of-work benefits 
as they are already withdrawn below this income 
level (67% of average wage).  
Therefore, financial incentives to take up work for 
the inactive second spouse are mainly (or only) 
shaped by taxes (and SSC) rather than a 
withdrawal of out-of work benefits. Graph 3.4 
shows a large dispersion in the inactivity trap and 
in its change over the period 2001-2008 for a 
second earner across the EU countries. The  
 
contribution of taxes to the trap is larger the more 
taxes paid by the working spouse are affected by 
the inactive spouse taking up work. In particular, 
the countries operating joint income tax systems 
are likely to face above-average income tax 
burdens for second earners. Therefore, to improve 
female labour market participation and to 
overcome the disincentive effects for second-
earners in a couple embedded in joint-income tax 
systems, Member States are increasingly 
introducing the possibility to either splitting family 
taxation or for individual taxation on incomes. (36) 
                                                          
(36) See Bettio and Verashchagina (2009) for a discussion of 
the impact of fiscal systems on female employment. 
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Table 3.2: Overview of tax reforms in selected Member States 
 AT In 2009 the government adopted a tax reform targeting an annual tax relief of about € 3 billion 
(1.1 % of GDP). The main elements of the reform are changes in the income tax system (for € 
2.3 billion) and the tax relief for families (€ 0.5 billion). Among the first set of measures, the 
marginal rates of the second and third brackets were lowered. The width of the zero rate bracket 
was increased by € 1 000, while the lower limit of the tax bracket for the top rate of 50 % was 
increased by € 9 000. The family tax relief package provides for increases in child allowances 
and child related tax credits, tax allowances for childcare costs, as well as wage tax exemptions 
for childcare subsidies paid by employers. 
  The 2009 tax reform increased the tax allowances for profits of unincorporated businesses to 13 
% (from 10 %) from 2010 onwards. However, this measure was partly offset by the cancellation 
of the favourable tax treatment for retained earnings. The preferential treatment for stock 
options was abolished as of 1 April 2009.  
CZ After the comprehensive reform of the tax system enacted in 2008, several measures have been 
approved in 2009, mainly affecting tax regulations for 2010, with the aim of curbing the budget 
deficit. While the flat PIT rate of 15% in place since 2008 is unchanged, rules for computing the 
taxable base in case of business income were amended. In particular, the lump-sum deductions 
that can be claimed by entrepreneurs instead of actual expenses were reduced for certain 
categories of tax-payers from 60 % to 40 %. 
 After the reduction in rates that took place in 2009(-1,5 pp in employee' SSC, -1pp in employers' 
SSC), changes to the bases for the calculation of social security contributions were introduced. 
The maximum basis of assessment for social and health insurance payments was raised from 48 
to 72 multiples of the average salary. 
 The value added tax rate was increased by 1 %. Thus, the basic VAT rate is set at 20 %, and the 
reduced at 10 %. Excise duties on alcohol, tobacco products, mineral oils and fuels were 
increased. The property tax rate, including the one applicable to land and buildings, was 
doubled, whereas taxes on buildings and non-residential spaces used for other business activity 
are left unchanged. 
 As stipulated in the enacted legislation, in 2010 the tax rate on corporate income is further 
reduced by one percentage point to 19 %. 
DK A major tax reform is being phased in from 2010 to 2019 with the aim of reducing the fiscal 
burden on personal income in order to stimulate labour supply in the long term. The reform is 
designed so as to guarantee overall revenue-neutrality, while the timing for introducing the 
different measures takes into account cyclical conditions. Hence, the main changes to the state 
PIT system are effective as of 2010. They include: the reduction of the bottom tax bracket rate 
from 5.26% to 3.76%; the abolition of the medium bracket taxed at the 6 % rate; the increase in 
the top tax bracket threshold by overall DKK 47 900 (approximately € 6 500) between 2009 and 
2010. While the overall PIT system remains highly progressive, as a consequence of these 
changes the lowest marginal tax rate will be reduced from 42.1 % to 40.9 %, and the highest 
from 62.8 % to 56.1 %. 
 Some base broadening measures have been introduced altogether. Those measures include 
limitations to the tax deductibility of net interest payments and payments to individual pension 
insurance schemes without life-long coverage above defined thresholds, as well as less 
favourable tax treatment of company cars and other fringe benefits. 
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  In line with the other energy and climate policy objectives of the government, financing of the 
reform is partly provided by higher energy, transport and environmental taxes, and also by 
increases of excise rates on health-related goods, such as tobacco and candy. In particular, 
energy taxes on business and households – except for petrol and diesel - are increased by 15%. 
To minimize the negative effect on household disposable income, a lump-sum transfer (‘green 
check’) will be granted to adults and children as well (up to two per household). The ‘green 
check’ is nominally fixed (DKK 1 300 for adults and DKK 300 for children) and is rapidly 
phased out for income above DKK 360 000 (€ 48 300). 
DE After the substantial reform of the corporate income tax system enacted in 2008, amendments to 
the taxation of personal income have been introduced with the aim of supporting aggregate 
demand during the crisis. The bottom PIT rate has been reduced from 15 % to 14 %, while the 
basic allowance has been increased. The PIT thresholds have also been raised by € 400 
retroactively as from 1 January 2009 and again by € 330 as from 1 January 2010. In addition, 
more generous child allowance and benefits have been granted. On 1 January 2010, the Bill for 
improved deductibility of payments for health and nursing care insurance, approved by the 
previous government, came into force. According to this law, payments for health and nursing 
care insurance are fully deductible, with an impact on the budget estimated around € 9.5 billion 
per annum. Environmental incentives promoting biofuels were introduced as well as an 
inheritance tax relief. 
IE The greatest impact on the revenue side of the budget stems from the personal income levy 
applicable from 1 January 2009. Following later amendments, the rates were doubled to 2 %, 
4 % (applicable to income above € 75 036) and 6 % (applicable above € 174 980). The 
exemption threshold is € 15 028. In 2008 and 2009, the rates of taxation of deposit interest, gift 
and inheritance tax (Capital Acquisitions Tax or CAT) and capital gains tax were increased in 
two stages from 20% to 25%. The tax free thresholds for CAT were reduced by 20% in April 
2009 and have fallen a further 4% in January 2010 in line with the fall in the Consumer Price 
Index. 
 In the domain of indirect taxation, the standard VAT rate has been brought back to 21 %, the 
same level in place before December 2008, when an increase by half a percentage point was 
decided. Other tax decreases concern excise duties on alcohol. Increases in excise duties on 
petrol, auto-diesel and cigarettes are estimated to yield about € 400 million. In 2009, a carbon 
tax on fossils fuels was introduced at a rate of € 15 per ton, as well as an air travel tax (March 
2009, € 110 million). As of 1 May 2010 the carbon tax applies also to kerosene, marked gas oil, 
liquid petroleum gas, fuel oil and natural gas, in addition to petrol and auto-diesel. The 
estimated revenue effect of all these measured is € 750 million (including VAT) per year. 
EE Although the economy was severely hit by the recession, the Estonian government adopted a 
prudent fiscal policy stance, also reflected in tax policy. Amendments to the tax code have been 
broadly consistent with the long-term plan to shift the tax burden from income and employment 
towards consumption and the environment. The foreseen reduction of the income tax rate by one 
percentage point annually was temporarily frozen and the personal and corporate tax rates will 
be kept at 21 %, the level reached in 2008. Also the basic allowance (the amount of tax-free 
income) will remain unchanged. 
 The tax burden on consumption has been affected by the rise of the standard VAT rate by two 
percentage points to 20 % in July 2009 and the removal of reduced rates on certain products 
(medical equipment, distant heating), as well as the rise of the reduced VAT rate from 5 % to 
9 % in 2009. This reduced rate is applied on a narrow range of goods, which essentially includes 
books, periodicals, accommodation services, medicines and medical equipment for the personal 
use of the disabled. Excise duties on transport fuels were increased substantially, and those on 
coal, coke, natural gas and electricity were introduced. Most of these excise duties currently 
clearly exceed the level of the EU minimum rates. 
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 EL In 2004 the Government approved a comprehensive Tax Reform Law involving significant 
modifications to the corporate and personal income taxation systems to be introduced in three 
phases. The aim of the reform was to make the tax system easier, more equitable and more 
transparent, in order to foster entrepreneurship, investment and innovation. After the reduction 
in the CIT and PIT rates took place in the first two phases of the reform, further gradual cuts in 
rates were approved in 2008. The rate on corporate income is due to decrease by 1 percentage 
point each year from 2010 to 2014, from 25 % to 20 %. 
 In fact, the growing size of public finance imbalances has led the government to introduce, in 
addition to one-off revenue-raising measures, substantial amendments to the tax system in order 
to restore a sustainable fiscal position. Further tax measures have been stipulated in the 
framework of the three-year economic and financial programme that represents the 
conditionality for the agreement on the financing package released by the EU and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in May 2010. Overall, the envisaged reforms should 
increase revenue by an equivalent of around 4 % of GDP through 2013; a contribution of further 
7 percentage points of GDP is expected on the expenditure side. As a result, the deficit-to-GDP 
ratio should decrease below the reference value of 3 % by 2014, from an estimated 13.6 % in 
2009. 
 Significant revenues are expected from indirect taxation. After the increase in taxes on mobile 
phones and petrol enacted in 2009, in the first months of 2010 VAT rates, as well as excise 
duties on fuel, cigarettes and alcohol were increased in two phases. The standard VAT rate has 
been raised to 23 % (from 19 %), the reduced rate to 11 % (from 9 %), whereas the super-
reduced rate is set at 5.5 % (previously 4.5 %).  
 Taxation of inheritance, gifts and parental provisions was modified to increase its progressivity. 
The new system in the case of closest relatives foresees 4 tax brackets – instead of the previous 
2 – with a top rate of 10 % applicable above € 600 000; transactions up to € 150 000 are 
exempted. Furthermore, a special levy on luxury goods has been envisaged. The real estate 
taxation regime was also reformed, and the 1 % flat rate on large properties was substituted with 
a progressive scale (the 1 % top rate applicable above € 800 000 is increased to 2 % for property 
values above € 5 million for a period of three years). The road tax on motor vehicles – 
calculated on the basis of the engine capacity and the environmental impact – was increased. It 
will be collected together with an extra levy on high-capacity private vehicles and motorcycles. 
 The other provisions planned as from 2011 include: broadening of the base for the real estate tax 
through the increase of the legal value of property; phasing in of a "green tax" on CO2 
emissions; the introduction of a tax of unauthorized establishments; the introduction of special 
levies on illegal buildings in order to regularise land use violations (to be discontinued in 2014). 
 In the domain of direct taxation, a restructuring of the PIT has been enacted by the Tax Law of 
April 2010. The new system envisages 9 tax brackets (instead of 4), with a top marginal rate of 
45 % applicable above € 100 000 (the previous top rate, applicable above € 75 000, was 40 %). 
All sources of income are subject to the new unified tax schedule, thus the differential treatment 
of sources other than employment income and pensions is eliminated. Moreover, tax exemptions 
are abolished. Bonuses to business executives in banks and financial corporations are made 
subject to a special taxation regime with progressive rates ranging between 20 % and 90 %; 
exemption is granted to bonuses not exceeding 10 % of income, for incomes   up to € 60 000. 
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 FR Several measures were taken to counter the economic crisis, some of which of a structural 
nature. A 50% tax is levied on bonuses exceeding € 27 500 paid in 2009 by financial institutions 
to their traders. The local business tax has been replaced by an "economic territorial 
contribution" from January 1st 2010. This tax is no longer based on the annual value of 
commercial and industrial equipment, but consists of the annual rental value of immovable 
property and a new tax of between 0.4% (from a turnover exceeding € 500 000) and 1.5 % 
(above € 50 million) on the added value of the business (cotisation sur la valeur ajoutée des 
entreprises). The overall tax can not exceed 3 % of the added value of the business. Further in 
the domain of direct taxes, the PIT reduction for low-income households resulted in a cut of 2/3 
in the 2009 tax burden for people concerned. Treasury measures for firms concern corporate 
income tax credit reimbursements (research tax credit and carry-back tax credits) and the 
anticipation of VAT credit reimbursements. As from 1 July 2009 a reduced VAT rate of 5.5 % 
applies to restaurant services. 
LV The Latvian economy was among the hardest hit by the global financial crisis. Thus, the tax 
measures introduced in 2010 were mainly motivated by the need to increase revenues and 
accelerate the recovery. Substantial changes were introduced in the area of personal income 
taxation. As of January 2010, the flat PIT rate (which had been cut from 25 % to 23 % in 2009) 
is increased again, from 23 % to 26 %. This latter rate is applicable also to business income to 
individuals, previously taxed at 15 %. Capital gains are taxed at a 15% rate, whereas investment 
income is subject to a 10% or a 26% rate depending on the type of income. 
 In the area of indirect taxation, excise duties on cigarettes, wine and fermented beverages were 
increased in February 2010, while guest accomodation services are subject to the reduced VAT 
of 10% from May 2010 onwards. Moreover, natural gas (used for transport and heating 
purposes) has been included among the products subject to excise taxes as of 1 May 2010. Also, 
fuel containing at least 5 % of bio-fuels will be taxed at a lower rate than fossil fuels.  
 Other measures were taken to encourage the use environment-friendly motor vehicles. The tax 
on cars and motorcycles will be calculated taking into account the emission of greenhouse gases 
(carbon dioxide) as well as engine volume. The annual vehicle duty is doubled altogether. As of 
January 2010, a system of progressive taxation of residential property is introduced. 
 The government also envisaged a property tax on four different types of high value assets 
(housing property, water vehicles, airborne vehicles and high performance cars), although the 
application of this measure depends upon ruling by the Constitutional Court. A company car tax 
was introduced in 2009 with effect from 1 January 2010. 
LT After the significant reforms enacted in 2006 and 2008, several amendments to the CIT and 
VAT systems have been introduced in 2010 to stimulate the recovery and correct public finance 
imbalances also with a view to adoption of the euro. The tax rate on corporate income was cut 
back from 20 % to 15 %, thus reversing the increase stipulated for 2009. A reduced rate of 5%, 
instead of 13%, was granted to small companies. New provisions were introduced for extending 
the scope of deductions and for transferring tax losses within the same group.  
 Cut of the PIT rate to a flat 15 % and introduction of separate compulsory health insurance 
contribution of 6 % (instead of allocating 30 % share of PIT to compulsory health insurance 
fund), bringing the combined rate on employment income to 21 %. Adjustements to personal 
allowances were made. 
 After a hike from 18 to 19 % in 2009, the standard VAT rate was increased again by two 
percentage points as of September 2009. In addition, almost all reduced VAT rates were 
abolished. Excise duties on energetic products, alcoholic beverages and cigarettes were 
significantly increased in 2009. 
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 HU Besides having to respond to the challenges of the financial and economic crisis, recent reforms 
have been driven by the need to reduce the tax on labour as well as to simplify and rationalise 
the tax system. As of 2010 the taxation of personal income has been significantly restructured 
with the introduction of lower rates (17 % and 32 % instead of the 18% and 36%) and base-
broadening measures, such as the increase in the tax bracket thresholds, the abolition of 
allowances and the inclusion of social contributions paid by employers in the base. Employers' 
social contributions were also reduced by 5 percentage points, and the system of health 
contribution reformed. In addition, the 4% surtax on high-income individuals was abolished. 
 In the area of corporate taxation, the broadening of the tax base was accompanied by an increase 
in the rate from 16% to 19 %. At the same time, paralleling the abolition in the area of personal 
taxation, the special levy (so-called 'solidarity tax') introduced in 2006 at a rate of 4% on the 
adjusted pre-tax profits was cancelled. As a result, the overall tax rate on corporations will 
decrease by one percentage point. 
 Several measures have been enacted in the area of indirect taxation. In 2009 the standard VAT 
rate was increased from 20 % to 25 %. In addition, a new reduced rate of 18% was introduced 
on dairy and bakery products, later extended to public accommodation services and district 
heating, the latter falling under a rate of 5% as of 15 January 2010. In 2009 excise duties on 
some energy products, tobacco and alcoholic beverages were raised by rates ranging between 
5% and 7%. A further generalized increase by rates ranging between 7.5% and 10% has taken 
place as of 1 January 2010. 
 A property tax was introduced, which following the decision of the Constitutional Court applies 
to three different types of high value assets (housing property, water vehicles and airborne 
vehicles and not to high performance cars as previously envisaged). A company car tax was 
introduced in 2009 with effect from 1 February 2009. 
PT The budget for 2010 contains a number of fiscal provisions in response to the crisis, 
subsequently complemented with an additional set of tax measures adopted in May 2010 in 
order to accelerate fiscal consolidation along the lines envisaged in the Stability and Growth 
Programme. The overall impact of the austerity package is expected at 1.2 % of GDP in 2010 
(2.2 % in 2011), which is consistent with the new targets for the deficit set by the Government, 
i.e. 7.3 % (previously 8.3 %) of GDP in 2010 and 4.6 % (instead of 6.6 %) for 2011.  
 In the area of direct taxation, additional revenue for 0.2 % of GDP is expected from the increase 
by 1 percentage point (up to the third income bracket) and by 1.5 percentage points (from the 
fourth bracket on) of the individual income tax (IRS). Furthermore, a new special rate of 45 % 
(the current top rate is 42 %) will be applicable on incomes above € 150 000. PIT withholding 
rates are also increased by 1.5 percentage points already in 2010. Capital gains on securities will 
be taxed at a 20 % rate.  
 An increase by 2.5 percentage points is foreseen for the corporate income tax applicable to 
profits exceeding € 2 million. Payments of remuneration and bonuses to managers and 
administrators are made subject to an autonomous penalty tax of 35 % (50 % in case of 
payments made by financial institutions), provided that such payments exceed 25 % of the 
annual remuneration, and are above € 27 500. Those limits do not apply if at least 50 % of the 
payment is deferred for a period of 3 years and is conditional upon the employer's financial 
performance during that period.  
 In the area of indirect taxation, a generalized increase in VAT rates by 1 percentage point has 
been introduced, with an estimated yield of 1 % of GDP for 2010-2011 (0.3% in the period July-
December 2010 and 0.7% in 2011. 
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 FI A number of measures were taken to alleviate the effects of the crisis on disposable income. In 
2010 the rates for all four state income tax brackets have been reduced by half a percentage 
point, while the employment income deduction and the basic allowance on municipal taxation 
have been increased. The latter two measures are targeted to low-income earners. Further 
provisions aim at ensuring that the tax burden of pensioners does not exceed that of wage-
earners. These measures are intended to compensate partly the increases of social security 
contributions for employees (including pension, health and unemployment insurance 
contributions) in 2010. In order to stimulate employment by reducing indirect labour costs, the 
national health insurance contribution of employers, temporarily abolished in 2009, has been 
removed definitely in 2010. 
 In the field of indirect taxation, a major restructuring of VAT rates has been undertaken. In 
accordance with the government programme, in 2009 the VAT rate on food was reduced from 
17 % to 13 %. To compensate for the revenues losses, a generalized increase in all (standard and 
reduced) rates by one percentage point is to take effect from 1 July 2010. Other changes in 
indirect taxation include the increase of excises on tobacco and alcohol, as well as the 
introduction of a tax on sugar and soft drinks. 
SE Recent tax policy measures have focused on mitigating the effects of the crisis on employment 
and on promoting economic, social and environmental objectives. The 2010 budget contains a 
further expansion of the in-work tax credit – the fourth since 2007. The overall effect of those 
measures has been a reduction of the tax on earned income by a total of about SEK 71 billion 
(€ 7 billion). In addition, the levy of social security contributions for employees and self-
employed has been decreased by 1 percentage point; a further 5% reduction of the total of SSC 
(maximum of SEK 10. 000 SEK/ year) for self-employed was introduced. Moreover, targeted 
reductions have been introduced for persons aged under 26, and people who are at least 65 years 
old through a reduction in the income tax. In the domain of corporate taxation, as of January 
2009 the tax rate was reduced from 28 % to 26.3 %.  
UK In the domain of PIT, a new higher tax rate (50 %) applies for annual incomes above GBP 150 
000 and the personal allowance is restricted for annual incomes over GBP 100 000. Moreover, 
the first budget for 2010-11 foresees the capital gains tax going up from 18 % to 28 % for 
individuals liable to tax at 40 % or 50 % on their income. The lifetime limit on qualifying gains 
for entrepreneurs' relief is increased from GBP 2 million to GBP 5 million, and provides a 10 % 
rate for assets within it. The first budget for 2010-11 also foresees the introduction of a bank 
levy, which will apply to the balance sheets of UK banks and banking subsidiaries of other UK 
groups and the UK operations (subsidiaries and branches) of non-UK banks. For corporations, 
the main tax rate shall be reduced to 27 % in April 2011, then in further 1 percentage point steps 
annually to 24 % in April 2014, and the main rate of investment depreciation allowance reduced 
from 20 % to 18 % from April 2012. The planned increase in the small companies’ rate of 
corporation tax has been deferred to April 2011. 
  The standard VAT rate shall increase from 17.5% to 20% in January 2011. 
 
Source: Commission services.  Cut-off date is 30 June 2010. 
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One pressing issue is what lessons tax policy could 
learn from the global financial crisis. In theory, the 
well-developed welfare systems in place in the EU, 
funded by taxation levels that are high on average, 
should have made it more resilient compared to 
other regions. However, the crisis spread quickly 
from the US to the EU and resulted in a slump of 
comparable magnitude. Although there is wide 
consensus that the crisis did not originate from 
taxation, the question remains as to whether tax 
systems could be reformed in order to make the 
economy more resilient in the future and to boost 
GDP growth - in particular with a view to the twin 
challenge of financing significantly increased debt 
levels and the mounting costs of ageing societies. 
Having looked at the tax policy response of 
governments to the crisis in Chapter 3, this chapter 
investigates the taxation-crisis nexus from a more 
structural and longer-term perspective by focusing 
on tax policy issues directly related to the crisis. 
These topics include the potential contribution of 
certain elements of the tax system to the crisis, the 
role of the tax system as an automatic stabiliser 
and specific proposals on the taxation of the 
financial sector following the crisis. The topic of 
taxation and growth will be addressed in 
Chapter 5. 
4.1. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF TAXATION 
TO THE CRISIS 
This section(37) analyses how far specific aspects 
of the tax systems, such as the favourable 
treatment of debt compared to equity in most 
corporate tax systems, the taxation of housing 
markets or the favourable tax treatment for 
executive compensation schemes such as stock 
options, could have contributed to the financial and 
economic crisis. It also examines how tax policy 
should be adjusted in order to address these 
possible deficiencies and distortions. 
4.1.1. Corporate taxation and financing 
neutrality 
Current corporate tax systems in Europe favour 
debt financing over equity financing. While, in 
general, interest payments on corporate debt are  
 
                                                          
(37) The section draws on Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme (2009). 
deductible from the corporate tax base, return on 
equity is not. This leads to a higher leverage for 
firms since financing investments through debt is 
tax-favoured. Although the tax preference for debt 
has not changed in recent years, this tax distortion 
has gained more attention recently, as the crisis has 
highlighted the fact that the leverage ratios of 
many companies are too high. This could lead to 
liquidity constraints, especially in times when 
banks tend to restrict their credit supply. (38) A 
well-designed tax base that reduces the leverage 
distortion could make companies less vulnerable to 
a short-term reduction in credit available on the 
capital market. There is empirical evidence that the 
leverage of companies is indeed influenced by 
taxes.  
Several studies analyse this issue and find that 
taxes have a measurable effect on debt policy (e.g. 
Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004, Huizinga, Laeven 
and Nicodème, 2008). Huizinga et al. (2008) find 
for instance that for stand-alone companies, 
increasing the effective tax rate by one percentage-
point increases the ratio of debt to assets by 0.18%. 
The impact is larger for multinationals, reaching 
0.24% for two equally-sized companies (with one 
of them a foreign subsidiary) within the same 
group. In addition, aggregate figures for the euro 
area highlight the role of debt financing. The total 
debt of non-financial corporations in the euro area 
in relation to GDP increased from close to 70% in 
2002 to more than 80% in the second quarter of 
2009 according to the Financial Stability Review 
of the European Central Bank (ECB, 2009). The 
debt to equity ratio increased from 160% to 320% 
over the same period. While the recent increase 
can be partly interpreted as a result of the crisis, 
the figures stress the generally high reliance of 
companies on debt as a source of finance. 
Graph 4.1 illustrates the favourable treatment of 
debt over equity. In fact, fully debt-financed 
investment is subsidised in most EU Member 
States - the only exceptions being Spain, the UK 
and France. For new equity financed investment, 
the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) is positive 
in all EU Member States. Table 4.1 shows that 
debt is also favoured in many economies outside 
the EU like the USA, Switzerland, and Norway. 
(38) The IMF (2009) draws similar conclusions in a recent 
document on tax policy and the crisis. 
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Table 4.1: EMTR on debt and new equity financed investments 
in selected countries 
EMTR debt EMTR new equity
Croatia -18.0 16.3
Switzerland -14.3 22.2
Turkey -9.0 20.3
Norway -5.1 33.0
USA -3.6 46.0
FYROM 0.4 13.7
Canada 3.8 42.2
Japan 8.9 51.4
Source: European Commission (2010e). 
 
The debt-bias may also have lead to the issuing of 
hybrid instruments that blend characteristics of 
debt and equity, such as convertible debt 
obligations or asset-backed securities. These 
instruments qualify as debt and therefore allow for 
the deduction of interest paid but have equity-like 
characteristics. The instruments also tend to reduce 
the transparency and accountability of corporate 
financing policies. However, there are so far no 
empirical studies on the magnitude of these effects. 
In principle, two opposing measures exist that 
might eliminate this distortion between debt and 
equity by treating both sources of finance in the 
same way: an Allowance for Corporate Equity 
(ACE) or a Comprehensive Business Income Tax 
(CBIT). The ACE would grant a deduction for 
return on equity (39) as it is the case for interest 
paid and would hence reduce or abolish the tax 
advantage of debt.  
ACE and CBIT have been discussed extensively in 
the economic literature. (40) Both systems are 
appealing due to their efficiency properties with 
regard to the financing decisions of companies; 
however, there is no clear recommendation on 
which system is most favourable and there are key 
trade-offs when designing a reform towards any of 
these pure systems. (41) While in the context of 
open economies, ACE is more prone to profit-  
 
                                                          
(39) Either new equity only or all equity. 
(40) See Devereux and de Mooij (2009, 2010) for a detailed 
overview of this literature. 
(41) One should note that the treatment of interest and dividend 
income on the personal and corporate level has also to be 
considered in order to render the corporate tax system 
indeed financing neutral. The introduction of CBIT would 
also have cross-border implications that need to be further 
assessed. 
Graph 4.1: Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) of debt vs. new equity financed investment in EU27 countries 
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shifting (in particular when its narrow tax base is 
accompanied by higher corporate tax rates), CBIT 
might lead to increased distortions in marginal 
investment. In order to mitigate these effects, one 
might also consider a combination of the two 
systems, i.e. a system that imposes limitations in 
the deductibility of interest but allows for a partial 
deduction in the return on equity. A combined 
reform of a partial ACE and a partial CBIT 
mitigates the discrimination between debt and 
equity in both directions. At the same time, the 
implications for corporate tax revenue are 
offsetting. Therefore, one can design a reform 
package of a partial ACE and partial CBIT that is 
revenue-neutral for the government and which is 
still neutral with respect to the financial structures 
of companies. First, this would preserve financing 
neutrality. Secondly, it would reduce possible 
negative effects of each of the pure ACE or CBIT 
systems. Devereux and de Mooij (2009, 2010) 
look at the design of corporate tax bases with 
respect to financing neutrality using ACE and 
CBIT systems as well as a combination of the two. 
The investigation of the tax distortions of 
investment financing and the possible measures 
against these distortions have been analysed in a 
simulation model. The authors present simulations 
of different reform options, as well as comparing 
the implementation of ACE and CBIT as pure 
systems with a combination of both. These 
different types of reforms are investigated both for 
the case of individual implementation by each EU 
country - with the others sticking to their current 
tax systems - and for the case of a simultaneous 
implementation by all Member States. Under the 
assumptions of the model, it is shown that 
combining the two ACE/CBIT systems leads to the 
same neutrality in investment financing as each 
single reform but also improves welfare, both in 
the case of unilateral reforms and of EU-wide 
reforms. Despite the advantages of financing 
neutrality, ACE or CBIT reforms can be found 
only in very few Member States. (42) Discussions 
 
                                                          
(42) Belgium implemented an ACE system; Italy had ACE 
elements in its tax system but removed them after a short 
period. Germany limited interested deductibility which is a 
move towards CBIT. Italy has also limited the deductibility 
of interests thus moving towards a CBIT. Estonia has a 
CBIT system which does not allow interest deduction. 
Austria had implemented an ACE system from 2000 until 
2003. It was replaced by a favourable tax treatment for 
retained earnings from 2004 until 2009 for individuals. As 
from 2010, an indirect instrument for encouraging the 
accumulation of equity of businesses of individuals (a tax 
on the design of corporate tax bases with respect to 
their financing neutrality should therefore be a 
topic for discussion for policy-makers in the 
European Union in the aftermath of the crisis. 
4.1.2. The housing market  
The end of the speculative price bubble in the U.S. 
housing market has been identified as an important 
trigger for the financial crisis. In a nutshell, U.S. 
households received credits for consumption 
purposes on the assumption that the increase in 
house prices would be large enough to cover these 
outstanding credits. Graph 4.2 shows the Case-
Shiller House Price Index for the U.S. and 
illustrates the strong increase in house prices since 
the end of the last century and the dramatic 
decrease in house prices since 2006. (43) Home 
prices started to improve in 2009 but at a moderate 
pace. With house prices decreasing since 2006, 
these mortgages - and especially the securitised 
products made out of them - became toxic assets, 
leaving the financial sector with unknown risks in 
its balance sheets.  
Graph 4.2: Case-Shiller House Price Index 
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In Europe, Ireland and Spain faced price bubbles 
in the housing market that were similar to the one 
                                                                                   
free profit amount) was introduced. Finally, Latvia 
introduced an ACE as from 1 January 2009, in the case 
where a company is not distributing dividends partially or 
fully, taxable income is reduced by the amount of interest, 
which the company would have to pay for an equal loan.  
(43) A description of the index can be found here: 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-
home-price-indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p-us--
--.  
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experienced in the U.S. When the international 
crisis hit, this led to a severe downturn in these two 
countries, which had experienced high growth 
rates before the crisis. Other European countries 
like the UK, France, Sweden and the Netherlands 
experienced similar increases in house prices over 
the last decades, albeit to a lower degree. (44)  
While real house prices rose in many countries, the 
same was true for another important indicator of 
the attractiveness of owning a house: the price-to-
rent ratio. The ratio compares the discounted rents 
for a house with its current price. If the ratio is 
larger than 100, it is less attractive to own a house, 
as renting is less expensive than buying a house. 
Comparing this ratio across countries allows 
comparing the incentives to own a house. As seen 
in Graph 4.3, the price-to-rent ratio significantly 
increased in many countries over the last decade, 
especially in Ireland and Spain. Ireland also faced 
the most dramatic decrease after the peak was 
reached in 2005. 
 
 in some cases. 
                                                          
The house price bubble is also confirmed by the 
estimations of the Commission Services for a 
sample of EU Member States (Germany, France, 
Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom). These 
show that house prices were overvalued from the 
middle of the last decade – in some cases to a 
significant extent - in all countries but 
Germany. (45) The analysis also suggests that 
while house prices experienced pronounced 
corrections between the second half of 2007 and 
the first half of 2009, further corrections seem 
justified
The strong increase in house prices in many 
Member States and the diverging development in 
the different countries, in particular within the euro 
area, impact on several macroeconomic variables 
other than the above-mentioned consumer demand. 
Estimates published in European Commission 
(2009b) suggest that house prices also have an 
effect on the trade balance. Higher house prices are 
associated with higher current account deficits in 
OECD countries, with the effect being much 
stronger in the euro area. (46) This may be 
(44) See Graph 4.4 below. 
(45) See European Commission (2010c). 
(46) Panel estimates of the determinants of the trade balance 
suggest that a doubling of house prices would lead to a 
deterioration of the trade balance by more than 7% of GDP 
in the euro area. 
explained by the wealth effect of higher house 
prices on consumption. The effect on the trade 
balance is, however, probably also related to 
supply factors and the shift of productive resources 
from tradable sectors to the less productive 
housing sector. (47) Moreover, as shown by Setzer, 
van den Noord and Wolff (2010a), house price 
developments also impact on the different 
monetary dynamics of euro area Member States. 
Setzer, van den Noord and Wolff (2010b) therefore 
suggest that the generally strong increase 
combined with divergent developments in house 
prices in the euro area could have contributed to 
the euro area's vulnerability to the crisis.  
Graph 4.3: Price to rent ratio 
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Given the observations on the development of 
house prices, the question arises how taxes might 
influence house prices. To answer this question, it 
is helpful to break down the decision of buying a 
house into its two economic dimensions (48): a 
consumption decision and an investment-
production decision. The first facet is related to the 
decision of households to 'consume' housing 
services, which is mainly related to the quality of 
the house. The household decides what type of 
house and in which location they would like to 
'consume'. The investment-production decision is 
related to the potential value increase of the 
property, as households also take into account that 
owning a house is an investment. Housing is a 
durable good which can potentially be sold at a 
higher price, even after years of use. This makes 
                                                          
(47) See European Commission (2009b) for a more detailed 
discussion of the role of housing markets in the divergence 
of current accounts within the euro area. 
(48) A detailed analysis of the functioning of the housing 
market can be found in Pozdena (1988). 
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the decision of buying a house more complex than 
consumption decisions for other goods which are 
mainly based on price and the consumer's budget 
constraint. In the following, the focus is on the role 
of taxation for the investment decision. The reason 
is that the consumption decision is less relevant for 
the creation of bubbles in the housing market. 
Taxes can influence the investment decision via 
the real user cost of housing capital, defined as the 
costs of owning and operating the property. 
Among those costs, one can identify the foregone 
interest earnings on the equity in the house, the 
interest cost of funds borrowed to purchase the 
house, the depreciation of the structure, 
maintenance, insurances, property taxes and real 
estate transaction costs. Since housing is a durable 
good that can be resold, one has to also account for 
capital gains or losses that may reduce or increase 
the final user cost. Taxation affects several of these 
items and therefore influences the demand for 
housing. For example, the deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments, the taxation of capital 
gains or the treatment of imputed rents from owner 
occupied-housing may all influence the demand 
for housing.(49) 
Even though taxes influence house prices, taxation 
was probably not the key factor for the recent 
speculative bubbles in Spain, Ireland or the United 
States. The driving forces behind the boom in the 
construction sector were rather low real interest 
rates and the rapid expansion of credit. For 
instance, low interest rates together with relatively 
liberal mortgage markets and low transaction costs 
in housing markets have been cited as important 
reasons for the housing price bubble in Spain and 
Ireland. (50) Furthermore, because of increasing 
house prices, banks also tended to provide 
consumption credits to already indebted 
households. The basic (and wrong) idea was that 
these credits would be secured by future house 
price increases. 
 
                                                          
Taxes may also play a role because the tax regime 
in many countries provides incentives for  
 
                                                          
(49) For a theoretical analysis of capital gains taxes on housing 
see Fuest, Huber and Nielsen (2008). While it is often 
argued that capital gains taxes could reduce price volatility, 
the authors show that the taxation of capital gains might 
lead to even bigger price swings. 
(50) See Ahearne, Delgado and von Weizsäcker (2008). 
households to take on large amounts of debt, as 
interest payments are often tax-deductible. The 
interest deductibility for owner-occupied housing 
can sometimes also include home equity loans. 
Consequently, taxes can influence the volatility of 
the housing market. Many countries subsidise 
mortgage debt in order to stimulate house 
ownership, while levying relatively low property 
taxes. This favourable tax treatment not only 
results in a higher steady-state level of house 
prices but may also interact and magnify shocks 
that may hit the supply or the demand side of the 
housing market, since taxes affect the real user 
cost of housing (Poterba, 1984). The real user cost 
of housing model takes the view that changes in 
the after-tax user cost are responsible for shifts in 
housing demand, which in turn influence housing 
price movements. 
Van den Noord (2005) applies Poterba's model to 
analyse the effect of tax policy on house prices in 
Europe. In his study on eight European 
countries (51) over the period 1970- 2001, he finds 
evidence that price volatility is higher in low-
housing-tax countries while volatility is lower in 
countries where owner-occupied housing is taxed.  
While higher volatility might occur due to 
differences in tax systems, the overall trend in 
Europe for the last decade shows a constant 
upward trend in house prices in most countries. 
Until the 2008 crisis, house prices rose 
significantly in most European countries. Data 
from the European Central Bank on the Residential 
Property Price Index Statistics in 17 EU countries 
show that real prices of residential property 
increased significantly in all countries since 2001 
(Graph 4.4), bar Austria and Germany, where 
prices decreased. (52) Given this increase in prices 
in many countries with very different tax systems 
it is difficult to clearly evaluate the role played by 
taxes in these increases. 
(51) Germany, France, Italy Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Finland, and Ireland. 
(52) Germany had experienced a housing boom in the early 90s 
in the "new Länder". This boom had been caused by strong 
fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock, such as a 
special depreciation of 50% of the acquisition cost for 
privately-owned newly constructed buildings (see, e.g. 
Bensemann and Kiesewetter (2008)). Although the German 
experience goes beyond the issue of owner-occupied 
housing, it may serve as an example for a tax induced 
housing boom. 
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Graph 4.4: Development of real house prices between 1996 and 
2008 
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existing dwellings, geographical coverage: whole country. 
Source: ECB, Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
There may be a tendency in many countries to 
create tax incentives that lead to over-investment 
in housing, which in turn leads to lower 
diversification of households' investments, 
excessive home ownership and excessive leverage 
by home-owners. A reduction in mortgage 
deductions and/or the taxation of imputed rents 
from owner-occupied housing might lead to more 
stable housing markets, since gains and costs from 
housing would be treated more similarly. Taxes on 
immovable property mainly consist of regular 
annual levies on land or buildings (residential or 
commercial) and taxes on property transactions; 
they can therefore be subject to considerable 
cyclical fluctuation. In 2007, their revenue 
represented less than three percent of total 
revenues from taxation in 19 Member States out 
of25.(53) In the UK, however, taxes on real estate 
 
                                                          
(53) There is no information for Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. 
levied on both residential and commercial property 
made up nearly one tenth of total tax revenues in 
2008. As a share of GDP, revenue varied from a 
low of ¼% in Hungary to 3 ½% of GDP in the UK 
(see Table 4.2). 
Tax revenues can however also be raised on 
property in additional indirect ways (for which 
reliable data is typically missing). For instance, 
property ownership may be taxed under the 
personal income tax. This is quite straightforward 
in the case of leased property, as the tax will be 
calculated on the rent collected. In the case of 
owner-occupied housing, the assessment of the 
'proper' taxable base is more difficult, as it 
theoretically reflects the rental value that could be 
collected if the property were put on the market. 
Many countries have more or less given up on 
attempting to determine the exact current value of 
property and use revaluated historical values 
instead, often yielding much lower tax bases. It is 
hard to assess the order of magnitude of this source 
of taxation, but it is unlikely to be very large both 
because data show the share of PIT revenue from 
capital income to be low in almost all Member 
States (European Commission, 2010a) and 
governments often grant tax relief on mortgage 
payments, which then offsets the PIT revenue to a 
significant extent. Another example of indirect 
ways of taxing property is to raise taxes on goods 
and services that are complementary to housing, 
such as mortgages or house insurance contracts. In 
addition, immovable property is typically subject 
to non-negligible one-off taxation upon 
inheritance. The levels of revenue raised in this 
way vary again considerably among Member 
States. By and large, typical revenue levels vary 
between a negligible amount and ½% of GDP, 
only part of which is realised on immovable 
property (European Commission, 2010a). 
In conclusion, tax incentives may have played a 
role in the development of the housing bubble. 
However, the size of this role is – at least so far – 
difficult to assess and the odds are that this role has 
been secondary to monetary policy and credit 
market developments.  
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Table 4.2: Revenue from real estate taxes in the EU Member 
States, 2008 
Member state % of GDP % of Total Tax Revenue
Austria 0.43 1.01
Belgium 1.16 2.63
Bulgaria 0.2 0.61
Cyprus 0.48 1.22
Czech Republic 0.4 1.11
Germany 0.65 1.68
Denmark 0.97 2.03
Estonia 0.3 0.93
Greece 0.84 2.58
Spain 0.79 2.41
Finland 0.49 1.14
France 1.86 4.34
Hungary 0.23 0.57
Ireland 1.32 4.54
Italy 0.84 1.97
Lithuania 0.26 0.89
Latvia 0.63 2.19
Malta 1.16 3.39
Poland 1.09 3.17
Portugal 1.13 3.09
Romania 0.76 2.76
Sweden 0.75 1.61
Slovenia 0.53 1.43
Slovak Republic 0.36 1.27
United Kingdom 3.53 9.48
Note: For some countries the amount is underestimated due to omission 
of transaction taxes not exclusively levied on real estate or of minor 
levies. In other cases the amount could be overestimated by including 
property taxes or stamp duties that fall largely but not exclusively on 
real estate. In countries where real estate is largely taxed via transaction 
taxes, revenues can be subject to considerable cyclicality. 
Source: 'Taxes in Europe' Database'. 
 
The main options for reform are the taxation of 
imputed rents, together with mortgage interest 
relief, which would be the theoretically best way to 
tax all capital income while at the same time 
avoiding a subsidy to housing, or the reduction or 
abolition of mortgage interest relief (together with 
a non taxation of imputed rents). (54) Raising 
annual property taxes would be partly equivalent 
to increasing the taxation of imputed rents and 
could create a stable source of income. The latter, 
as pointed out by Keen et al. (2010), would 
however also mean the introduction of better 
valuation systems in order to create the necessary 
tax base.  
 
4.1.3. Executive compensation 
The public debate of systems and the overall level 
of executive remuneration in the financial sector 
                                                          
                                                          
(54) Discussion on these reform options is ongoing in several 
Member States. For example, the Irish Ministry of Finance 
has announced that mortgage interest relief will be phased 
out. 
have received large public attention during the 
crisis. While these systems create efficiency gains 
from the perspective of principal-agents problems 
in the relation between shareholders and 
executives, they also can create undesirable side 
effects. It is now widely acknowledged that pay 
packages of banks' executives contributed to an 
excessive focus on short-term performance. (55) 
Executives are indeed able to realise large 
payments from bonus and equity-based payments 
(i.e. stock options) before the long-term effects of 
business decisions are clear. (56)  
The basic difference between performance-related 
pay and fixed salaries is that some performance-
related payments, like stock options, might create 
incentives for taking risky behaviour. The question 
here is whether taxes had a significant influence on 
the spread of these schemes by offering a 
favourable tax treatment, i.e. whether payments in 
the form of bonuses, stock options and similar 
instruments have been treated more favourably 
than traditional wage payments.  
Since the 1990's, there has been a tendency for 
companies to develop specific executive 
compensation schemes, such as stock option plans. 
Tax rules for these payment schemes are complex 
and vary substantially across countries. There are 
examples in some countries of such schemes 
benefiting from favourable tax treatment, such as 
deductibility from corporate income tax, 
exemption from personal income tax or social 
security contributions. (57) While there may be 
certain tax or social security contribution aspects 
which favour these payment packages, there is 
evidence that, compared to salary payments, only 
some countries offer tax advantages that could act  
 
(55) A comprehensive overview of this literature can be found 
in Bebchuk and Spamann (2009). Bebchuk et al. (2010) 
describe the executive compensation at Bear Stearns and 
Lehman from 2000 to 2008 and come to the conclusion 
that pay packages provided incentives for excessive risk 
taking.  
(56) The fact that these incentives exist does however not mean 
that bank executives always profit from these 
arrangements. As Fahlenbach and Stulz (2009) show many 
bank CEO did not reduce their equity exposure from pay 
packages in the crisis and suffered large wealth losses as a 
consequence. 
(57) See Ceriani (2009) for a discussion. Austria abolished its 
beneficial taxation of stock options completely as of 1 
April 2009. 
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to amplify the problems linked to the contracts 
outlined above(58). The main tax advantage of 
stock options is the deferral of tax obligations 
which seem to be rather limited in size. (59) 
In conclusion, there is evidence that pay packages 
based on equity-based components can create 
incentives for executives to realise short-term cash 
payments. If the business strategy proves to fail in 
the long-term because of high risks taken in the 
short-run, these payments can usually not be 
retrieved. In this sense there is foremost a need for 
regulatory reform (60) to improve the incentives 
created by pay packages. Taxes could play an 
additional role in the sense that a higher taxation of 
equity-based pay-outs might reduce the incentives 
for excessive short-term strategies. 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(58) See OECD (2005) 
(59) See e.g. Keen et al. (2010). 
(60) In its Communication dated March 4th 2009, "driving the 
European recovery", the Commission indicated that it 
would strengthen its 2004 Recommendation on 
remuneration of directors of listed companies and table a 
new Recommendation on remuneration in financial 
services to address perverse incentives throughout firms. 
The Commission emphasised that the Recommendation 
should apply across the financial services industry, 
regardless of their legal status, in order not to leave aside 
financial institutions which may also be of importance to 
maintain financial stability and also to avoid any 
distortions of competition between different sectors 
covering the same labour market. These remuneration 
policy problems in the financial services sector are not 
limited to directors´ and managers´ pay, but also extend to 
remuneration schemes at other levels, notably to those 
persons whose work involves risk-taking (e.g. traders) and 
whose remuneration for a variable part is a function of 
performance. In line with the G20 London Summit 
conclusions, the Commission adopted on 30 April 2009 the 
Recommendation (2009/384/EC) on remuneration policy in 
the financial services sector. Its principles were also 
confirmed by a general agreement adopted in the ECOFIN 
Council meeting of November 10, 2009 proving the EU 
determination to act on this issue. The main objective of 
this Recommendation was to ensure that remuneration 
policies of financial institutions do not encourage excessive 
risk taking and are in line with the long-term interests of 
financial institutions. The Recommendation invited 
Member States to adopt measures in four main areas: (i) 
structure of remuneration policy, (ii) governance, (iii) 
disclosure of remuneration policy, (iv) supervision. 
Currently, the Commission evaluates the extent to which 
Member States have put in place the necessary framework 
in order to give effect to the main principles of the 2009 
Recommendation on remuneration policy in the financial 
services sector. 
4.2. TAXATION AS AN AUTOMATIC STABILISER 
4.2.1. Introduction 
The previous section analysed how different 
elements of the design of the tax system could 
have contributed to the economic and financial 
crisis. Taxation may, however, also have played a 
stabilising role in the current economic crisis. This 
can take place via discretionary measures 
implemented as active counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy or via the automatic stabilisers inherent in 
the tax system, which will be analysed in this 
section. (61) Stabilisers in the tax system 
complement other stabilisation policies such as 
automatic stabilisers on the expenditure side, 
discretionary fiscal policy and monetary policy. 
Following Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) 
automatic stabilisers can be defined as "…those 
elements of fiscal policy that tend to mitigate 
output fluctuations without any explicit 
government action."  
Automatic stabilisers have a number of advantages 
over discretionary policy measures in terms of the 
support they provide. Through their very nature 
they provide timely support, as tax receipts are 
directly linked to the performance of the economy. 
Furthermore, they do not require the identification 
of underlying trends before any action is taken by 
policy makers. Lastly, the size of the stabilisation 
provided is linked to the magnitude of the 
slowdown or overheating of the economy and 
there is no need to actively reverse the stabilisation 
provided once the economy returns to a sustainable 
growth path. 
The effectiveness of the automatic stabilisers 
depends on various factors, such as the openness 
of the economy, labour and product market 
flexibility and the type of shock hitting the 
economy. (62) There are different ways of looking 
at and measuring the automatic stabilising effect of 
the tax and expenditure systems. This section will 
in general focus on the proportion of 
(61) Discretionary measures taken by the EU Member States in 
response to the financial and economic crisis are addressed 
in chapter 3 of this report and presented in more detail in 
European Commission (2010a). 
(62) See, e.g. Buti et al. (2003) and Buti and Van den Noord 
(2003) for an analysis of the stabilisation effects for 
different shocks from the demand and supply side and 
European Commission (2010b) for a general discussion of 
the pros and cons of automatic stabilisers. 
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output/income shocks as measured in levels 
absorbed by the government. (63)  
4.2.2. Strength of automatic stabilisers in the 
overall tax system depends on various 
factors 
As regards the strength of automatic stabilisers, 
Darby and Mélitz (2007) refer to estimates for 
aggregate automatic stabilisation in OECD 
countries of around 0.5 as measured by the 
sensitivity of the budget to the cycle. Table 4.3 
presents estimations for automatic stabilisers in EU 
Member States. Looking at the reaction of levels 
of revenues and expenditure to changes in 
output/income, the revenue side turns out to be 
quantitatively more important for stabilisation than 
the expenditure side. This reflects the close-to-
unity elasticity of revenues with respect to GDP in 
most countries, describing an overall more or less 
proportional tax system. (64)  
The output smoothing capacity of a country's 
overall tax system depends on various factors. The 
aspect that has probably been analysed most in the 
macroeconomic literature is the link between the 
overall tax-to-GDP ratio and the strength of 
automatic stabilisers. (65) The relationship between 
the tax-to-GDP ratio and output volatility is 
certainly complex. There is, however, evidence 
that automatic stabilisers in general increase with 
higher tax-to-GDP ratios or bigger 
governments. (66) The relation, however, appears 
non-linear as several empirical studies find 
decreasing returns as regards output stabilisation of 
an increasing tax-to-GDP ratio above a certain 
value. Debrun et al. (2008) refer to a threshold in 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          (63) Another approach used in the literature is to look at 
budgetary items in ratios to GDP (and not levels), see, e.g. 
Darby and Mélitz (2007). Debrun et al. (2008), however, 
consider the analysis based on ratios to be flawed. The 
share of government spending in GDP would rise 
mechanically in bad times even at unchanged government 
spending levels (in $ or €). 
(64) In terms of ratios of revenues and expenditures to GDP, 
this implies that revenue ratios are more or less constant 
over the cycle, while expenditure ratios vary considerably. 
(65) See, e.g. Debrun et al. (2008) and Martinez-Mongay and 
Sekkat (2005) for an overview of the literature. For the 
assessment also measures of the government size other 
than the tax-to-GDP ratio are used, such as total revenues 
or government expenditure in percent of GDP. 
(66) See, e.g., Girouard and André (2005), which find that a 
larger government leads to a greater sensitivity of the fiscal 
position to fluctuations in economic activity. 
the area of around 40% above which a further 
increase in the government size would not increase 
output stabilisation in a relevant way.(67) The 
relationship appears to be non-stable over time, in 
particular due to structural changes, and depends 
on the characteristics of the individual country. 
Given the already high average tax-to-GDP ratio in 
the EU (see chapter 2), the likely increase in tax 
revenues in many Member States as a contribution 
to fiscal consolidation is unlikely to lead to a 
substantial increase in automatic stabilisation. 
Moreover, several empirical studies indicate that a 
higher tax-to-GDP ratio could negatively impact 
on growth, particularly in the case of corporate and 
personal income taxation in view of its effects on 
investment and labour supply (see chapter 5 for an 
analysis).  
A second factor that is critical for the automatic 
stabilisers is the progressivity of the overall tax 
system. A higher tax progressivity is in general 
seen as a way to enhance automatic stabilisers. 
Progressive taxation makes disposable income less 
volatile than income and tends to reduce 
fluctuations in GDP. (68) The benefits in terms of 
stabilisation must, however, be weighed against 
the potentially distortive effects as discussed in 
chapter 5 of this report. The increase in 
stabilisation due to higher progressivity might be 
limited when compared to the associated loss in 
efficiency. Simulations by Baunsgaard and 
Symansky (2009) suggest that increasing the 
elasticity of PIT with respect to GDP by 10 percent 
would lead to an increase of the automatic 
stabilisers by only 0.01% of GDP. The question of 
the stabilising role of tax progression will be 
looked at in more detail in the section on the 
personal income tax (PIT), which is the main 
(67) According to estimations by Debrun et al. (2008) an 
increase in government size by one percent of GDP in the 
area of government expenditure of around 40% of GDP is 
unlikely to yield a reduction in output growth volatility in 
excess of 0.1 percentage points. Buti et al. (2003) and Buti 
and Van den Noord (2003) even find that at high tax-to-
GDP ratios under specific circumstances a further increase 
in the tax-to-GDP ratio leads to a decrease in the automatic 
output stabilizers in the case of a supply shock. Whether 
and at which tax-to-GDP ratio this phenomenon is possible 
depends, e.g., on the country size and the openness of the 
economy. In such an area a reduction in the tax burden 
could lead to a double dividend of higher economic 
efficiency and more effective output stabilisation. See also 
Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat (2005). 
(68) See, e.g., Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat (2005) and Buti et 
al. (2003).  
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driver of the progressivity of the overall tax 
system. 
 
Table 4.3: Sensitivity of the budget to the cycle 
Sensitivity of 
revenues
Sensitivity of 
expenditure
Sensitivity of 
budget balance
BE 0.47 -0.07 0.54
BG 0.35 -0.01 0.36
CZ 0.36 -0.01 0.37
DK 0.50 -0.15 0.65
DE 0.40 -0.11 0.51
EE 0.29 -0.01 0.30
EL 0.42 -0.01 0.43
ES 0.38 -0.05 0.43
FR 0.44 -0.06 0.49
IE 0.36 -0.05 0.40
IT 0.49 -0.02 0.50
CY 0.39 -0.01 0.39
LV 0.26 -0.02 0.28
LT 0.26 -0.01 0.27
LU 0.48 -0.01 0.49
HU 0.45 -0.01 0.46
MT 0.35 -0.01 0.36
NL 0.39 -0.17 0.55
AT 0.43 -0.04 0.47
PL 0.33 -0.06 0.40
PT 0.41 -0.04 0.45
RO 0.28 -0.02 0.30
SI 0.41 -0.05 0.47
SK 0.27 -0.02 0.29
FI 0.41 -0.09 0.50
SE 0.48 -0.10 0.58
UK 0.40 -0.02 0.42
EU27 0.39 -0.05 0.43
Note: The sensitivity of the budget to the cycle measures the reaction of 
the level of the budget balance, in percent of GDP, to a one percent 
change in GDP. It is defined as the difference between the cyclical 
sensitivity of four tax categories (Personal tax, corporate tax, indirect tax 
and SSC) and current expenditure, weighted by their respective GDP 
shares. 
Source: Ameco database based on Girouard and André (2005). 
 
Thirdly, not only the level, but also the structure of 
the tax system (the tax mix) impacts on the 
strength of the automatic stabilisers. A higher 
reliance on cyclically sensitive taxes in overall tax 
revenues leads to higher automatic stabilisers. (69) 
Taxes as a function of income stabilise disposable 
income more than taxes that are fixed. Empirical 
studies confirm that direct taxes contribute more 
than social security contributions and again more 
than indirect taxes to automatic stabilisation, 
reflecting the higher elasticity of income taxes to 
the business cycle. Darby and Mélitz (2007) 
estimate for a set of OECD countries that around 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(69) See section 2.2 for an analysis of the developments of the 
main tax categories over the cycle. 
60% of the stabilisation via the tax system stems 
from direct taxes on households, around 30% from 
other direct taxes and around ten percent from 
SSC, with a statistically insignificant contribution 
from indirect taxes. (70) Baunsgaard and Symansky 
(2009), however, refer to simulations that show 
that the increase in the automatic stabilisers that 
can be achieved by a shift in the tax structure is 
rather small. (71) As in the case of tax 
progressivity, a change in the tax structure might 
negatively affect growth, thereby  outweighing the 
(potentially small) increase in automatic 
stabilization. (72)  
4.2.3. Design of individual taxes important for 
stabilisation  
In addition to the importance of characteristics of 
the overall tax system for the strength of the 
automatic stabilisers, it is important to analyse the 
extent to which individual taxes and their design 
matter. Given the above-mentioned importance of 
income taxes (and social security contributions) for 
automatic stabilisation, the following discussion 
will focus on personal and corporate income taxes.   
Personal income taxation and social security 
contributions 
Personal income taxes, as well as social security 
contributions (SSC), mitigate economic 
fluctuations by reducing the volatility of 
disposable income, i.e. a change in gross income 
leads to a smaller change in net income due to the 
levying of an income tax and the SSC, 
respectively. The strength of personal income tax 
(as well as SSC) as an automatic stabiliser depends 
on two aspects: (i) how does a change in gross 
income translate into a change in net income or 
disposable income (73) and (ii) how strong is the 
link between current disposable income and the 
demand for goods and services.  
(70) In their paper, Darby and Mélitz estimate the additional tax 
collection in levels that is produced by a positive output 
gap. 
(71) According to the authors, a shift in the composition of tax 
revenue by 5 percentage points from indirect taxes to PIT 
would increase automatic stabilisers on the G-20 average 
by only around 0.05 % of GDP. 
(72) See chapter 5.3 for a discussion of growth-friendly tax 
structures. 
(73) A change in gross-income can, of course, not only lead to a 
change in taxes and SSC but also to a change in benefit 
payments which also impact on disposable income. 
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The degree to which disposable income is 
smoothed through the tax system depends first of 
all on tax rates and the tax structure. A more 
progressive tax structure has a stronger stabilising 
effect, as a decrease (increase) in income will 
entail a lower (higher) average tax rate, but fully 
proportional or even regressive taxes can also have 
a stabilising effect. Disposable income will decline 
less than the pre-tax income as part of the decline 
in pre-tax income will automatically lead to a 
reduction in government revenue. 
Most EU Member States have progressive PIT. 
Seven EU Member States, however, currently 
apply so-called flat rate personal income taxes. (74) 
It is therefore worthwhile to analyse the strength of 
flat tax systems – as compared to standard 
progressive rate systems – as an automatic 
stabiliser.(75) The introduction of a flat tax 
combined with a tax-exempt threshold does not 
necessarily decrease tax progression (76) and the 
role of the tax system as an automatic stabiliser. 
The overall effect of the introduction of a flat tax 
on tax progression depends on the progressivity of 
the pre-reform tax rate schedule, the level of the 
new threshold, potential changes in the tax base, 
the impact on tax compliance and taxpayers' 
distribution. (77) Keen et al. (2008) point out that 
income shocks tend to be concentrated at lower 
levels of income. If this is the income region 
somewhat above the threshold of the flat tax, 
automatic stabilisation could actually be greater 
under the flat tax. This is due to the fact that in this 
income region, the introduction of a flat tax is 
typically associated with an increase in the 
marginal tax rate, whereas it leads to a reduction in 
the marginal tax rate for very low incomes below 
the tax allowance (to zero) and for high income 
levels. 
 
                                                          
However, it is not only the rate structure of the PIT 
that matters, but also the tax base. Tax deductions 
                                                          
(74) These Member States are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia. 
(75) See European Commission (2009a) and Keen et al. (2008) 
for a detailed discussion of so-called flat tax schemes. 
(76) See, e.g. Jakobsson (1976) for a discussion of different 
measures of tax progression.  
(77) As also pointed out in European Commission (2009a), 
global measures of tax progression need to consider how 
the entire distribution of income is changed through the tax 
system. To calculate such global measures, the tax (and 
benefit) schedule needs to be complemented with data on 
the distribution of income, which raises conceptual and 
data availability issues. 
in place in many tax systems can function in a pro-
cyclical way. To the extent that taxpayers move 
into lower tax brackets or even have no taxable 
income in economic downturns, the money value 
of tax deductions is reduced in times of downturns. 
From this perspective, tax credits are preferable to 
deductions or allowances, because the value of the 
tax credits is independent of the marginal tax rate 
as long as the tax due is positive. If the 
introduction of the tax credit in addition increases 
the progressivity of the marginal tax structure, it 
could further smooth macroeconomic demand 
fluctuations. Refundable tax credits even act as 
transfer payments in downturns and can smooth 
disposable income and stabilise the economy 
further.(78) 
In contrast to PIT, which in all but one EU country 
(79) has at least a progressive element, SSC overall 
tend to be linear or regressive. This is due to the 
fact that contribution ceilings are in place in many 
Member States. (80) However, as pointed out 
above, regressive contributions have a stabilising 
effect, too. In the case of SSC, the tax incidence is 
of importance for their potential to have an income 
stabilising effect. This applies in particular to 
employers' SSC, which can only have an income 
stabilising effect if they are borne by the 
employees. (81)  
A rather simple measure for the progressivity of 
the tax system including PIT and SSC can be 
calculated based on the tax wedge concept 
presented in Chapter 3.3. This can be done by 
comparing, e.g., the tax burden (incl. SSC) of a 
single person earning five thirds and two thirds of 
the average wage (see also OECD (2010)). This 
measure shows that the progressivity of personal 
income tax is partly offset by the regressive 
structure of SSC in many countries. Based on this 
measure, the progressivity of the tax system (incl. 
SSC) has increased or remained stable in all but 
two EU OECD Member States in the 2000 to 2009 
period (see discussion in Chapter 3.3).  
(78) For a more detailed discussion of tax credits see Batchelder 
et al. (2006). 
(79) Bulgaria is the only EU Member State with a flat rate tax 
that currently has no general tax allowance. 
(80) See 'Taxes in Europe' database for a presentation of the rate 
structure in the Member States. 
(81) In case they are borne by the employers, a reduction in the 
employers' SSC would have no impact on the disposable 
income of the employees. 
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The extent to which the stabilisation of disposable 
income translates into a lower volatility of 
household consumption depends on several 
factors. The demand of households will remain 
unchanged if the demand depends on permanent 
income or life-cycle decisions, the households 
perceive the decline in income as transitory, and if 
they are not credit constrained. In this case the 
impact of the automatic stabiliser would be zero. 
In case of a (normal) cyclical downswing, the 
extent to which households are liquidity 
constrained or myopic is important. While the 
economic and financial crisis has likely impacted 
trend growth, it is unclear how far this will impact 
on the expectations of households about their 
permanent and lifetime income.  
 
                                                          
In a recent study, Dolls et al. (2010) calculate 
automatic stabilisers of the tax and benefit system 
in the crisis. The study is based on micro data for 
19 EU Member States and the US and focuses on 
the effects of PIT, employees' SSC and 
unemployment benefits. (82) With respect to the 
first two components, it derives estimates of 36% 
and 28% for the share of the income shock 
absorbed by automatic stabilisers in EU countries  
for a proportional income shock and an 
unemployment shock, respectively (83) (see Table 
4.4). This implies that around one third of the 
reduction in gross income directly leads to lower 
government tax revenues and two thirds to lower 
disposable income of households. (84) The study 
derives an additional income stabilisation effect 
via higher government spending on unemployment 
benefits of 1.7% and 18.8% for the two types of 
shocks. As discussed above, the results for demand 
stabilisation depend on how the change in 
disposable income translates into a change in 
demand. Under the permanent income hypothesis, 
a change in current disposable income can only 
lead to a change in demand when parts of the 
households are credit constrained. Dolls et al. 
(82) The study also contains extensions to consider the role of 
employers' SSC and consumption taxes. 
(83) In the case of an income shock the study assumes a 
proportional decline in household gross income by 5%, 
whereas in the case of the unemployment shock it assumes 
an increase in the unemployment rate that leads to a 
decrease in total household income by 5%. 
(84) An assessment of flat tax system is not possible based on 
this dataset as it only includes one flat tax Member State 
(Estonia). For this country, however, it is interesting to 
note that the income stabilising effect of the PIT alone is 
rather close to the EU average (23% for Estonia compared 
to an average of 26%). 
(2010) use four different approaches to identify 
liquidity constrained households. Taking the tax 
and benefit system together, the demand stabilising 
effects range from 4.1% to 31.3% for the two 
shock scenarios analysed. The results are quite 
heterogeneous across countries, with Central and 
Northern European Countries having in general 
much higher automatic stabilisers than Eastern and 
Southern European countries. This is, e.g., shown 
by the demand stabilising effect in the case of a 
proportional income shock using an upper limit for 
the share of credit constrained households: the 
demand stabilising effect of the tax/benefit system 
ranges from 2.1% (Slovenia) to 44.8% (Denmark). 
 
Table 4.4: Automatic stabilisation of PIT, employee SSC and 
benefits 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound
PIT 0.260 0.156
SSC 0.100 0.124
Benefit 0.017 0.188
SUM 0.377 0.041 0.242 0.468 0.132 0.313
Unemployment scenario
demand 
stabilisation
Income scenario
demand 
stabilisationIncome 
stabilisation
Income 
stabilisation
Note: Arithmetic averages of the 19 EU countries analysed. 
Source: Dolls et al. (2010). 
 
To conclude, the tax and benefit system tends to 
stabilise income and demand over the cycle in a 
static perspective. However, relatively high 
automatic stabilisers can potentially encourage 
activity and increase employment in cyclical 
industries through softening the negative effects of 
downturns on disposable income. Such 
behavioural adjustment may offset part of the 
stabilisation effect of the tax/benefit system. 
Corporate income taxes 
Due to their cyclical nature, profits are far more 
volatile than GDP. Despite their generally linear 
tax rate, corporate income taxes therefore account 
for a greater share of tax fluctuations than their 
rather low share in overall tax revenues would 
suggest (see Chapter 2). This, however, does not 
necessarily imply that corporate income taxes play 
an important role as automatic stabilisers. 
Decisions of firms to invest or purchase input 
goods do in general not depend on their current 
cash flow and how it is influenced by taxation, but 
on capital costs and expectations about the 
profitability of investment linked to present and 
expected future demand. 
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Corporate income taxes only have a stabilising 
effect if two conditions are fulfilled: (85) (i) the tax 
system must cushion fluctuations in profits, or in 
other words, a change in taxable profits needs to 
translate into a change in the tax due. This is the 
case if a company has a positive current taxable 
income or if a loss making position has the 
possibility to carry the loss back. (ii) Companies 
must at the same time face a lack of financial 
reserves and be credit constrained. In the case that 
both conditions are fulfilled, the effect of tax 
policy on the cash flow becomes important in 
stabilising demand and CIT plays a countercyclical 
role in downturns. (86) It is important to note that 
both the share of companies that are credit-
constrained and of those that have positive profits 
are affected by the cycle. While the share of 
companies making profits increases (decreases) in 
an upswing (downswing), the share of credit-
constrained companies tends to decrease (increase) 
The size of the automatic stabiliser also depends 
on the CIT rate itself, with a higher CIT rate 
implying a stronger stabiliser. (87) 
A loss carry forward is less valuable than a loss 
carry back. As a loss carry forward does not only 
have the disadvantage that the real value of the 
payment is lower because of its postponement to a 
future period, but also that it does not stabilise the 
current cash flow. Restricting loss offsets by 
excluding loss carry back therefore reduces the 
potential of CIT as an automatic stabiliser. 
Currently, companies can carry forward losses 
indefinitely in around half the EU Member States, 
with the period limited to 5 to 15 years in the other 
Member States (see Table 4.5). Some Member 
States have specific conditions for the carry 
forward or put a limit on the maximum amount 
used in a given year. Only five Member States 
allow in general for the carry-back of losses (see 
Table 4.5) 
 
                                                          
(85) See, Buettner and Fuest (2009), Devereux and Fuest (2009) 
and Auerbach and Feenberg (2000). 
(86) The CIT tax might also have an indirect effect not only via 
the investment demand of companies but also via enabling 
companies to maintain dividend payments in recessions 
which maintains the disposable impact of the shareholders 
at a relatively stable level.  
(87) See Table A.1.3 in Annex 1 for an overview of the top CIT 
rates in the EU Member States 
 
Table 4.5: Loss carry-forward and back in the EU, 2009 
5 years BG, CZ, EL, IT, PL, SK
6 years PT
7 years RO
8 years LV
9 years NL
10 years FI
15 years ES
indefinite BE, DK, DE, IE, FR, CY, LT, LU, HU, MT, AT, SI, SE, UK
- BE, BG, CZ, DK, EL, ES, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, AT, 
PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE
1 year DE, IE, NL, UK
3 years FR
Loss carry-forward
Loss carry-back
Note: The table presents the general situation for the loss carry-forward 
and back. Some Member States have specific conditions for the carry 
forward or back or put a limit on the maximum amount used in a 
specific year. For a detailed description see, e.g., 'Taxes in Europe' 
database. Losses carry-back and -forward are not applicable in the case 
of Estonia. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Several countries have (temporarily) introduced 
more generous rules on carry forwards and carry 
backs in the course of the current crisis. In the 
Netherlands, corporate taxpayers may opt, based 
on a temporary provision, to carry back losses for 
two years with respect to the fiscal years 2009 and 
2010. (88) In the Slovak Republic, the loss carry-
forward period was increased from five to seven 
years applicable as of 2010, in Latvia from 5 to 8 
years as of 2009 and in Romania from 5 to 7 years 
also as of 2009. In France, carry back credits were 
reimbursed immediately in 2009, instead of the 
usual delay of up to five years, enhancing its role 
as an automatic stabiliser. 
The merits of loss carry-forwards and particular 
carry-backs are not undisputed. Loss offsets (either 
longer carry forwards or carry back) have a cost in 
terms of lower tax revenue and make revenue 
forecasting more difficult. Moreover, they impose 
a burden on the tax administration, in particular in 
the case of carry-back. Finally, loss carry forwards 
and backs are also associated with fears about 
abuse, which has made several countries introduce 
restrictions on the use of losses from other periods 
in recent years. (89) On the other hand, a generous  
 
                                                          
(88) For companies using this option, the loss carry forward is 
restricted to six instead of the usual nine years. 
(89) See, e.g., Dwenger (2008) for a discussion of tax loss offset 
restrictions that have been introduced in Germany in recent 
years. 
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approach with regard to losses in times of 
recessions can ease restructurings (mergers, 
acquisitions). (90) As a general rule, the tax system 
should neither prevent nor encourage 
restructurings.  
Even if loss carry backs were possible, delays in 
collection can reduce the potential role of CIT as 
an automatic stabiliser. (91) The potential 
stabilising effect also depends on whether the 
instalments are based on income from previous 
years or on estimated income for the current year, 
with the latter treatment being preferable.(92) A 
CIT system that more closely reflects actual 
profitability is in general preferable from a 
stabilisation point of view as well. 
Whereas they can function in a stabilising way in 
downturns, it could be asked whether corporate 
income taxes might turn out to be pro-cyclical in 
upturns. Many corporations, at least in the first 
years of an upswing, benefit from past loss carry 
forwards as an instrument to reduce their tax due, 
which provides them with extra liquidity. 
Few empirical studies exist on the role of the CIT 
as an automatic stabiliser. Devereux and Fuest 
(2009) find a very small demand stabilisation 
effect for the UK of 1 per cent of the initial shock 
to gross income. In the presence of a full loss 
offset (carry back), the effect would have 
amounted to 8.5 per cent. Using a more detailed 
data set for Germany, Buettner and Fuest (2009) 
find a higher stabilising effect of CIT in the range 
of 3-13 percent of the initial shock to gross 
revenues in a situation with no loss carry back. As 
discussed above, the result depends on the share of 
firms that have a positive taxable income and are 
at the same time credit constraint. Both shares 
change with the cycle, although in an opposite 
way. According to Buettner and Fuest (2009) the 
role of the CIT as an automatic stabiliser is likely 
to increase with the length of the downturn as the 
share of credit constraint companies tends to grow. 
It is also important in how far a demand 
stabilisation also stabilises domestic output, as part 
of the demand could leak to other countries. 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(90) See Keen et al. (2010). 
(91) See Creel and Saraceno (2008). 
(92) See, for instance, Baunsgaard and Symansky (2009). 
Overall, the available empirical evidence points to 
CIT playing only a limited role as an automatic 
stabiliser.  
4.2.4. Automatic discretionary policy  
The previous sections showed that, despite the 
number of advantages they have over discretionary 
policy measures, the stabilising elements inherent 
in the tax system suffer from the fact that tax 
systems must fulfil multiple aims. As such, their 
ability to respond to the aim of stabilisation is 
restricted by their other objectives, which are of 
primary importance. Moreover, the use of 
extensive discretionary stimulus as the crisis hit 
indicates that the amount of automatic stabilisation 
provided was expected to be insufficient. 
Increasing the size of the automatic stabilisers 
would therefore have strong advantages for most 
countries. Against this background, the question 
emerges: how to enhance stabilisation without 
compromising growth? (93) 
Recently, the idea of automating discretionary 
policy has been increasingly discussed as an 
alternative to increasing the traditional automatic 
stabilisers in the case of severe recessions.(94) This 
idea envisages predefining specific tax changes, 
like temporary VAT reductions, PIT rebates, 
investment tax credits, for predefined economic 
situations, such as a specific projected reduction in 
GDP. Such policy measures could be targeted at 
households that would have large multipliers. By 
using automatic discretionary policy decisions, 
changes to the tax system could be in place much 
faster than the normal discretionary changes. They 
could contribute to lessening interference by 
politicians and reducing uncertainty. However, in 
order to be revenue-neutral these measures would 
need to be counterbalanced, e.g. by automatically 
higher rates in good times, at the risk of some 
asymmetry over the cycle. (95)   
Another stabilisation device could be the 
establishment of so-called rainy-day funds. Such 
instruments could strengthen the commitment of 
governments to not spend or give away via tax cuts 
because of better-than-expected budgetary 
(93) For this discussion see also European Commission 
(2010b). 
(94) See, for instance, Solow (2005).   
(95) For a more detailed discussion of design issues and other 
questions see Baunsgaard and Symansky (2009). 
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outcomes in good economic times. Building on a 
non-ambiguous definition of good and bad 
economic times, predefined revenue rules could 
reinforce such commitments by determining ex 
ante which share of revenue windfalls should be 
saved. (96) The potential of such schemes depends 
largely on country-specific features. For instance, 
in countries where housing taxes are driven by 
highly cyclical transaction tax revenues, rainy-day 
funds could be a way to improve the management 
of such revenue windfalls. (97)      
4.3. FINANCIAL SECTOR TAXATION 
The activities and business structure of the 
financial sector have been intensely scrutinised in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis. (98) While 
there is broad consensus that taxes did not a play a 
central role in the build-up to the crisis, there is an 
ongoing debate about whether certain activities of 
the financial sector and the structure of balance 
sheets of financial institutions have been 
detrimental to stability.  
In recent months, various tax measures have been 
debated in several international fora, such as the 
EU and the G20, to possibly remedy this situation. 
The European Commission has issued a Staff 
Working Document on innovative financing at 
global level that dealt with i.a. financial sector 
taxation. (99) The IMF presented a report to the 
G20 ministerial meeting in June 2010 on the 
possibilities for taxing the financial sector. (100)  
This section discusses one important aspect of the 
current debate, namely the question of whether the 
potential existence of pure economic rents in the 
financial sector might justify a tax that specifically 
addresses these rents, e.g. by taxing profit and 
remuneration like the Financial Activities Tax 
(FAT) proposed by the IMF. In addition, other 
instruments can be specifically applied to the 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(96) Balassone et al. (2007) provide evidence regarding the US 
that the effectiveness of rainy-day funds hinges crucially 
on the existence of strong fiscal rules. 
(97) For a discussion of the size and determinants of revenue 
windfalls in EU countries, see Barrios and Rizza (2010). 
(98) The financial sector is defined in this section as consisting 
of banks. This does not mean that the basic issues 
discussed here do not apply to other financial companies 
like insurance companies.  
(99) See European Commission (2010d). 
(100) See IMF (2010b).  
financial sector, e.g. bank levies (101). In fact, these 
instruments have already been discussed in some 
detail in the above mentioned Commission Staff 
Working Document (European Commission 
(2010d)). Before the FAT and a tax on bonuses are 
discussed in more detail, the proposal for an FTT 
and a bank levy will be addressed briefly.(102) 
The idea of a transaction tax is derived from a 
1978 proposal by James Tobin. (103) He proposed 
an internationally based tax on all spot conversions 
from one currency into another. The idea of an 
FTT has a much broader scope and can also be 
applied to other financial transactions such as 
equity, bonds, derivatives etc. In the recent 
discussions, the proponents of an FTT have made 
the point that it could stabilise financial markets by 
reducing speculative and technical trading and 
raise substantial tax revenue. The effect on price 
volatility is, however, found to be positive in a 
number of empirical studies.(104) The possible 
effects for business and government financing, and 
on the allocative efficiency of financial markets 
due to the increase in the price of transactions, 
would need to be further assessed. In terms of 
economic incidence, the distributional effects 
depend on the extent to which financial 
intermediaries can pass on the costs to their clients. 
In addition, the relative distribution of financial 
transactions also needs to be further assessed. An 
FTT also faces open legal questions, especially 
with respect to the taxation of currency 
transactions. The tax would discriminate between 
all transactions involving countries with different 
currencies compared to countries with one 
currency. (105) Estimations highlight significant 
revenue raising power, with numbers ranging 
range up to EUR 20 billion at EU level and EUR 
50 billion worldwide (excluding contributions 
from derivatives)(106), but these estimates are 
(101) These levies could be labelled as taxes in case the revenue 
was used for the general budget. 
(102) While a tax is usually defined as a payment which is 
directed to the general budget without any equivalent 
given, a levy is usually associated with the payment entitles 
the payer to receive some equivalent for the levy.   
(103) See Tobin (1978). 
(104) See for example Baltagi, Li and Li (2006), Hau (2006) as 
well as Jones and Seguin (1997). 
(105) For a more detailed analysis of FTT and its potential merits 
and weaknesses see also European Commission (2010d) as 
well as IMF (2010b).  
(106) It is not straight forward to determine the transaction value 
for derivatives. 
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al 
financial markets. 
ould be part 
of a credible resolution framework." 
                                                          
subject to significant uncertainty. (107) There is 
also a risk of circumvention, both from the 
relocation of transactions to non-taxed 
jurisdictions and from the shifting of financial 
intermediation to untaxed products. In conclusion, 
the FTT could be a revenue raiser, but it should be 
levied at global level in order to reduce relocation 
issues given the high mobility of internation
The Commission Communication on "Bank 
Resolution Funds" of 26 May 2010 (108) suggests 
the setting up of 27 harmonised Member State 
funds to finance the orderly and financially non-
disruptive resolution of EU banks. It suggests that 
these funds should be pre-funded by financial 
sector contributions, referring to banks' liabilities 
as one potential tax base. Balance-sheet related 
levies are a potentially useful tool in the context of 
a fair sharing of the burden of past and possible 
future economic crises. Various proposals are 
currently being discussed or have already been 
introduced in various countries. (109) Bank levies 
can also contribute to the internalisation of 
systemic risk, which is in particular created by 
systemically important large banks. Depending on 
the design of the levy it might reduce excessive 
risk taking by financial institutions, and thereby 
foster financial stability. However, higher costs of 
capital could also reduce credit demand and supply 
and thereby, investment and aggregate growth. The 
size of the effect might, under reasonable 
assumptions for the base and rate of the levy, be 
relatively small. If the base was calculated on 
consolidated (world-wide) balance sheets, 
international coordination would be necessary in 
order to avoid a double burden and reduction of 
financial intermediation.(110) On 17 June 2010, the 
European Council adopted conclusions about bank 
levies: "The European Council agrees that 
Member States should introduce systems of levies 
and taxes on financial institutions to ensure fair 
burden-sharing and to set incentives to contain 
systemic risk. Such levies or taxes sh
                                                          
(107) See European Commission (2010d) for a presentation and 
discussion of current revenue estimates. 
(108) See COM(2010) 254 final: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/crisis-
management/funds/com2010_254_en.pdf 
(109) For an overview of current proposals see IMF (2010b). 
(110) In fact, some member states already expressed their 
intention to impose additional levy on specific financial 
market institutions.  
The remainder of this section starts with a 
discussion about whether the financial sector is 
under-taxed, notably about whether the sector 
enjoys specific rents which should be taxed. Next, 
it turns to specific tax and regulatory provisions 
that may influence taxation. 
4.3.1. Sector-specific economic rents? 
Competition within the financial sector and the 
regulation of banks differ significantly from other 
sectors. (111) The reason is that banks fulfil specific 
roles in the economy, with direct and strong effects 
on the entire economy. Among other functions, 
banks provide means of payment. They also act as 
intermediaries between small amounts of short-
term capital supply (i.e. depositors) and demand 
for large long-term amounts from borrowers. In 
addition, they screen borrowers, monitor their 
activity and enforce repayments. 
These functions imply high interconnectivity 
between banks and mean that considerable 
liquidity and credit risk must be held by banks. As 
providers of payment systems, banks create 
interconnected networks. Many clients of banks 
only make use of these payment systems and do 
not act as financial investors. These depositors are 
protected by regulation (e.g. Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes protect them up to a certain degree 
against losses). Furthermore, banks transform 
short-term deposits into long-term credits, which 
requires them to handle maturity mismatches (i.e. 
short versus long term interest rates) and to 
manage liquidity and market risk. Banks trade in 
interbank markets (either directly among each 
other or through brokering platforms) to meet their 
liquidity requirements and to achieve their 
profitability and risk targets. For these markets, 
financial stability and trust are essential. If they are 
distorted, as witnessed in the recent crisis, banks 
would run in severe liquidity problems. Given   
these characteristics of the banking sector, some 
form of safety network for banks is necessary to 
protect bank clients from the effects of a potential 
bankruptcy and to preserve the financial stability 
needed for sufficient liquidity. 
Banks are different from other sectors for two 
main reasons: (a) their bankruptcy carries, 
depending on the size of the failing institution, a 
(111) The argument draws on Beck et al. (2010). 
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high social cost and negatively affects competing 
banks through their interconnectedness in 
interbank markets; and (b) the existence of an 
(implicit or explicit) safety net combined with 
banking regulation may put banks into a situation 
where they enjoy economic rents. Banks are aware 
of this special situation and this may create moral 
hazard for systemic important banks. Those are 
usually big and highly interconnected banks In 
particular, large and strongly interconnected 
financial institutions that may expect to be bailed 
out in case of default, have an incentive to take 
excessive risk. (112). 
It is often argued that the financial sector might 
enjoy pure profits (i.e. economic rents) and face 
moral hazard because of these implicit guarantees, 
and that they might be oversized because of this 
special position. In fact, the proposals for bank 
levies based on (risky) items of their financial 
statements and related resolution funds try to 
mitigate the problem of implicit guarantees by 
providing better incentives to reduce risks 
exposure, and reducing the rents that accrue to the 
"too big to fail" institutions. (113) In general, 
temporary rents for a single company or a sector 
are not problematic. High profitability in a sector 
will lead to more investment and entry in that 
sector. (114) The increased competition will drive 
profits down to 'normal' market returns. If 
competition works properly, then there is no 
problem with pure profits from, e.g., product or 
production innovations. Due to the special 
structure of the financial sector – high 
interconnectedness and concentration (115), 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(112) The difference to other sectors with respect to moral hazard 
can be explained by using the pharmaceutical sector as an 
example. If a company sells a drug which is later proven to 
be damaging for patients, the company will have to pay for 
the damages. The government does not bail out the 
company, in fact, it might even go bankrupt. However, this 
bankruptcy is not problematic for other pharmaceutical 
companies since the companies in this sector are not as 
interconnected as companies in the financial sector. On the 
contrary, the failure of a competitor usually increases the 
profit opportunities of other companies.  
(113) See also the Communication of the European Commission 
on Bank Resolution Funds (COM(2010) 254 final). 
(114) Take again the pharmaceutical sector as an example. Rents 
in this sector are even legally protected by patents in order 
to create incentives for research. However, after the patent 
expires competitors try to create generics. This process 
drives prices and profits down. 
(115) The GDP-weighted average EU27 C3 ratio, indicating the 
cumulative share of the largest three competitors was 70 % 
in 2008. Note that the figure for the US is 35 % 
(computations based on Beck and Demirgüç, 2009). 
however, this competitive mechanism might not 
work properly in the financial sector. As a 
consequence, there might be persistent economic 
rents and - if this is the case - it would be 
reasonable to tax these rents (i.e. tax profits above 
a 'normal' return to factors of production). 
Identifying these rents is nevertheless a difficult 
exercise. Hence, an alternative approach would be 
to tax some proxy for the risk exposure of the 
banks: the tax is then designed not only to capture 
the rents that accrue to the “too big to fail” 
institutions, but to provide better risk allocation to 
them, thereby indirectly reducing the extra rents 
through excessive risk taking. 
4.3.2. Corporate Income Taxation 
Corporate income tax provisions generally apply in 
the same way to banks and non-banks. In that 
sense, taxable profit is subject to the same 
statutory tax rate. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the financial sector faces a 
tax burden similar to other sectors. Several caveats 
apply.  
First, in many countries, accounting practices and 
frameworks seem to differ from the ones applied to 
non-financial companies. This blurs the notion of 
accounting profit. Huizinga and Laeven (2009) 
also suggest that the financial sector might enjoy 
large discretion in the computation of their taxable 
profit. Although the authors do not discuss the 
differences with non-financial sectors, it is 
possible that this creates a bias. This is because the 
widespread method of fair value accounting (116) 
might be more beneficial in terms of the kinds of 
assets and liabilities held by financial institutions 
than those of companies in non-financial sectors. 
(117) Fair value accounting is indeed somewhat 
more subject to discretion than values based on 
historical cost. 
Second, the structure of income in the banking 
sector differs strikingly from the one in non-
financial sectors. In the latter, profits are derived 
(116) In particular, the IAS 39 that applies to financial 
instruments. Note, however, that in some countries such as 
Belgium, the taxation statement follow the accounting 
statements and are widely based on historical costs. 
(117) Although this argument needs to be balanced by the fact 
that some sectors may have proportionally more intangibles 
than the financial sector and that the accounting value of 
these assets is also subject to some degree of discretion. 
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from the total amount of sales, from which the cost 
of materials and the compensation of workers is 
deducted to provide the gross operating profit. The 
net operating profit is obtained by deducting 
depreciation allowances and by correcting for 
value adjustments and provisions. Then the 
financial income is added, the interest paid is 
deducted and value adjustments on financial assets 
are made (in addition to extraordinary income and 
charges) to obtain the taxable profit. In the banking 
sector, the bulk of revenues is made out of net 
interest income (received minus paid) and of net 
fees and commissions received. Next, staff and 
property costs are deducted and all provisions 
accounted for. This conceptual difference in 
revenue makes it difficult to compare the tax bases 
in the absence of a satisfactory comparable 
measure of profit. 
Third, because of their interconnectivities, banks 
may be more likely to be part of an international 
group. This, coupled with the specific 
characteristics of their assets, could enable them to 
shift profit more easily. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2001) indeed find evidence that foreign-
owned banks engage in profit-shifting activities. 
(118) They report that for the years 1988-1995, the 
average share of foreign bank assets was 27% for a 
set of 80 OECD and developing countries. 
Isolating EU Member States only, the average was 
21%. This is exactly the value found by Huizinga 
and Nicodème (2006) for all sectors in Europe 
over the period 1996-2001. Although the time 
frames are different, this does not seem to strongly 
suggest that banks are clearly more multinational 
than non-financial sectors. The question of 
whether their assets are more easily shifted abroad 
remains an empirical question, although the tax 
elasticity of some financial products is estimated to 
be high. (119)  
What does the empirical evidence tell us? In terms 
of their contribution to tax receipts, the financial 
sector accounted for a substantial share of 
corporate tax revenue before the crisis. The EU27 
GDP-weighted average share of the contribution 
by the financial sector to corporate tax collection 
was around 20% in both 2006 and 2007. It 
 
                                                          
(118) Also, the assignment of banking policy responsibilities 
varies between host and home countries across policies 
(see table 7). 
(119) See Huizinga and Nicodème (2001) for international 
deposits. 
decreased to 17% in 2008 as a result of the crisis. 
This share will most probably decrease further in 
the coming years due to the fact that the losses 
accumulated in the crisis will reduce future tax 
payments via loss carry forward. These values for 
the EU27 are similar to those for many non-EU 
G20 countries, as collected by the IMF for its 
preliminary report to the G20. For the period 
between 2006 and 2008, the share of the financial 
sector in corporate taxation was around 18% for 
the United States, 23.5% for Canada and around 
15% in Brazil and Australia. The financial sector 
therefore seems to have a share in total CIT that 
exceeds its share in the value-added or total 
employment of the business sector, at around 5 and 
3% respectively. This is, however, not evidence 
that the financial sector is over-taxed, as higher 
profitability – stemming from rents or not - 
inevitably leads to higher taxes. However, given 
that implicit state guarantees result at least partly 
in economic rents there is a theoretical case for 
above-market profits in the sector. Further research 
will need to address this empirically. 
4.3.3.  Exemption from Value-Added Taxation 
If statutory provisions of corporate tax systems do 
not seem to discriminate between the financial 
sector and the non-financial activities, the same is 
not true for value-added taxation. Since the 
adoption of the Sixth VAT Directive in 1977, the 
EU's common value added tax system has 
generally exempted mainstream financial services, 
including insurances and investment funds. Article 
135(1) of the VAT Directive provides an 
exemption from VAT for most financial and 
insurance services. To some extent the Directive 
reflects an uncertain approach in that it also allows 
EU Member States to grant taxable persons the 
option of taxing financial services – to the extent 
that this is technically possible. The difficulty is to 
technically define the price of specific financial 
operations (e.g. for interest margins). .  
Applying VAT to financial activities raises 
difficulties. As Huizinga (2002) points out, a major 
input (and output) in the financial industry is 
capital and determining the price on which VAT 
shall be applied is difficult, for example because 
interest rates charged or offered also reflect i.a. 
risk premia or the price of auxiliary services. The 
situation is even more complicated if either the 
borrower or the lender is a business. In that case, 
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one would have to determine the share of interest 
margin made by the bank that accrues to the VAT-
liable operator (De la Feria and Lockwood, 2010).  
The question of whether applying VAT to the 
financial sector would raise additional tax revenues 
and – consequently – whether the exemption 
constitutes an under-taxation case for the financial 
sector is an unsettled empirical question. Whereas 
the exemption means that the financial sector does 
not charge VAT on most of its output, it cannot 
either deduct the VAT charged on its inputs. This 
is known as the 'irrecoverable VAT problem'. 
Based on case studies, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2006) found that VAT recovery rates in the 
financial sector varied from 0% to 74%. The 
variations in recovery rates could be explained by 
differences in the way in which the Member States 
interpret the scope of the exemption and the option 
to tax. De la Feria and Lockwood (2010) estimate 
the irrecoverable VAT at 0.39% of total tax 
revenue for Italy, 0.43% for Spain, 0.64% for 
France, 0.65% for the Netherlands, 0.74% for 
Germany and 1.48% for the UK.  
To account for this potential under-taxation and to 
overcome the difficulties in applying VAT, several 
authors have proposed various versions of cash-
flow VAT taxation, which would treat all inflows 
as taxable and all outflows as creditable inputs (see 
e.g. Poddar and English (1997)) 
4.3.4. Quasi-taxation 
As stressed by Honohan (2003), the financial 
sector is also subject to many regulations that act 
as quasi-taxes. These are reserve requirements at 
the Central Bank (often unremunerated or with low 
remuneration), liquidity reserve requirements, as 
well as in some countries – although not in the EU 
– explicit interest ceilings. In addition, banks are 
subject to the payment of contributions to deposit 
guarantee schemes (120) and there are ongoing 
debates on the bank levy, including its possible use 
for the financing of resolution fund(s). 
Furthermore some Member States have already 
expressed their intention to impose an additional 
levy on specific financial market institutions. 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(120) See Huizinga and Nicodème (2006b) for a description of 
these schemes. 
4.3.5. Conclusions: which policy to tax 
economic rents? 
The Financial Activities Tax 
Economic rents translate into higher before-tax 
company profits. If the policy goal is to reduce 
these rents in order to correct for the potentially 
distorted size and behaviour of the financial sector 
discussed above, a tax that falls directly on this 
profit is the first-best solution. Indeed, the 
European Commission (2010d) has discussed an 
increase in profits taxation (surcharge) with respect 
to the taxation of pure profits. The IMF has 
proposed a broader means, a so-called Financial 
Activities Tax (FAT). This tax is not only levied 
on profits but on the sum of profits and 
remunerations. Depending on the precise design of 
the FAT (definition of taxable profit, threshold for 
the taxation of remunerations and profits) it could 
serve two different goals. (121)  
First, its tax base would proxy value-added by 
taking the sum of cash-flow profit and 
remuneration for each tax period. It has been used 
in some countries as a surcharge applied to sectors 
that are fully or largely exempted from VAT. 
Several Member States are indeed already 
applying such schemes. Denmark applies a 
financial sector-specific tax on labour costs, which 
was increased in 2010 from 9.13% to 10.5%. 
France applies a progressive wage tax to 
companies that are not liable for VAT (or are not 
liable for VAT for at least 90% of their turnover), 
levied on the sum of gross wages paid and benefits 
in kind. (122) Finally, Italy's IRAP is a regional tax 
that is applied on profit and remunerations of 
companies. 
Second, a FAT would not directly alter market 
structures where financial institutions are active, 
since it taxes profits independently of how profits 
are earned. In this sense, it is targeted as it does not 
discriminate between different products or depend 
(121) Alternative definitions of profit and remuneration could be 
used as tax base and have been outlined by the IMF 
(2010b). Depending on the concrete design the FAT could 
be designed to mimic value-added, to tax on rents, or to tax 
risk-taking. 
(122) In 2009, the rates were 4.25% for the portion of annual 
individual wages not exceeding EUR 7,461; 8.5% for the 
portion between EUR 7,461 and EUR 14,901; and 13.6% 
for the portion exceeding EUR 14,901. 
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on the level of turnover. (123) It would however 
lead to differences in treatment between financial 
institutions which would be subject to such a tax 
and quasi-financial institutions which would be 
outside the scope of such a measure. 
Third, by designing the tax base in order to cover 
only profits above normal market returns, the FAT 
would especially fall on excessive profits from 
high risk activities. In this sense, the tax would 
reduce incentives to engage in excessive risk 
taking. While this is theoretically intriguing, it 
turns out to be very difficult to determine "normal 
market returns" in reality. (124) For capital, the 
interest rate on risk-free investments is taken and 
increased by return on risk component. The latter 
is of course difficult to estimate. For wages, 
average wages in other sectors could serve as a 
proxy. This would however not account for 
structural differences in sectors, which might lead 
to different wage structures in addition to 
potentially untaxed rents.  
An important question is whether the economic 
incidence of the tax falls on the financial sector. 
This depends on the concrete design of the tax. If it 
is only levied on "above- normal profits" by taxing 
only profits and remuneration above a certain 
threshold, that is on economic rents, there is less 
incentive to shift it to customers since the profit 
maximisation condition would be unaffected and 
marginal investments would therefore remain 
undistorted. The incidence is different when all 
remuneration is taxed. Since there is no deduction 
for business consumers, the tax burden will also 
fall on all users of financial services. The general 
cost increase would be passed on to consumers.  
Finally, a FAT would add to the existing 
incentives to shift profit via relocating profit or 
remunerations that derive from differences in 
current CIT systems. The unilateral introduction of 
a FAT triggers relocation and competitive 
disadvantage risks as in the case of the FTT. 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(123) In fact, a tax on transactions would be similar to a (gross) 
sales tax and have a cumulative effect which does not 
depend on the risk characteristics of the product traded but 
on the number of times the product is traded. 
(124) The problem of defining a notional return to equity also 
occurs in the case of Allowance for Corporate Equity. See 
Klemm (2007) for an overview of possible 
implementations. However, implementation might be more 
difficult for the financial sector given the higher risks and 
volatility in the sector. 
Nevertheless, given the nature of the base and the 
need for financial companies to generally operate 
where their consumers reside for their basic 
activities, the risk of relocation can be assumed to 
be lower than in the case of the FTT. However, 
technical developments may increase the mobility 
of the financial sector. For example, in the field of 
retail banking, the development of internet banking 
may provide opportunities for avoidance. 
The Bonus Tax 
Another aspect of taxing the financial sector is the 
recent tax increases on bonus payments in the 
financial sector. The motivation behind these was 
not in the first place to reduce risky behaviour due 
to performance related payments, but rather to tax 
the windfall gains the financial sector received 
from public support, especially in cases where a 
possible rent of the sector was captured by 
managers.(125)  
In the UK, banks paying individual bonuses will 
have to pay an additional bank payroll tax of 50% 
on excesses bonus over £25,000 (bankers will 
continue paying income tax on their bonuses). This 
is a retrospective one-off tax for the year ending on 
1 April 2010. In France, bonuses paid to bank 
employees in 2010 are also taxed at 50%. (126) 
Once approved by Parliament, the levy will apply 
to bonuses above EUR 27,500. The levy affects 
between 2,000 and 3,000 bankers working in 
France. Greece also introduced an additional bonus 
tax. Bonuses to business executives in banks and 
financial corporations are taxed with progressive 
rates ranging between 20% and 90%. Exemption is 
granted to bonuses not exceeding 10% of income, 
for incomes up to EUR 60,000. Portugal 
introduced a "penalty taxation" of bonuses or any 
other profit-based payments at the level of the 
company. If such payments to directors, managers 
and board directors represent more than 25% of 
annual salaries and have a value exceeding EUR 
27,500 (per director) a 35% penalty tax is 
applied (127); in the case of financial institutions, a 
higher 50% rate applies in 2010. 
(125) Shackelford et al. (2010) also discuss bonus taxation. 
(126) Included in the text Collectif Grand emprunt 
(127) The tax is not applied if the bonus payment is part of a 
profit-dependent deferred renumeration scheme with a 
minimum time-span of 3 years covering more than 50% of 
the amount paid. 
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A one-off ex-post measure, as introduced by the 
UK and France, would introduce only very limited 
aggregate efficiency gains or losses to the financial 
sector at large. If such a tax was introduced on a 
more permanent basis, it could have more 
pronounced effects on the stability and efficiency 
of the financial sector. It might partly correct for 
excessively high incentives in the bonus system for 
bankers to take risk. Incentive structures for 
bankers have been identified as one of the factors 
contributing to emergence of the crisis. However, 
for this purpose any approach by regulators to 
directly monitor the incentive system for bank 
managers could be a much more targeted and 
better-suited instrument. (128) For example, it 
might be the case that such a tax could be passed 
on to shareholders and would only lead to small 
changes in the behaviour of managers. The UK  
  
(128) The latest proposal by the Commission for the modification 
of the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) also tackles 
perverse pay incentives by requiring banks and investment 
firms to have sound remuneration policies that do not 
encourage or reward excessive risk-taking. Banking 
supervisors will be required to oversee remuneration 
policies and will be able to sanction banks – by placing 
higher capital requirements, via Pillar II – with 
remuneration policies that do not comply with the new 
regulations. The proposal includes principles on preventing 
remuneration policy from encouraging excessive risk-
taking, promoting long-term value creation, greater 
management responsibility, an independent internal review 
of the remuneration policy, an appropriate balance between 
fixed and variable pay, performance measurement and risk 
adjustment of performance, deferment of bonuses and 
severance pay. 
experience seems to indicate that banks are 
increasing bonuses and swallowing their losses by 
transferring them to shareholders and possibly also 
to staff in other countries which do not apply 
bonus taxes. In general, taxation of bonuses should 
be in line with overall remuneration policies. 
Hence, if bonuses are capped at a certain % of 
income, taxation should not undermine the policy 
of reducing the attractiveness of bonus payments 
by taxing them at preferential rates. 
Furthermore, a tax on bonuses – similar to the 
regulation of bonus payments - may encourage 
banks to shift the structure of pay from bonuses to 
less performance-related components (i.e. base 
salary). If the measure is taken on a single-country 
basis, there is also a risk of relocation. 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the introduction, public finances 
have deteriorated substantially during the financial 
and economic crisis due to massive and 
unprecedented fiscal interventions and fiscal 
stimulus packages, aimed at supporting the 
financial sector and aggregate demand, in 
conjunction with the operation of the automatic 
stabilisers (see Section 4.2). In principle, these 
challenges for public finances can be addressed in 
a number of ways. Past experience shows that the 
likelihood of successful fiscal consolidation 
increases when it is targeted to reducing non-
productive expenditures and strengthening 
incentives for raising investment and productive 
capacity of the economy, taking account of social 
policy considerations. (129) However, in many 
countries the sheer size of the consolidation 
requirements will make it virtually impossible to 
achieve a sustainable consolidation of public 
finances only through a reduction in expenditures. 
Given a need to also improve government balances 
through increases in revenues, it is important to 
know which changes in the tax system – not 
necessarily in the form of tax rate increases - could 
yield the required additional tax revenues, while 
bearing in mind that distortionary effects of 
taxation may impact on growth. A sound long-term 
consolidation strategy hence calls for changes in 
the structures of tax systems that take into account 
incentive effects with a view to producing the least 
distortionary effects, in particular on growth, 
investment and jobs, and make them best 
contribute to other policy goals (e.g. environmental 
or social policies). It is in this spirit that the Europe  
2020 strategy 'A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth', (130) recommends that "…where 
taxes may have to rise, this should, where possible, 
be done in conjunction with measures to make the 
tax systems more employment, environment and 
growth-friendly". 
Current tax systems are in many cases too 
complex. This is because they tend to develop in a 
piecemeal fashion, with exceptions and 
exemptions being added to address specific 
concerns as they arise, without adequate care being 
                                                          
(129) See European Commission (2010b) for an overview of the 
literature on successful fiscal consolidations. 
(130) COM(2010) 2020 final. 
taken to ensure that they do not create conflicts 
with other objectives. Against this background, a 
strategy aimed at fundamentally reforming tax 
systems leads as a rule to a better overall economic 
performance than adjustments at the margins. The 
current challenges linked to public finances offer 
an opportunity to rethink tax systems, to restate the 
objectives of taxation, assess potential conflicts 
between different objectives, and to identify what 
makes for good tax systems for the 21st century. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse possible ways 
of increasing tax revenues while preserving the 
redistributive and allocative functions of tax 
systems. In particular, it focuses on how possible 
tax revenue increases could be designed in a 
growth-enhancing way and to what extent some of 
the reforms would entail a need for coordination at 
the EU level. Coordination might be needed either 
because domestic strategies cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States acting individually 
or because they directly affect the functioning of 
the Single Market. The chapter will also address 
the recommendations on tax policy in the report 
"Towards an Economic Union: A new strategy for 
the single Market", which the former 
Commissioner Prof. Monti presented on 10 May 
2010. 
5.2. TAX LEVEL AND GROWTH 
The link between taxation and growth has been the 
focus of a large number of studies. So far, these 
studies provide only partial evidence that the total 
level of taxation, as measured by the tax-to-GDP 
ratio, impacts on economic growth. (131) The 
analysis is subject to many technical difficulties. In 
particular, the adverse effects on growth from an 
increase in taxation are, in general, at least partly 
offset by the positive growth effects of government 
spending, which in turn depends on the quality of 
government expenditure, a variable which not only 
poses difficult questions of quantification but also 
(131) See for a review, European Commission (2008a) and 
Myles (2009). Several empirical studies do in fact find a 
negative relationship between the level of taxation (or other 
measures of the government size) and GDP growth but, as 
emphasised by Myles (2009), "…none of this analysis 
escapes the fundamental observation that the lack of 
structural modelling limits the interpretation of the 
estimated equations and leaves the causality issue 
unresolved." 
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varies considerably across countries. This 
complicates considerably the task of estimating the 
pure effect of taxation on growth. (132) Moreover, 
tax levels and growth are both endogenous since 
tax levels affect growth but growth also affects the 
level of taxes collected. In addition, analytical 
approaches very often conclude that the impact of 
marginal tax rates on economic growth is more 
important than the average tax burden in the 
economy as such. This literature also provides 
empirical evidence that higher effective marginal 
tax rates and higher tax progressivity for a given 
share of tax revenues in GDP have a negative 
effect on growth, (133) but these results remain 
subject to difficulties in defining and calculating 
the overall effective marginal tax rate.  
5.3. TAX STRUCTURE AND GROWTH 
While the relationship between the overall tax 
level and growth remains uncertain, there is 
generally a better understanding of how individual 
components of the tax system affect GDP per 
capita and growth. In the current juncture, where it 
appears that tax increases are in many cases 
inevitable as part of the consolidation process, it is 
therefore important to consider which taxes could 
be raised. The structure of taxation matters 
particularly in the case of high tax-to-GDP ratios, 
which will be more likely in the years to come. 
Taxes affect economic growth through the various 
channels of growth: total factor productivity, the 
growth of the capital stock and the growth of 
labour supply. Tax policies that improve research 
and development, entrepreneurship and foreign 
direct investment enhance productivity growth. 
Tax policies that make work pay and promote 
human capital formation boost labour supply in the 
short and long term. Tax policies that encourage 
domestic and foreign investment as well as saving 
increase the capital base of the economy. These 
outcomes can be achieved in two ways: by either 
providing the right incentives within the provisions 
of specific taxes or by shifting the tax structure in a 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(132) How public expenditure affects growth is looked at in more 
detail in the Commission report 'Public Finances in EMU 
2008'. 
(133) See, e.g., Padovano and Galli (2001, 2002), Koester and 
Kormendi (1989) and Mullen and Williams (1994). See 
also Myles (2009) for a critical review of the literature. 
Note however that the analysis on progressivity is blurred 
by the statistical correlation between flat tax systems and 
low rates. 
desirable way. This applies regardless of whether 
total taxes need to be increased or not. 
At a more macroeconomic level, various studies 
(134) have shown that taxes on income are usually 
associated with lower economic growth (and so 
lower steady-state GDP) and that property and 
consumption taxes (including environmentally 
related taxes) are the least detrimental to growth. 
Personal income taxes (135) and in particular 
corporate income taxes appear to be the most 
detrimental. Corporate income taxes have a 
negative impact on capital investment and 
productivity improvements. Personal income taxes 
can affect labour supply via the reduction in the 
net wage. They also tend to have a progressive 
structure which acts to reduce growth. Moreover, 
they discourage saving by lowering the returns to 
saving. Although they can also affect labour 
supply by reducing real purchasing power, 
consumption taxes are less distortive than personal 
income taxes as they partly fall on accumulated 
assets, which are an inelastic tax base. Moreover, 
consumption taxes do not impact on the returns to 
saving and, in most cases, do not have a 
progressive tax structure. In terms of property 
taxes, an increase in recurrent taxes on immovable 
property is found to have the smallest effect on 
GDP per capita, with an increase of those levied on 
households having the least detrimental effect. 
This reflects the fact that – as discussed in chapter 
4.1.2 – currently many countries provide tax 
preferences for owner-occupied housing, which 
tends to distort the allocation of capital in favour 
of housing. Environmental taxes can help to 
internalise external effects and at the same time 
generate badly needed tax revenue. These studies 
suggest that possible future tax increases should 
consider adjustments to property taxes, 
consumption taxes and environmental taxes and be 
accompanied by measures that encourage labour 
participation, promote education and training and 
increase investment. Estimates provided by Heady 
et al. (2009) suggest that a revenue-neutral shift of 
taxes from income taxes to consumption and 
property taxes of 1% of GDP would increase GDP 
per capita in the range of ¼ to 1 percentage point 
in the long run. Obviously, the tax policy changes 
(134) See, e.g. Johannson et al. (2008), Arnold (2008) and Myles 
(2009).  
(135) In the literature, social contributions paid by employees 
and employers as well as payroll taxes are usually included 
in this item. 
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that are most likely to boost GDP in any country 
will depend on its starting point in terms of its 
current tax structure and the relative performance 
of the drivers of economic growth, i.e. labour 
supply, investment and productivity growth. 
The relationship between individual taxes and 
growth described above are confirmed by 
calculations using the European Commission's 
Quest III model. This model distinguishes labour 
taxes, consumption taxes (VAT and others), 
corporate profit taxes and property taxes (taxes on 
housing). The simulation results reported in 
European Commission (2010b) suggest that a 
consolidation through an increase in property taxes 
and VAT is the most favourable of all tax based 
consolidations as regards long run GDP growth. A 
1%-of-GDP consolidation achieved by raising 
these two types of taxes would lead to a small 
initial decline in GDP of 0.1-0.2 percent. Due to 
the fiscal space that becomes available as a result 
of the reduction in government debt, the effect on 
GDP would turn positive already after 3-4 years. 
In the long run, GDP would be higher by 0.4-0.5 
percent compared to the baseline scenario of no 
consolidation. A consolidation through increasing 
labour taxes would lead to stronger initial GDP 
losses and the long-run gains would be lower. 
While an increase in corporate profit taxes would 
lead to comparable short-term GDP losses, these 
losses build up over time as investment is 
depressed and the capital stock declines, leading to 
a sizeable GDP loss in the long-run. Similar 
simulations using the Quest III model also indicate 
that a shift from the most distortionary taxes (on 
labour and capital) to the least distortionary taxes 
(consumption, housing) could mitigate the output 
losses associated with fiscal consolidation in the 
short run and have a positive impact on GDP in the 
long run. (136) According to these simulations, a 
consolidation package relying heavily on taxing 
consumption and housing while reducing income 
taxes would only lead to a minor and short-lived 
fall in GDP. Given the rise in potential output 
entailed by such a tax reform, output would be 
almost 1 percent higher than baseline in the long 
run.   
 
                                                          
                                                          
(136) See Roeger and in 't Veld (2010) on these simulations 
combining the effects of a fiscal consolidation with that of 
shifts in the tax structure. 
It is important to have an understanding of the 
quantitative importance of the different tax 
categories in overall revenues since this can 
indicate potential limits to the proposed tax shifts. 
Whereas real estate taxes (137) and environmental 
taxes correspond to a relatively small share of 
overall tax revenues in the EU on average (making 
up around 2-3 percent and 6 percent of the total, 
respectively), the share of VAT and personal 
income taxes amounts to around one fifth each, 
with around 30% stemming from social 
contributions. (138) Differences in revenue shares 
are, however, substantial between EU Member 
States as highlighted by the discussion in chapter 
2. This is particularly so for real estate taxes, 
whose share in overall tax revenues ranges from 
less than 1 per cent to more than 10 per cent of 
total tax revenues (see Table 4.1. in Chapter 4). 
The existing tax structure and the economic 
situation in different Member States will therefore 
determine which changes in the tax structure and 
tax design can be expected to have the strongest 
impact on growth. (139)  
5.4. DESIGN OF INDIVIDUAL TAXES 
The design of individual taxes can be adapted, too, 
in order to reduce their distortionary effects on 
growth. For example, Li and Sarte (2004) find that 
tax progressivity in the PIT has a small but non-
negligible negative impact on long-run growth, a 
result which has been confirmed by later 
research. (140) Tax progressivity and high top 
marginal PIT rates reduce productivity growth, 
especially in industries characterised by high entry 
rates of new firms. Of course, tax progressivity 
might be seen as desirable for other reasons, such 
as for redistribution or stabilisation purposes (see 
Chapter 4.2). As regards VAT, a single rate VAT 
with only a few exemptions is considered 
preferable to a more complex structure, as it  
 
(137) Taxes on immoveable property or real estate mainly consist 
of regular annual levies on land or buildings (residential or 
commercial) and taxes on property transactions. 
(138) The main other tax revenue categories are taxes on 
corporate income and excise duties and consumption taxes 
(excluding VAT). 
(139) IMF (2010a) presents rough estimations for potential 
revenue increases of different types of taxes in the G-20 
countries. 
(140) See, e.g. Johansson et al. (2008) and Heady et al. (2009). 
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reduces distortions and facilitates compliance and 
tax administration. While some reduced VAT rates 
find their rationales in inducing consumption 
behaviours that promote economic efficiency or 
income redistribution, other reduced rates fail to 
find strong arguments in their favour and their 
abolition could unleash new sources of 
revenues. (141) Moreover, assistance to low-income 
households, which is one of the key arguments 
often brought forward in favour of reduced VAT 
rates, can be provided at lower budgetary costs 
outside the VAT system. (142) In general, there is a 
consensus in the literature in support of broad tax 
bases and low tax rates. A cut in inefficient 
reductions, exceptions or exemptions – the so-
called tax expenditures - which are either not 
economically justified or display incentives not in 
line with their original aims could be beneficial for 
many countries. Indeed, the revenue effects of 
properly adjusting tax expenditures might mitigate 
the size of the tax rate increase needed as part of 
the consolidation. (143) However, careful analysis 
needs to be undertaken to ensure that changes do 
indeed enhance the efficiency of the tax system. 
5.5. POTENTIAL REASONS FOR LACK OF 
GROWTH FRIENDLY TAX REFORMS 
The data presented in chapter 2 and the more 
detailed analysis in European Commission (2010a) 
illustrates that there has only been a modest shift in 
the structure of taxation in the direction of the 
above discussed growth friendly tax structures in 
recent years. The share of environmental taxes has 
even decreased. This development indicates that 
there exists significant potential for further 
reforms. But the slow progress could also be a sign 
that change is difficult to introduce. Possible 
constraints include conflicting interests such as 
diverging preferences in terms of redistribution, 
fairness aspects of the reforms, the desire to 
promote home-ownership as discussed in Chapter 
4.1, or the presence of alternative regulatory 
measures to achieve similar goals such as in 
environmental matters. 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(141) See Copenhagen Economics (2008a and 2008b). 
(142) See Heady et al. (2009) and IMF (2010a). 
(143) See OECD (2010c) for a discussion of tax expenditure 
practices in a sample of OECD countries. 
As regards redistribution it is important to note that 
presumably in many cases there is a trade-off 
between growth and equity. A shift in the tax 
structure from progressive labour taxes towards 
(potentially regressive) indirect taxes is expected 
to increase growth but might at the same time 
reduce the redistributive impact of the tax 
system(144). 
There might also be a trade-off between growth 
and the stabilisation capacity of automatic 
stabilisers inherent in the tax system. As discussed 
in Chapter 4.2, the available empirical evidence 
indicates that the loss in stabilisation by a move 
towards more growth-friendly tax structures could 
be rather limited and that a trade-off between the 
two objectives of growth and stabilisation might 
not exist at higher tax-to-GDP ratios.  
A further aspect is the impact of tax reforms on the 
price level. A substantial tax shift towards indirect 
taxes has short-term inflationary effects which – 
depending on the environment – could lead to a 
reaction from central banks with potential negative 
consequences for economic activity. Another 
aspect that has to be taken into account is tax 
evasion.  
Finally, the political economy of reforms must not 
be neglected. There is first the general issue of 
reforms normally creating winners and losers, with 
losers often small, well-defined and vocal groups, 
while potential winners are too numerous and 
amorphous to organise. The reduction of tax 
exemptions for specific groups in favour of a 
generalised reduction of tax rates would be a case 
in point. More specifically focussing on the 
political economy of tax reforms, Castanheira, 
Profeta and Nicodème (2010) show that some 
reforms that appear efficient from an economic 
point of view do not represent a political 
equilibrium. This is because they do not allow 
policy-makers to attract voters via specific 
exemptions or regimes.  
When looking at the magnitude of changes in 
recent years, it is also important to bear in mind 
that tax reforms could affect the revenues of 
different levels of government and in this case 
(144) However, this effect is unclear if one takes the entire life-
cycle into account. 
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could require adjustments in revenue sharing 
arrangements. (145) 
Finally, tax competition issues could impose 
constraints on national tax reforms. For instance, 
countries may not want to engage in tax reforms 
that act to improve their competitive position vis-
à-vis partner countries if this entails the threat of 
retaliatory measures by the latter. Such situations 
point to the potential benefits that could be reaped 
by tax coordination. 
5.6. INTERNAL MARKET AND THE ROLE OF 
TAXATION – SUGGESTIONS FROM THE 
MONTI REPORT 
Many of the above-mentioned growth-enhancing 
tax reforms can be implemented individually by 
Member States as long as they are compatible with 
the rules of the Internal Market and fulfil the EU 
legislation in tax matters, the Treaty provisions and 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
(e.g. on non-discrimination) as well as non-legally-
binding agreements (e.g. the political agreement 
not to exceed 25% for the standard VAT rate). 
Coordination at the EU level can, however, prove 
beneficial in the implementation of national tax 
policy strategies, for instance when it leads to the 
exchange of best practices or the elimination of 
mismatches between national systems. In addition, 
some reforms would benefit from coordination at 
the EU level since cross-border spill-over effects 
may constrain the taxing capacity of an individual 
Member State. This is in fact the basic argument of 
the tax competition literature. Without co-
ordination, governments apply tax rates on mobile 
factors that are inefficiently low. The reason is that 
single governments do not take into account the 
externality of capital outflows due to a tax increase 
in every other country.(146) In this sense, 
governments are in a prisoner's dilemma since the 
fiscal externality can only be internalised with co-
ordination. Finally, carried out individually, some 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(145) OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of 
Government (2010), "Fiscal Policy across levels of 
government in times of crisis". 
(146) The externalities and potential welfare losses from tax 
competition are described in e.g. Fuest et al. (2005) and 
Hemmelgarn (2007). They discuss also the counter-
argument that tax competition might be beneficial because 
it limits governments' power to excessive taxation (i.e. the 
Leviathan argument). 
tax reforms may entail a risk for the proper 
functioning of the Single Market and/or the euro. 
Copenhagen Economics (2004) looks into the 
economic effects of tax coordination in the EU. 
They find that corporate tax cooperation can yield 
some gains in GDP and welfare. This applies to 
both cooperation across the whole EU and 
enhanced cooperation among subsets of Member 
States. However, the study highlights the fact that 
the outcomes of tax cooperation are determined by 
its concrete implementation. Depending on the 
details of cooperation policies and the set of 
cooperating countries, gains can be reversed into 
losses. In particular, aggregate gains from tax 
cooperation do not automatically mean that all 
participating Member States will be better off. At 
the level of individual countries, effects can be 
large and sometimes negative. Individual countries 
may experience significant changes in economic 
activity, tax revenues and government budgets. 
While it is imperative to avoid endangering the 
Single Market with uncoordinated tax reforms, 
there are several areas in the domain of taxation 
where significant barriers still prevent citizens and 
businesses from fully reaping the benefits of an 
integrated market. The report "A new strategy for 
the Single Market – At the service of Europe's 
Economy and Society", which the former 
Commissioner Prof. Monti presented on 10 May 
2010 (147) points to these areas and indicates some 
room for improvement.(148) 
First of all, the report deems administrative and 
compliance costs stemming from the highly 
fragmented tax landscape to weigh 
disproportionally on citizens and business 
operating cross-border. Similarly, in many cases 
where a single EU framework exists, it is 
considered to lack transparency and to lead to 
loopholes. Furthermore, it opens the door to 
uncertainties about the applicable rules or to 
instances of double taxation or tax discrimination. 
Hence there is substantial scope for updating rules 
on cross-border relief and for simplifying the 
business environment for cross-border transactions 
(147) See Monti (2010). 
(148) The Commission published the Communication "Single 
Market Act" presenting initiatives to re-launch the Single 
Market on October, 7th 2010. 
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(including VAT rules), as well as for cross-border 
work by individuals.  
A second important issue discussed in the "Monti 
report" is capital tax competition. While the report 
acknowledges the potential disciplining effect on 
national budgets, it stresses that in the presence of 
progressing market integration companies pursue 
strategies of tax minimisation by looking for the 
most convenient taxation area. 
There is some evidence that capital movements to 
and from the EU and the euro area have become 
more responsive to the levels of corporate taxation. 
Cuts in corporate taxation can be seen as 
reductions in production costs which subsequently 
impact on trade between the Member States.  
As stated in the "Monti report", to keep up tax 
revenues, EU Member States have hence 
progressively shifted the fiscal burden from more 
mobile tax bases (capital income and corporate 
income) towards a more extensive taxation of less 
mobile tax bases, notably labour. This might not 
only reduce the fairness and the growth 
supportiveness of the tax system, but also impact 
on its long run sustainability, as tax avoidance and 
elusion lead to gaps in future revenue potential. 
While the drawbacks of – in particular capital - tax 
competition are clearly stated, the report does not 
consider tax harmonisation to be a realistic 
objective. This assessment is justified by the idea 
that tax sovereignty reflects preferences ultimately 
rooted in the democratic process. However, the 
report recognises the importance of closer 
multilateral coordination. 
The report identifies areas where tax coordination 
would prove particularly beneficial. 
(i) Corporate taxation, with a wider examination 
of the effects of harmful regimes, mismatches and 
other negative effects of tax competition, and the 
work towards the definition of a common base.  
 
                                                          
There might indeed be a case for implementing 
rules in computing corporate tax bases that are 
common for all Member States. Such rules would 
also be in line with the renewed fight against 
practices that artificially divert profit from where it 
is generated to minimise the tax burden. The 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) project could provide a comprehensive 
solution for removing significant tax obstacles 
from the Internal Market. It has the potential to 
allow reductions in the high compliance costs that 
multinational enterprises face in dealing with 
different tax administrations and transfer pricing 
obligations. The European Tax Survey (2004) 
estimated compliance costs at 2% of taxes paid by 
large companies. Moreover, the study identified a 
positive and significant correlation between cross-
border activity (in terms of subsidiaries established 
abroad) and the size of tax-related compliance 
outlays. Tasks related to transfer pricing 
obligations seemed to be perceived as particularly 
onerous by the surveyed multinationals, which is 
consistent with the findings of the 2001 Company 
Tax Study. According to available estimates, the 
costs of transfer pricing requirements for large and 
medium-sized multinationals would amount to 
roughly 3% of corporate income tax revenues. For 
2007, this amounts to EUR 13 billion for EU27. 
Furthermore, by introducing cross-border loss 
relief, the CCCTB could provide a solution to the 
potential occurrence of double taxation, which is 
not adequately tackled by the existing tax treaty 
network. Beyond this objective, there is a need to 
develop a coherent approach vis-à-vis third 
countries, as profit shifting does not take place 
only within the EU. For these reasons, the CCCTB 
project has gained support from business and the 
academia as well as certain tax 
administrations. (149)  
Some suggested tax reforms (e.g. CO2 taxation) 
would require an adoption of common tax bases 
and at least some agreement on minimum rates or 
a range of rates at the EU level. Moving together 
would allow the scale and the effects of the 
proposed action to be increased and  the desired 
outcome of the reform to be achieved. In 
particular, recently discussed taxes on the financial 
sector, be they financial transaction taxes (Tobin 
style or other), balance sheet levies or financial 
activity taxes as discussed in Chapter 4.3, fall in 
this category. (150)  
More generally, reforms require coordination when 
they target mobile tax bases. This does not only 
(149) Various documents on the CCCTB project can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax
/common_tax_base/index_en.htm 
(150) Potential pros and cons are discussed in European 
Commission (2010d). 
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apply to the taxation of corporations 
(multinationals in particular) but also of savings. 
The current Savings Tax Directive (151) has been 
operational since mid 2005 and is functioning well 
within its limits. There is however a need to 
improve the effectiveness of the Directive and 
close existing loopholes by broadening its scope to 
savings instruments and vehicles that are presently 
not covered. Currently a Commission proposal to 
address these shortcomings is pending before the 
Council and discussions are in the closing stages. 
This makes the Savings Directive an even more 
efficient weapon in the fight against cross-border 
tax fraud and evasion. 
(ii) Consumption taxation, particularly VAT, 
especially in the context of a trend towards 
increasing its contribution to balance national 
budgets. 
Theoretically, a shift from income taxation 
towards consumption taxation could be used by 
Member States as a tool to improve their 
competitiveness vis-à-vis other Member States 
through a so-called internal (tax) devaluation. 
Indeed, cutting labour or corporate income taxes 
and financing the reform by increasing VAT 
would lower the cost for the export sector because 
exports are not subject to VAT. Although there is 
an academic debate (152) on the adjustment 
mechanisms, the size of these effects and their 
durability, there is little doubt that they affect trade 
and capital movements at least in the short- to 
medium-term. The issue is of particular 
importance within the euro area. 
The coordination of such policies – be they an 
increase in the standard VAT rate or a limitation of 
the application of reduced VAT rates –, as 
suggested in the "Monti report", is thus supported 
by an economic rationale. However, implications 
in terms of equity (tax expenses of different social 
strata) cannot be disregarded. 
Hence the Commission will undertake a review of 
VAT systems. The key issues of this work will 
focus on the difference of treatment between 
domestic and intra-Community supplies (exempt 
cross border supplies of goods, distance sales, 
 
                                                                                                                    
(151) Council Directive 2003/48/EC 
(152) Syed and Keen (2006) and Lipinska and von Thadden 
(2009) 
reverse charge of services) and flexibility for 
Member States to set the level and scope of VAT 
rates without distorting the functioning of the 
single market. Insofar as electronically supplied 
services are concerned, the "VAT package"(153) 
changes will ensure that from 2015 taxation on 
B2C will occur at the place of consumption rather 
than the place of establishment, thus ending the 
potential for distortion that has encouraged 
suppliers to locate their activities in the country 
with the lowest VAT rate. 
(iii) Environmental taxation, which is likely to play 
a key role in the near future. 
Indeed, the evidence derived from Chapter 2 of 
this report indicates that environmental taxation 
deserves careful consideration, particularly in the 
current context of revenue shortfalls. Revenues 
from environmental taxes have been declining, as a 
percent of GDP, for several years. This may be 
justified by greater efforts done elsewhere, for 
example in emissions trading, and by the trend 
decline in energy intensity and the consequent 
decrease in energy demand, but may also to some 
extent reflect devaluation of per unit tax rates fixed 
in nominal terms if not adjusted for inflation.. 
Decreasing environmental tax revenues is at odds 
with perceptions among the general public as well 
as with often-stated policy objectives. This is an 
aspect on which some policy action might already 
be needed in the short term. The issue is not 
merely the average level of taxation of energy, but 
its differentiation. The wide divergence of taxation 
per unit of energy for some products raises the 
question of the optimal degree of differentiation 
between EU Member States that have unequal 
industrial structures, climate conditions, and 
starting positions – but belong to the same Internal 
Market. 
This is of particular concern as many reforms – 
e.g. excise duties on energy products, CO2 
taxation or auctioning of carbon emission rights – 
have an impact on the competitiveness of 
companies as the products they target constitute 
important inputs for businesses. The application of 
different rules to determine the tax base or large 
differences in rates may lead to large differences in 
(153) IP/08/208 VAT package: Commission welcomes adoption 
by the ECOFIN Council of new rules on the place of 
supply of services and a new procedure for VAT refunds 
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competitiveness. Failure to coordinate could lead 
to tax strategies that risk creating distortions in 
competition between firms located in different 
Member States and overall welfare losses.  
Bearing these issues in mind, the Commission 
plans to propose a revision of the Energy Taxation 
Directive. The objective of this proposal is to 
better reflect the EU energy and climate policy 
objectives in the taxation framework by basing 
minimum rates on CO2 and energy content. Best 
practices in market-based instruments for 
environmental policy purposes could be exchanged 
in an expert forum.  
As indicated in the "Monti report", one should 
closely follow the numerous tax reforms 
governments have introduced to support the 
economy or to consolidate public finances. The 
high integration of the economies of the European 
Union – free movement of factors, removal of 
trade and non-trade barriers and, for the euro area, 
a common currency – is not without consequences 
for the potential economic effects of tax reforms. 
This includes higher price transparency (which 
increases competition and trade), a larger mobility 
of factors (in particular capital and high-skilled 
labour), and the loss of the ability to use the 
monetary instrument and interest rates to absorb or 
adjust to domestic or external fiscal shocks. In 
particular, there can be country specific shocks in 
reaction to tax changes in a Member State that 
cannot be absorbed by changes in nominal 
exchange rates but need to be absorbed by changes 
in real wages. Moreover, asymmetric tax shocks 
could deepen the already existing inflation 
differentials in the euro area. (154)   
Even though coordination in some areas of 
taxation is necessary to guarantee the full benefits 
of the integrated market, progress in the past years 
has been slow. This can in part be attributed to a 
taxes and mechanisms and see individual 
 
(154) See European Commission (2007, pp. 23-28). 
lack of suitable pressure (or indeed incentive) for 
Member States to accept these initiatives. If, in the 
new economic and budgetary situation, this is to 
change, Member States will need to take a 
coherent overview of the interactions of different 
initiatives as part of an overall fiscal policy 
strategy covering both EU and national elements.  
Currently, some specific aspects of direct taxation 
are being discussed in the Code of Conduct Group 
on business taxation within the Council, although 
such discussion is limited by the mandate of the 
group that covers only harmful tax competition. To 
facilitate discussion towards enhanced cooperation 
and coordination in other areas of tax policy, the 
"Monti report" suggests the relaunch of a Tax 
Policy Group, chaired by the Commissioner 
responsible for taxation and composed by personal 
representatives of the Finance Ministers of the 
Member States. Arguably, tax coordination could 
contribute to the effectiveness of national fiscal 
exit strategies from the crisis.  
The Tax Policy Group should seek to identify and 
agree on areas where coordination in the widest 
sense of the term can provide a clear value-added 
for the Member States. The objective would be to 
optimise tax mechanisms while taking into account 
the rules of the internal market framework. 
Coordination should concentrate on aspects of 
taxation for which a lack of coordination between 
Member States could unduly constrain taxing 
capacities of some or all Member States or create 
unnecessary compliance costs for citizens and 
businesses. As discussed above, such areas include 
international aspects of corporate tax systems, 
taxation of highly-mobile individuals and of 
expatriates, tax obstacles to the mobility of 
workers, increasing revenues from VAT by 
broadening its tax base, the future share and cross-
border aspects of environmental taxation, as well 
as possible difficulties linked to a lack of a 
common approach to double-taxation relief. 
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ANNEX 1 
Statistical annex 
 
Table A1.1: Total taxes (incl. social security contributions) and tax structure, % of GDP, 2000-2008, EU27 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 pp change 2001-2008
Structure by type of tax
Indirect taxes 14.0 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.7 13.9 13.8 13.4 -0.3
    VAT 7.0 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 6.9 0.1
    Excise duties and consumption taxes 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 -0.4
    Other taxes on products (incl. import duties) 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.6 0.0
    Other taxes on production 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 0.0
Direct taxes 13.9 13.5 13.0 12.7 12.7 12.9 13.4 13.6 13.5 0.0
    Personal income 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.3 9.0 9.1 9.3 9.4 9.5 -0.3
    Corporate income 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.0 2.7 0.1
    Other 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 0.2
Social contributions 12.7 12.6 12.6 12.8 12.6 12.6 12.5 12.4 12.6 -0.1
     Employers´ 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.3 0.0
     Employees´ 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 -0.2
     Self- and non-employed 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 0.1
Total taxes (including SSC) 40.6 39.7 39.0 39.0 38.9 39.2 39.7 39.7 39.3 -0.3
Structure by economic function
Consumption 11.4 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 10.8 -0.3
Labour 20.3 20.2 19.9 20.0 19.6 19.6 19.5 19.3 19.7 -0.5
    Employed 18.6 18.5 18.3 18.3 17.9 17.9 17.8 17.7 18.0 -0.5
          Paid by employers 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.9 0.1
          Paid by employees 10.9 10.7 10.5 10.4 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.0 10.1 -0.6
    Non-employed 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 0.0
Capital 8.9 8.5 8.1 8.0 8.3 8.6 9.3 9.4 9.0 0.5
    Capital and business income 6.2 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.8 6.4 6.6 6.2 0.4
           Income of corporations 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.1 0.2
           Income of households 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2
Note: GDP-weighted EU27 averages. Totals may be affected by rounding. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A1.2: Development of implicit tax rates, in % 
1995 2000 2008 1995 2000 2008 1995 2000 2008
BE 43.6 43.6 42.6 20.5 21.8 21.2 25.6 29.6 32.7
BG : 38.7 27.6 : 19.7 26.4 : : :
CZ 40.5 40.7 39.5 22.1 19.4 21.1 26.3 20.9 21.5
DK 40.2 41 36.4 30.5 33.4 32.4 29.9 36 43.1
DE 39.4 40.7 39.2 18.8 18.9 19.8 21.8 28.4 23.1
EE 38.6 37.8 33.7 21.2 19.5 20.9 14.1 6 10.7
IE 29.7 28.5 24.6 24.8 25.7 22.9 : : 15.7
EL : 34.5 37 : 16.5 15.1 : 19.9 :
ES 29 28.7 30.5 14.2 15.7 14.1 : 29.8 32.8
FR 41.2 42 41.4 21.5 20.9 19.1 32.5 38.3 38.8
IT 38.2 42.2 42.8 17.4 17.9 16.4 27.4 29.5 35.3
CY 22.1 21.5 24.5 12.6 12.7 20.6 16.9 23.7 36.4
LV 39.2 36.7 28.2 19.4 18.7 17.5 20.5 11.2 16.3
LT 34.5 41.2 33 17.7 18 17.5 12.7 7.2 12.4
LU 29.3 29.9 31.5 21 23 27.1 : : :
HU 42.3 41.4 42.4 29.6 27.5 26.9 14.8 17.1 19.2
MT 19 20.6 20.2 14.8 15.9 20 : : :
NL 34.6 34.5 35.4 23.3 23.8 26.7 21.6 20.8 17.2
AT 38.5 40.1 41.3 20.5 22.1 22.1 27.1 27.7 27.3
PL 36.8 33.6 32.8 20.7 17.8 21 20.9 20.5 22.5
PT 26.5 27 29.6 18.7 18.9 19.1 21.8 33.6 38.6
RO : 33.5 29.5 : 17 17.7 : : :
SI 38.5 37.7 35.7 24.6 23.5 23.9 12.7 15.7 21.6
SK 38.5 36.3 33.5 26.4 21.7 18.4 35.1 22.9 16.7
FI 44.3 44.1 41.3 27.6 28.5 26 28 36.1 28.1
SE 45.2 46 42.1 27.6 26.3 28.4 19.9 43.2 27.9
UK 25.7 25.3 26.1 19.6 18.9 17.6 34.6 44.7 45.9
EU-27 average
weighted : 36.9 36.5 : 19.9 19.5 : : :
arithmetic : 35.8 34.2 : 20.9 21.5 : : :
EA-16 average
weighted 38.3 39.2 38.6 19.4 19.6 19.1 25.9 30.4 30.1
arithmetic 34.2 34.5 34.4 20.5 20.5 20.8 24.6 27.4 28
EU-25 average
weighted 36.9 36.9 36.6 20 20 19.5 26.8 33 32.2
arithmetic 35.6 35.8 34.6 21.5 21.1 21.4 23.2 25.6 26.5
Implicit tax rate on Labour Implicit tax rate on Consumption Implicit tax rate on Capital
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A1.3: Statutory tax rates, in % 
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
BE 60.6 60.6 53.7 53.7 20.5 21 21 21 40.2 40.2 34.0 34.0
BG 50.0 40.0 24.0 10.0 18 20 20 20 40.0 32.5 15.0 10.0
CZ 43.0 32.0 32.0 15.0 22 22 19 20 41.0 31.0 26.0 19.0
DK 63.5 59.0 59.0 51.5 25 25 25 25 34.0 32.0 28.0 25.0
DE 57.0 53.8 44.3 47.5 16 16 16 19 56.8 51.6 38.7 29.8
EE 26.0 26.0 24.0 21.0 18 18 18 20 26.0 26.0 24.0 21.0
IE 48.0 44.0 42.0 41.0 21 21 21 21 40.0 24.0 12.5 12.5
EL 45.0 45.0 40.0 45.0 18 18 19 19 40.0 40.0 32.0 24.0
ES 56.0 48.0 45.0 43.0 16 16 16 18 35.0 35.0 35.0 30.0
FR 59.1 59.0 53.5 45.8 18.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 36.7 37.8 35.0 34.4
IT 51.0 45.9 44.1 45.2 19 20 20 20 52.2 41.3 37.3 31.4
CY 40.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 8 10 15 15 25.0 29.0 10.0 10.0
LV 25.0 25.0 25.0 26.0 n.a. 18 18 21 25.0 25.0 15.0 15.0
LT 33.0 33.0 33.0 15.0 18 18 18 21 29.0 24.0 15.0 15.0
LU 51.3 47.2 39.0 39.0 15 15 15 15 40.9 37.5 30.4 28.6
HU 44.0 44.0 38.0 40.6 25 25 25 25 19.6 19.6 17.5 20.6
MT 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 15 15 18 18 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0
NL 60.0 60.0 52.0 52.0 17.5 17.5 19 19 35.0 35.0 31.5 25.5
AT 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 20 20 20 20 34.0 34.0 25.0 25.0
PL 45.0 40.0 40.0 32.0 22 22 22 22 40.0 30.0 19.0 19.0
PT 40.0 40.0 40.0 42.0 17 17 21 20 39.6 35.2 27.5 26.5
RO 40.0 40.0 16.0 16.0 18 19 19 19 38.0 25.0 16.0 16.0
SI 50.0 50.0 50.0 41.0 n.a. 19 20 20 25.0 25.0 25.0 20.0
SK 42.0 42.0 19.0 19.0 23 19 19 40.0 29.0 19.0 19.0
FI 62.2 54.0 51.0 48.6 22 22 22 23 25.0 29.0 26.0 26.0
SE 61.3 51.5 56.6 56.4 25 25 25 25 28.0 28.0 28.0 26.3
UK 40.0 40.0 40.0 50.0 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 33.0 30.0 30.0 28.0
EU-27 arithmetic 47.3 44.7 39.9 37.5 : 19.2 19.6 20.1 35.3 31.9 25.5 23.2
EA-16 arithmetic 50.4 48.4 43.0 42.4 : 18.1 18.9 19.2 37.5 34.9 28.4 25.7
Standard VAT rate Adjusted Top Corporate Tax RateTop Personal Income Tax rate
Note: The top PIT rates reflect the statutory tax rate for the highest income bracket. The rates include surcharges, state and local taxes. Only the 'basic' 
(non-targeted) top CIT rate is presented here. Existing surcharges and averages of local taxes are includes. For details of the calculation of the top PIT 
rates and CIT rates see European Commission (2010a). 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A1.4: Energy tax revenues in relation to final energy consumption 
1995 2000 2005 2008 1995 2000 2005 2008
BE 91.6 92.4 116.3 115.2 BE 97.0 92.4 106.9 97.1
BG : 36.4 61.9 109.5 BG : 36.4 52.6 71.7
CZ 38.7 55.2 96.4 132.9 CZ 50.0 55.2 93.5 127.1
DK 200.5 300.8 315.6 316.7 DK 219.2 300.8 290.3 267.8
DE 168.3 192.7 213.8 208.1 DE 172.4 192.7 206.6 193.8
EE 6.5 32.2 77.4 105.1 EE 10.0 32.2 65.4 71.5
IE 112.2 140.5 170.8 175.1 IE 133.0 140.5 154.7 153.1
EL 157.7 117.3 115.7 : EL 206.1 117.3 100.3 :
ES 128.1 137.8 140.3 148.8 ES 147.5 137.8 119.3 114.6
FR 169.1 173.2 175.3 : FR 177.0 173.2 163.0 :
IT 237.9 248.7 236.4 233.2 IT 270.5 248.7 208.0 187.4
CY 26.4 43.1 145.8 138.3 CY 30.4 43.1 128.2 110.0
LV 10.1 48.3 72.2 92.0 LV 13.7 48.3 55.1 48.4
LT 12.3 58.0 81.6 102.5 LT 14.9 58.0 78.3 78.5
LU 140.9 164.3 193.7 212.8 LU 167.8 164.3 177.7 173.3
HU 58.5 79.7 100.8 121.6 HU 110.8 79.7 86.8 98.0
MT 52.0 142.2 134.1 : MT 60.7 142.2 127.1 :
NL 112.4 154.4 197.9 221.1 NL 123.1 154.4 182.2 189.8
AT 122.8 141.8 159.6 172.4 AT 128.5 141.8 149.5 150.2
PL 20.6 58.9 95.8 131.8 PL 34.7 58.9 84.2 108.0
PT 164.6 111.8 167.5 175.0 PT 190.6 111.8 148.8 143.4
RO 15.1 58.2 59.4 79.1 RO 160.2 58.2 24.7 26.2
SI 126.0 118.3 144.9 168.8 SI 180.3 118.3 114.5 121.7
SK 29.9 42.4 77.4 107.9 SK 40.1 42.4 65.0 84.6
FI 96.7 108.7 116.0 126.5 FI 103.4 108.7 111.7 114.5
SE 138.3 182.0 210.7 218.9 SE 144.7 182.0 196.9 190.1
UK 142.6 249.5 234.9 219.7 UK 152.3 249.5 212.5 180.2
EU-27 averages EU-27 averages
GDP-weighted : 188.8 193.6 196.3 GDP-weighted : 188.8 177.4 166.4
base-weighted : 171.7 181.1 187.3 base-weighted : 171.7 165.3 158.2
EA-16 averages EA-16 averages
GDP-weighted 165.4 179.1 188.1 194.7 GDP-weighted 178.0 179.1 173.2 167.4
base-weighted 161.2 173.3 184.3 191.3 base-weighted 174.6 173.3 169.5 164.6
Nominal Real (2000 deflator)
Note: Nominal: EUR per tonne of oil equivalent; Real: EUR per tonne of equivalent, deflated with cumulative % change in final demand deflator 
(2000 = 100). 2008 are provisional data. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A1.5: The composition of tax wedge in 2009, single average income worker 
Country Tax wedge Income tax Employee SSC Employer SSC Tax wedge Income tax
Employee 
SSC Employer SSC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Belgium 55.2 21.1 10.7 23.3 -0.54 -0.50 0.00 -0.04
Hungary 53.4 15.9 12.8 24.6 -0.72 0.11 0.17 -1.00
Germany 50.9 17.3 17.3 16.3 -0.57 -0.52 -0.03 -0.03
France 49.2 9.9 9.6 29.7 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.00
Austria 47.9 12.1 14.8 17.8 -0.91 -1.05 -0.02 0.10
Italy 46.5 15.0 7.2 24.3 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00
Sweden 43.2 13.9 5.3 23.9 -1.65 -1.11 0.04 -0.57
Slovenia 42.9 9.3 18.9 14.7 -0.52 -0.20 0.00 0.30
Finland 42.4 18.6 5.1 18.7 -1.39 -0.88 0.14 -0.66
Czech Republic 41.9 8.3 8.2 25.4 -1.55 0.05 -1.05 -0.55
Romania 41.7 8.8 12.3 20.6 -1.65 0.31 -1.03 -0.93
Lithuania 41.7 15.6 2.3 23.8 -1.38 -1.38 0.00 0.00
Latvia 41.6 14.9 7.3 19.4 -0.81 -0.81 0.00 0.00
Greece 41.5 7.1 12.5 21.9 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.00
Estonia 39.5 12.6 2.0 25.0 -0.56 -0.56 0.00 0.00
Denmark 39.4 29.1 10.3 0.0 -1.28 -1.25 -0.03 0.00
Spain 38.2 10.3 4.9 23.0 0.19 0.33 0.01 -0.15
Netherlands 38.0 15.1 13.8 9.1 -0.96 1.18 -1.86 -0.29
Slovak Republic 37.6 6.3 10.6 20.8 -1.17 -1.17 0.00 0.00
Portugal 37.2 9.1 8.9 19.2 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.00
Bulgaria 35.1 7.2 10.8 17.1 -1.37 0.27 0.78 -2.42
Poland 34.0 5.6 15.5 12.9 -0.52 -0.52 0.00 0.00
Luxembourg 34.0 12.7 10.9 10.3 -1.16 -1.59 0.08 0.35
United Kingdom 32.5 14.6 8.3 9.6 -0.34 -0.21 -0.06 -0.07
Ireland 28.6 12.9 6.0 9.7 1.54 0.35 1.18 0.00
Malta 22.8 8.7 7.0 7.0 -0.81 -0.07 -0.74 0.00
Cyprus 13.9 2.1 5.9 5.9 -0.21 -0.21 0.00 0.00
EU27 39.7 12.4 9.6 17.6 -0.69 -0.36 -0.09 -0.22
Income tax plus employees' and employers' social security 
contributions (as % of labour costs, 2009) Annual change 2009/08  (in percentage points)
Note:  Data for non-OECD-EU countries (SI, LT, LV, EE and MT, BG and RO) are only available for 2008 (CY only for 2007). For these countries, 
changes in tax wedge refer to period 2007-2008 and 2000-2008 (for CY to period 2006-2007 and 2000-2007). Countries are ranked by the size of the 
tax wedge in 2009. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2 
Additional graphs 
Graph A2.1: Tax wedge development, 2000-2009 
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Source: Commission services. 
Graph A2.2: Tax progressivity, 2000-2009 
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